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Abstract 
The Solomon Islands, a nation rich in natural resources with a large and rapidly expanding youth 
population, has recently experienced severe social unrest predicated upon ethnic rivalry and 
property rights. In the actual fighting during the ‘tensions’ on both sides, the Isatabu Freedom 
Movement and the Malaita Eagle Force youth provided leadership and fighters. As youth numbers 
grow and educational outcomes decline their livelihood prospects are severely impacted in the 
nation. These outcomes could be viewed as social manifestations catalysed by a type of ‘resource 
curse’, which has been widely researched. However, much of this literature is macroeconomic in 
character and does not deal with the socio-economic dynamics involved.   
In this thesis these dynamics are analysed in detail by examining the experiences of a youth cohort 
in the capital city of Honiara. It is there that youths are impacted in the greatest number and 
studying them provides a detailed understanding of the key factors that drive the 
disenfranchisement and marginalisation of youth when resource curse dynamics are operative. Such 
dynamics are not unique to the Solomon Islands. Many resource-based nations experience sub-
optimal social dynamics which are underpinned by analogous demographic settings.      
To understand how these dynamics operate, it is necessary to examine how the political process 
works in a nation defined economically by rapid natural resource led growth and its impact upon the 
rights of the youth population. The economic future of a country such as the Solomon Islands is 
critically dependent upon the extent to which the young have property rights, appropriate education 
and employment opportunities. The thesis provides an enhanced understanding of the distortionary 
power dynamics that are operative in the Solomon Islands with lessons for other developing 
countries experiencing natural resource dependency.  
The core issue is systemic corruption fuelled by windfall gains, the youth are the generational 
conduit to such dynamics being sustained. The resource curse literature has highlighted the problem 
but has been unable to address the localised, social attributes of such effects. A focus on formal 
institutions and market-based financial prescriptions has resulted in informal cultural realities being 
largely ignored. The corruption operating in these informal spheres facilitates the manipulation and 
gaming of formalised legal institutions.    
There is an expansive literature on the impacts of resource dependency upon developing countries. 
It is a diverse, interdisciplinary and often disconnected literature. This thesis provides a critical 
evaluation of this literature and an enhanced perspective derived from this analysis. Additionally, 
literature on the role of social, political and economic institutions and how they are formed and 
maintained in different kinds of cultures was examined. It becomes clear when examining this 
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literature that the role of property rights is of fundamental importance and, therefore, the literature 
was reviewed with relevant insights distilled. Since aid flows and development finance are critical 
to economic development, the relevant literature was also reviewed in order to discover what kinds 
of financial models are appropriate for the sustainable development of resource dependent 
countries, such as the Solomon Islands.  
The thesis poses a range of specific research questions at both the country-wide level and at a 
personal level of inquiry. These were guided by the theoretical principles developed and informed 
by the literature examined. In answering these questions, a mixed methodological approach was 
applied with the case study of the Solomon Islands employed as an empirical test bed. Given the 
almost universal absence of adequate data in resource dependent countries, a case study involving 
the creation of data via survey techniques is essential. Much of the analysis has to be qualitative and 
where a quantitative technique such as econometrics can be applied to data its only use is to validate 
the presence of relationships observed in qualitative research rather than in testing hypotheses. The 
case study involved key informant interviews, round table discussions and data from survey 
questionnaires. Additionally a database which records all youth in a disenfranchised vocational 
program in the nation was employed to cross-check the representation of the youth cohort included 
in the questionnaire. This approach facilitated meaningful data collection and enabled a more 
thorough understanding of the pivotal factors that drive the emergence of power traps in the nation 
and more generally.  
The thesis offers a multi-faceted picture of the negative impacts of resource dependence in the case 
of the Solomon Islands. There is clearly strong political pressure to undermine legislation intended 
to protect local cultures and the people’s connection to the land. This is indicative of the presence of 
systemic corruption that has over-ridden well intentioned formal, codified institutions. This 
illustrates that without a critical mass of well-educated and informed citizenry, legislative loopholes 
cannot be defended against. Without a democratic system that can work effectively within the 
cultural mix that exists, decisions that disempower, marginalise and, in some instances, destroy a 
people’s culture, cannot be resisted.  Not having this democratic input means putting complete faith 
in unrepresentative actors who lead development projects and, in many instances, have a poor 
understanding of the cultural damage that is inflicted. The findings of this thesis demonstrate that 
the young generation is pivotal to the sustainability of a resource dependent developing economy 
and, therefore, it is their rights in relation to areas such as education, property, health and welfare 
that are fundamental. Furthermore, these rights must all be embedded within a specific culture that 
must be fully understood by external agencies providing aid and finance. For example, support for 
education and project finance has to be delivered in a way that is compatible with the prevailing 
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culture and is carefully designed to protect the rights of the young and negates the corrupting 
influence of power elites that are supported by foreign resource interests.   
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
“Here is your country. Cherish these natural wonders, cherish the natural resources, 
cherish the history and romance as a sacred heritage, for your children and your children's 
children. Do not let selfish men or greedy interests skin your country of its beauty, its riches 
or its romance”. ― Theodore Roosevelt 
1.1. Background 
Natural resources can provide the platform for development and improvement in livelihoods if 
managed correctly. An extensive research agenda has focused on resource abundant nations that 
have experienced negative growth outcomes coupled with severe social unrest (Auty, 1993; Sachs 
and Warner, 2001; Frankel, 2012b; Papyrakis, 2017). However, the literature has produced 
contradictory evidence and few practical measures that can be implemented in reality (Papyrakis, 
2017).  
Poor societies can, relatively speaking, gain the most from developing their own resources. The 
divergent interest of citizens and elites is mitigated via transparency and subsequent accountability 
of governments. What has become the focus of prescriptions has been to counter citizen 
misunderstandings so that accountability assists good government (Collier, 2017). Misinformation 
and propaganda perpetuate misaligned perceptions of what is being said and what is occurring in 
reality. Therefore, effective management of natural resources is promoted by prior investment in a 
‘critical mass of informed citizens who adhere to the rules and support the institutions which guide 
and implement decisions’ (Collier, 2017). However, what constitutes a ‘critical mass’ is context-
specific and will vary enormously depending upon the actual structure of political power within the 
region being analysed (Collier, 2017). Education that promotes diversified cultural capacities will 
be integral to making meaningful improvements in this regard.  
Institutions that mimic properly functioning administrative bodies do not serve to improve maladies 
associated with resource dependence and power distortion. It is difficult to build institutions that are 
effective and protected from being subverted as they require a critical mass of informed citizenry to 
operate and to defend those which are operating effectively. Declining educational outcomes that 
promote uniform cultural narratives in resource dependent economies creates a human and social 
capital deficit in this regard. Misinformation and political rhetoric can very easily gain adherence in 
such settings. Transplanting institutions into societies without an appropriate consideration of pre-
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existing cultures results in a dominant social psychology pervading both formal and informal 
institutions without appropriate contextual relevance. 
The defence of rules and institutions is the core task of informed citizens. Building a critical mass of 
such citizens is difficult and little serious analysis has yet been devoted to how it might be done 
although recent developments in social psychology and behavioural economics has propelled this 
agenda somewhat (Collier, 2017). The anthropological literature that addresses the characteristics of 
resource extraction and how it generates and reshapes social relations between corporate actors, 
state officials, and the local population promotes this agenda further (Gilberthorpe and Rajak, 
2017).  
In resource dependent nations, natural resources are the largest asset class which enable economic 
prosperity and livelihood sustention. Power distortions within the social hierarchy of nations caused 
by unequal distribution of wealth produced from these resources has led to many well documented 
crises and extreme violence (Klare, 2002; Ballard and Banks, 2003)}. The end result is 
disempowerment of individuals and local communities, with subsequent dislocation from the 
decision making processes associated with political power. The severity of such dynamics are 
largely context specific, dependent upon the type of resource, socio-political institutions and 
linkages with the rest of the economy (Papyrakis, 2017). The interaction of corporate actors with 
local communities is well detailed in (Gedicks, 1994). 
In countries such as Australia the young have political power, not so much directly but indirectly 
through the bipartisan actions of politicians that ensure useful education and training. This is 
substantially diminished for indigenous Australians. In countries such as the Solomon Islands, the 
youth have a dual exploitative burden in terms of:  
(1) Unemployment, underemployment, inadequate education and training, and absence of much in 
the way of non-resource industry which renders their political power non-existent; and 
(2) An almost complete lack of local politicians who can represent them indirectly by ensuring 
that resource companies are taxed to provide the education, training and industries that the 
young need.  
Consequently, to understand the impact and long term implications of resource curse style 
dynamics, the experiences and impact upon youth cohorts needs to be accurately understood as they 
provide an insight into what the future will look like in this regard. Not understanding them could 
be perilous and the recent ethnic tension in the Solomon Islands provides a powerful, recent 
example of the importance of this insight (KIP, 2015). To understand the implications and measure 
the effects of a resource curse style power trap, the experiences of the youth must be studied. The 
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literature associated with the resource curse, critiqued in Chapter 4, has largely missed this point. 
Youth population bulges in developing nations combine with the fact that the youth have the least 
influence in political economy power struggles over resources, creating disenfranchisement and 
marginalisation of large numbers of individuals.  
1.1.1.Renewed Perspective 
While many of these dynamics have been exhaustively researched, the problem is that a great deal 
of this evidence is contradictory due to the sub-optimal understanding of the basic, disaggregated 
human factors that drive such phenomena. This anthropological detail will be seminal to advancing 
the body of knowledge associated with power distortions caused by resource dependent 
development.  
The inherent complexity, context specificity and influence of natural resource revenues require new 
ways of thinking about and viewing the dynamics which propagate adverse outcomes. A recent 
example emphasises the psychological foundations of natural resource policies impacted by such 
power distortions (Collier, 2017). Citizens of impacted nations and communities can be either the 
victims or potential solution to such problems. Individuals who are impacted by such dynamics can 
moderate or amplify the severity of these dynamics. However, to date, they have not been the main 
focus of research.  
Outcomes are context specific and how citizens assign ownership depends upon norms and 
identities that are influenced by self-interest and politically generated narratives (Collier, 2017). In 
the absence of an active communications strategy self-serving norms are liable to be the default 
option and thereby introduce potentially serious conflicts into a society (Collier, 2017). 
When communities are influenced by narratives such as ‘the government will steal our money’, 
there will be pressure for visible consumption. A government that uses revenues for less visible 
assets will not be politically supported. Short sighted financial strategies can also cause nations to 
discount the future more heavily. Expectations surrounding the potential impacts of resource 
discoveries also need to be managed as false expectations and distorted realities can easily become 
the basis of culturally biased political narratives.  
Norms and narratives are observable beliefs. They can be quantified through responses to surveys. 
Questionnaire surveys employed within a disenfranchised youth cohort in the Solomon Islands in 
addition to testing hypotheses derived from key informant interviews and round table discussion 
seeks to advance this endeavour and provide an illustration of how this can be achieved practically.  
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Prior to such quantification, a sensible stage would be to build case studies which apply the 
approach to specific situations (Collier, 2017). It should be possible to determine with a reasonable 
degree of confidence whether changes in beliefs following a resource discovery played an important 
role in either generating conflict or encouraging populism, and whether government 
communications strategies countered or exacerbated any such tendencies (Collier, 2017).  
1.1.2.Youth Focus 
The focus of this study is on youth. Youth populations within such impacted regions are the most 
adversely affected as they will inherit the impacts of decisions made under social duress by those 
currently in power. This cohort also forms the majority of the population in developing nations 
where such dynamics are most acute and so form the critical mass of informed citizens. Many 
developing nations have declining educational outcomes which further exacerbate the problem and 
increase the susceptibility of a critical mass of citizens to lose faith in institutional structures and be 
influenced by spurious political agendas. The importance of protecting education as a basic human 
right and means of empowerment is extensively and compellingly detailed in Power (2015). 
Meaningfully designing education programs that promote diversified cultural identities and 
reinforce the rights of minority groups needs to be prioritised in this regard.  
Disenfranchised youth are not able to participate in the process of decision making, compounding 
their vulnerability and susceptibility to adverse outcomes. They are largely detached from the rules 
and institutions that govern decisions and evoke change. In acute circumstances, this leads to 
displacement, disenfranchisement and livelihood destruction in addition to violence, substance 
abuse and suicide. The magnitude of youth cohorts in countries impacted by power distortions 
associated with natural resource dependence further emphasises the need to improve the knowledge 
and understanding of this domain. There is a pressing need to understand these issues with new data 
and research agendas that focus on such individuals.  
1.2. Case Study of the Solomon Islands 
After extensive scoping research, the Solomon Islands was selected as an appropriate and important 
case study to explore the story of disenfranchised youth in a natural resource dominated economy 
with declining educational and social outcomes. Severe civil unrest, underpinned by external 
intervention and domestic tribal rivalry in the region has resulted in external military and police 
forces being required to restore order (Hameiri, 2007; Hayward-Jones, 2014). Declining educational 
outcomes coupled with livelihood instability has resulted in large numbers of disenfranchised and 
marginalised youth living on the fringes of society in the capital city of Honiara. Given the 
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declining state of human capital in the nation underpinned by economic stagnation and an 
underfunded educational system it would appear that an external military presence has restored 
order but has not addressed the underlying causes of the social unrest. This military presence is now 
being scaled back, with efforts to withdraw entirely. Understanding how to address, understand and 
manage the underlying issues that have resulted in this social upheaval is not only a pressing 
concern at present but integral to the success of the nation in the future. Many interventionist 
strategies attempt to manage the risk of state failure by focusing on institutional factors that 
promote liberal market led development along the lines prescribed by the dominant international 
development orthodoxy (Hameiri, 2014). 
Within the Solomon Islands, logging, as one example of natural resource exploitation, functions as 
a kind of primitive accumulation, destroying subsistence production habitats without providing 
long-term benefits (Allen, 2011; Allen and Porter, 2016). The resource rents are divided unequally 
between both foreign loggers and local elites, which include those that are able to assert authority 
without meaningful accountability to the community (Hameiri, 2014). 
International military and police intervention in the Solomon Islands has demonstrated the massive 
limitations of approaches that seek to promote peace through liberal market-led development 
(Hameiri, 2007; Hameiri, 2014). The promotion of economic development in this way has, in effect, 
accelerated primitive accumulation without proletarianisation.  
Without a critical mass of informed citizenry, institutions, formal or informal will be manipulated to 
the benefit of those in power. The nation at present, due to the course of its history, has a 
problematic set of institutions and a surrounding social reality that must be acknowledged and dealt 
with.  
Investing in an informed citizenry which could improve the functioning of these institutions can 
lead to local people making well informed decisions about the future of their nation. There will 
always be trade-offs between development ideologies. At present, the overly accommodating 
acceptance of foreign investment and market-based solutions is, in most instances, counter-
productive to local people and has resulted in a severe under-valuation of their natural resources 
(KIP, 2015). The power structures that facilitate this are seminal to the preservation of such 
outcomes. Furthermore, the best development trajectory for the nation’s resources may be to 
preserve them and derive value from the natural environment of the Solomon Islands in non-
extractive enterprises. How these decisions and trajectories unfold will be highly politicised.  
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Key aspects of the Solomon Islands relevant to the study include: 
 The Solomon Islands’ current political system seems to be a recipe for instability (Allen and 
Dinnen, 2015; Allen and Porter, 2016). Prior to independence, which was implemented in 
1978, the Solomon Islands were simply a chain of islands operating under different 
traditional and unwritten sets of norms and values. Leadership existed, even if the approach 
varied among the different societies. 
 The Melanesian leadership concept known as the “Big Man” system has been an integral 
part of the fabric of the nation’s culture. How this power was used and was bequeathed 
differs greatly given the dissection of tribal identities and patrilineal and matrilineal societies 
that exist within the one nation (KIP, 2015).  
 Upon gaining independence a Westminster parliamentary democracy was established under 
the Solomon Islands 1978 Constitution and remains the political system used in the country 
today. Although tribal wars between some of the islands did occur, by and large leadership 
and politics during the pre-independence era was stable, with the people respecting an 
authority that was directly responsible for their subordinates. This stability changed with the 
imposition of an open democratic electoral system (KIP, 2015). 
 Today, The Solomon Islands still maintains the traditional leadership system in rural areas 
but it is rarely effective in practice. People tend to see their local members of parliament as 
their saviour, someone they choose so that they can be assisted in return (KIP, 2015). 
 This Westminster system combined with the electoral process has created a broad political 
spectrum whereby competition for leadership within the hierarchy of the system becomes 
never ending. Parliamentarians push their own agenda, in a constant power struggle. People 
are no longer seen as citizens but as servants of an agenda, with less pride in their national 
identity, but prepared to give blood for the sake of their tribal identity. This is unfortunately 
a recurring theme globally (Jegede et al., 2015). 
 The concept of power struggle and power distortion in the Solomon Islands context is both 
obdurate and damaging. For one thing, political leaders tend to quickly forget their 
mandates, instead pushing their own agenda. Second, the constant power struggles have 
proven to be a huge distraction. Instead of doing what they were elected to do, the 
government is more obsessed with maintaining its numbers (KIP, 2015). 
 The power structure becomes particularly threatening when they begin to involve ethnic 
groups of special interests. When this happens, it weakens the very foundation of the 
Solomon Islands as an integrated state of multiple islands, and it can result in fragmented 
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political interests that can lead to even greater instability and tension. This occurred during 
the severe upheaval and ethnic tension which reached a tipping point in 1999 (Moore, 2004). 
The Solomon Islands is very susceptible to this dynamic reoccurring and it has been 
managed with the use of non-domestic military and police force (Hayward-Jones, 2014). 
The result of the violence associated with the ethnic tension has been negative economic 
outputs, a weak political system, poor social services, and declining living standards for the 
entire population. 
 The current electoral system is not the best tool for solving these challenges. The 
transplanted system of governance also has many flaws and does not seem to fit the setting 
at all. Changing the system is the only solution for genuine transformation in the country, 
and in saying this citizens must be proactive and play an important role in the process. 
Although it is a stretch to think that it could return to its traditional leadership system, the 
Solomon Islands could surely at least revisit its traditional concept of leadership and try to 
create an applicable hybrid model that could be tested carefully before it is adopted. Given 
the small population size and relative diversity, if managed and guided properly the nation 
could provide examples for the rest of the world with respect to evolving such systems. The 
youth of today will inherit the system that is left behind. The evidence illustrates that this is 
a worrying reality given the current social unrest in the nation. Although research has been 
undertaken on children in the nation the distinction of youth cohorts and associated 
understanding is noticeably lacking (Mollica, 2017). This point is well addressed and 
examined within Mollica (2017).  
The focus of the empirical analysis will be on a disenfranchised youth cohort in the capital city, 
Honiara. A focused discussion will identify factors that have had overwhelming effects with respect 
to disempowerment. This will be fused with factors of relevance highlighted within relevant 
literature that will be outlined separately throughout the thesis. This refined discussion in addition 
to new data will contribute towards the nations’ understanding of what impact growth underpinned 
by natural resource assets, ill-defined property rights, cultural disintegration and legal pluralism can 
have with respect to the development outcomes (economic and social) for the nation.  
It is the youth who are the next custodians of these issues and the current victims that have little 
power to evoke any meaningful change. Continued disagreement and inability to plan for the future 
in the Solomon Islands will impact upon future generation’s livelihoods. In addition to the personal 
cost involved, youth disenfranchisement has clear costs to society in terms of wasted talent in the 
form of human capital and the likelihood that embittered and disenfranchised young people will 
turn to crime and violence to vent this frustration (Anderson, 1998; Argenti, 2008; OECD, 2016).  
 
22 
Declining educational outcomes and a growing youth population in the Solomon Islands is 
contributing to a critical mass of uninformed citizenry, which promotes misunderstanding, 
minimises accountability of governments and fosters information asymmetries which perpetuate 
power distortions and cultural divides. As the population is one of the fastest growing in the pacific 
region proportionally, this is a pressing concern that requires solutions and well guided research.  
The explicit link between natural resource led development, disenfranchised youth and power 
dissemination in developing nations is rudimentary. The revenues from a nation’s resource pool are 
being diverted from where investment is required. For institutions that manage this wealth to 
function properly an informed and educated citizenry is a requisite input. For the Solomon Islands, 
investment in education and overall education standards are rapidly declining (KIP, 2015). This 
causal loop can easily become a positive feedback loop once a critical mass of factors aligns, 
evidence of this would be the recent ethnic tension. Military forces were installed with the objective 
of bringing peace to the nation (Hameiri, 2007). If the underlying symptoms however have not been 
addressed this would seem to be a temporal, transplanted solution with no domestic foundations that 
could ensure long term realisation (UNICEF, 2014).  
1.3. Study Objectives and Research Questions 
As outlined above, the literature to date has highlighted many important issues surrounding the 
impact of natural resource led economic development. What needs to be understood to reduce the 
contradictory nature of research is an enhanced perspective of the individual and social realities that 
constitute impacted communities. The focus of this study is on disenfranchised youth within those 
communities. The objective of the thesis is to more accurately determine the impact of the 
politicised assignment of rights on youth populations in regions economically defined by rapid 
natural resource led growth, legal pluralism and cultural de-generation. The research can provide an 
enhanced understanding and way of exploring distortionary power dynamics in regions that are 
impacted by disparate development agendas associated with natural resource dependency.  
Under this broad study objective are a series of specific research questions that will be investigated 
as part of the study. Systematically these can be organised into more broad state level factors and 
individual disaggregated life condition factors.  
State Level 
 How can power distortions underpinned by wealth from resource extraction be better 
defined and studied? 
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 What are the key contributing factors of power distortions predicated on natural resource 
dependence at a state level? 
 Why are the rent-seeking elite successful in sustaining their power in some countries but not 
in others?  
 Can international collective action be strengthened to modify the behaviour of rent-seeking 
elites in affected countries with a critical mass of informed citizens?  
 What can be done to mitigate and improve the current situation at a state level in the region 
and can this be applied in other settings? 
 How can citizen misunderstanding and cultural degeneration be countered to promote good 
government? 
Individual Level 
 What are the key characteristics of marginalised youth in such regions?  
 Can a disaggregation of pivotal factors be used to remedy prescriptions to current resource 
development issues? 
 How are disenfranchised individuals impacted? 
 What are the key contributing life condition factors that amplify power distortions at an 
individual level? 
 Do vocational programs assist in making up the shortfall in educational outcomes? 
 What is the current sentiment towards the government amongst the youth population? 
 What is the youth’s role in the political process? What is the legal voting age, is there a 
national youth policy?   
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1.4. Outline of Methodological Framework 
Systematically, the research is structured in line with the conceptual framework presented in Figure 
1.1. Initially questions associated with broad, overarching state level functioning of power are 
investigated within seminal literature so as to provide the basis of understanding needed to further 
disaggregate and refine analysis. In addition, extensive key informant interviews are carried out to 
better ground the research in the contextual reality of the Solomon Islands. Systematically, the 
research questions centre on two distinct themes; those relating to the state level political economy 
functioning of power, and individual life condition factors perpetuating such dynamics within 
communities.  
 
Figure 1.1. Power Distortion Complex 
Deficiencies in the literature and limitations associated with data in developing nations where 
power distortions are most acute are identified along with useful insights to come out of the existing 
research. The conceptual framework guiding this research fuses research from a number of fields 
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relating to resource led development. The framework builds on an international exchange and 
professional collaboration by the author with Professor Stein Holden. The original state level power 
trap complex of Holden (2009) was retained and combined with factors identified in this research to 
develop this framework further. 
Disaggregated individual factors and additional state factors investigated as part of the Solomon 
Islands case study provide a more detailed and nuanced understanding of these dynamics. The case 
study seeks to better understand the problems effecting the youth in a nation where 
disenfranchisement, marginalisation and civil unrest is prevalent. Leading authors have promoted 
this form of disaggregated understanding to improve knowledge of such dynamics and social 
ailments (Ross, 2014; Collier, 2017; Papyrakis, 2017). Key informant interviews, round table 
discussions and focus groups were used to further promote this understanding before surveys were 
used to assess factors of importance. This qualitative research has been an integral component of 
this study due to the quantitative limitations associated with data collection.  
The survey questionnaires are associated with other related surveys including:  
 Solomon Islands People Survey (ANU, 2011); 
 PNG LSMS Survey1; 
 Tailored synthesis of survey questionnaires employed by Professor Holden within the 
context of the Solomon Islands (see, for example, (Holden and Otsuka, 2014).  
The objective of these surveys is to be able to more accurately define and characterise 
disenfranchised youth in a nation defined by power distortions associated with windfall natural 
resource wealth. This characterisation allowed for a more nuanced understanding of contributing 
factors within the power distortion complex at an individual and state level. The previous 
framework was solely focused on state level dynamics. The intent of the survey questionnaires 
significantly promoted the understanding of contributing factors at both a state and individual level 
as well as providing a basis for triangulation of information gathered in key informant interviews 
and round tables.  
Based on the assessment of Collier (2017) it would appear that the Solomon Islands is indeed an 
appropriate and embryonic natural experiment setting that, when researched, could greatly improve 
the understanding of power dynamics associated with natural resource development in a developing 
nation.  
                                                          
1
 Papua New Guinea Household Survey (1996). Accessed online via the World Bank Living Standards Measurement 
Study Database at: http://go.worldbank.org/CJ9LIGVJ00 
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Insight gained from four years of nationwide interviews and personal, in country, experience is 
included and interspersed throughout the thesis where pertinent. There is not a section solely 
dedicated to information collected from these interviews, rather the information and insight is 
applied where it adds richness to the analysis or discussion. 
1.4.1. Mixed Methods  
Given the raison d'être of this thesis within the context of the Solomon Islands a mixed methods 
methodology has been chosen for myriad reasons. Original scoping research and key informant 
interviews led to the conclusion that there was a severe lack of data or patchy data which may have 
been relied upon to support preliminary analysis. The prevalence of corruption greatly compounds 
this issue. Although surveys have been carried out in the nation from a social perspective, youth 
have not been the focus and in many instances it has only be the head of the household who has 
provided feedback (KIP, 2015). More recently a youth focus has become more obvious, see for 
example Quinn (2016). 
To gain a more comprehensive understanding of the youth both qualitative and quantitative 
approaches to research need to be combined. The qualitative dimension of this research has 
grounded the theoretical understanding garnered from the literature and contextually framed the 
understanding required to develop quantitative findings. A mixed-methodology approach has 
allowed for rich qualitative understanding to be combined with quantitative analysis of 
disaggregated points of interest. This allows for more detailed insights to be derived from the case 
study and the dynamics that present socially as complex and multi-faceted. 
1.5. Synopsis 
The thesis initially details the conceptual framework that has guided this research. This will provide 
the structure and guide relevance of the concepts and theories introduced. Initially broad, related 
concepts that have formed the basis of understanding within this realm will be explored to minimise 
confusion and draw together useful veins of research that have previously been presented in a more 
isolated fashion. By way of an overview the thesis will then become more refined in the scope of 
analysis after each chapter, focusing on aspects which add to the understanding of power distortions 
in natural resource dependent economies. These key research arenas will elucidate weaknesses in 
how such issues are currently viewed but also harvest the most useful findings to create an 
improved understanding of what is really driving power distortion dynamics. This will culminate in 
a detailed exploration and analysis of the selected case study of the Solomon Islands and a cohort of 
disenfranchised youth in a country displaying acute symptoms of natural resource windfall wealth 
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induced power distortion. Within the course of this research it was the questionnaire, round table 
discussion and key informant interviews that aided in the formulation of the more disaggregated 
power distortion factors. The case study associated with this research and the analysis are presented 
in the latter sections of the thesis due to the intuitive flow that progresses from broad concepts to 
progressively more granular concepts and on the ground realities.  
Sequentially the thesis can be summarised as follows: 
 Chapter 2 details the conceptual framework which has guided this research.  
 Chapter 3 then introduces the key theories and critiques the scholarly enquiry into 
understanding the politicisation of power in nations influenced by windfall psychologies 
stemming from natural resource wealth. Many of the associated theories have overlapping 
themes that require disaggregation and further exploration with respect to the applicability to 
the case study.  
 Chapter 4 explores and critiques the resource curse literature which is the most extensive, 
yet contradictory due to its contextual nature. Points of confusion will be highlighted and 
consistent findings will be collated to invigorate this extensive literature with respect to 
providing additional insight to related themes and research objectives in this thesis. 
 Chapter 5 details the history and diversity of the institutions that form an integral part of 
politicised power relationships at any level of society. Disaggregating these factors in a 
meaningful fashion can significantly reduce confusion and complexity stemming from the 
underlying heterogeneity of institutional arrangements. This chapter simplifies and 
synthesises this diversity guided by the notion that culture should be codified into a nations 
laws. Although on the surface this would appear to be the case in the Solomon Islands a 
closer inspection reveals the corruption mechanics that are rendering well intentioned legal 
structures powerless and manipulable.  
 Chapter 6 emphasises and explains the overwhelming impact of property rights and property 
rights institutions in natural resource led development power struggles. Property rights and 
land ownership provide the initial access point and underlying justification of ownership 
structures that cause severe unrest and conflict. These rights are seminal to the development 
trajectories of natural resource assets.  
 Chapter 7 explores the idiosyncratic attributes of natural capital and the processes of 
financial transformation that are required to give natural resources value within the modern 
economy and globalised marketplace. How this process of commodification intersects with 
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social and human capital in the Solomon Islands will be explored to set the scene for the 
case study.  
 Chapter 8 introduces, with relevant and topical detail, the study setting and the case study 
(The Solomon Islands). This chapter provides not only background on why the Solomon 
Islands was chosen as a useful case study to expand knowledge of the aforementioned 
themes but also the importance and significance of youth populations. Influential dynamics 
impacting youth disenfranchisement in the nation is explored as well as programs that 
attempt to redress these issues.  
 Chapter 9 then presents the findings from the characterisation of a cohort of disenfranchised 
youth in the Solomon Islands’ capital city of Honiara. This characterisation draws together 
the findings of key informant interviews, focus group discussions and survey questionnaires 
to better frame the realities that current marginalised youth in the nation are experiencing.  
 Chapter 10 draws together the findings of this characterisation and highlights the failures of 
culturally insensitive education programs which have garnered overwhelmingly negative 
results in the past. Additionally one practical alternative to funding capital intensive 
infrastructure projects, an acute issue for the nation with respect to internal empowerment is 
outlined and discussed.  
 Chapter 11 reflects upon key research questions. This chapter also addresses the 
contribution of this thesis to the field and the implications of the research for the people of 
the Solomon Islands.  
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Chapter 2 – Conceptual Framework and Power Dynamics 
“Knowledge is power. Information is liberating. Education is the premise of progress, in 
every society, in every family” – Kofi Annan 
 
2.1. Overview 
The conceptual framework used to explain and discuss individual and state level power dynamics is 
outlined in this chapter. The literature used to develop this framework and that forms the basis of 
the logic applied within this thesis will initially be explored to further elucidate and substantiate the 
importance of identified veins of research. A brief diachronic analysis of seminal world history 
literature in Section 2.2 provides a broader sense of how societal change has occurred. The 
Solomon Islands is in a transitory phase and current population growth rates indicate that rapid 
social change will ensue. A natural resource windfall would catalyse this rate of change from an 
economic perspective. Given the recent violence that has arisen in the Solomon Islands, the need for 
social discourse and understanding how social change can occur peacefully in a rapidly changing 
environment is timely and essential. Section 2.3 outlines the refined logic applied to analyse these 
dynamics more effectively.  
2.2. Historical Perspective of Social Change 
Hegel, in ‘Phenomenology of Spirit’, first published in 1807, argued that every era could be looked 
at as a repository of a particular kind of wisdom (Heidegger, 1994). Progress is never linear; there is 
wisdom as every stage. Hegel believed that being an historian involved the collection of those ideas 
of the past which can compensate for the blind spots of the present. Synthesising the literature to 
contribute to the understanding of power distortions in natural resource led economies follows this 
logic.  
Hegel believed in finding a new solution that manages to synthesise the good qualities of the 
previous solutions. In the ‘Philosophy of World History’, first published in 1830, Hegel details the 
thesis, antithesis and the synthesis. This is well summarised in Hegel et al. (1975). Hegel believed 
that the world makes progress by lurching from one extreme to another as we seek to 
overcompensate for a previous mistake. He proposed that it takes three moves before the right 
balance on any issue can be found. Subsequently, history moves forward in a dialectical way. This 
theory was developed upon the complex twists and turns of the modern state evolving through such 
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periods of turmoil as the French revolution. Marx and Engels responded to Hegel’s thesis, antithesis 
and synthesis with their materialist reconceptualization and the history of the world being a history 
of class struggles (Marx and Engels, 2009). There is also a Weberian critique of Hegel’s 
conceptualisation detailed within Weber (1978).  
Habermas agrees with the notion of Hegel’s dialectic, the problem being that it occurs through 
violence (Habermas et al., 1985). Habermas wanted to replace violence with discourse. 
Communicative action is any social interaction which is accepted uncritically by the particular 
population in question. However discourse is any social interaction involving opposing or altering 
viewpoints aimed at achieving a new rational consensus. Discourse comes into play any time there 
is a conflict, when one culture clashes with another. This is particularly relevant to the negative 
dynamics associated with a new natural resource discovery although discourse does not always 
prevail (Ballard and Banks, 2003; Le Billon, 2004).  
Edmund Husserl (1936) introduced the concept of ‘lifeworld’ in his book, ‘The Crisis of European 
Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology’. Here he introduced us to the concept as the dynamic 
background of all shared human experience. The lifeworld is a grand theatre of objects variously 
arranged in space and time relative to perceiving subjects. This forms the basis or platform for all 
shared human experience (Husserl, 1970). The lifeworld can be thought of as the horizon of all our 
experiences, in the sense that it is that background upon which individuals act (Ion, 2015). The 
lifeworld cannot, however, be understood in a purely static manner. It is not an unchangeable 
background, but rather a dynamic horizon in which we live, and which ‘lives with us’ in the sense 
that nothing can appear in our lifeworld except as lived (Schutz, 1970; Schutz and Luckmann, 
1973). Habermas looks at the dual nature of society in terms of the lifeworld and the system. As a 
key point of differentiation Husserl is more interested in consciousness where Habermas is much 
more interested in discourse (Ion, 2015). Given the multiple cultural identities in the Solomon 
Islands designing meaningful education outcomes which consider and promote these identities will 
be crucial to how individuals fit within the fabric of the nation and experience their life.  
The lifeworld is governed by communicative action, which is action orientated towards coming to a 
mutual understanding. Therefore the lifeworld is open to dialogue and practical rationality. The 
system world on the other hand is made up of objective social structures which mediate social 
relations. This distinction and logic frames the conceptual understanding required to design 
meaningful education systems that promote diversified cultural capacities. The key difference being 
that the system world has its own technical rationality as opposed to the practical rationality of the 
lifeworld. It has its own internal logic, which may or may not be consistent with the lifeworld. The 
two impact upon each other intimately and each requires citizenry input and consensus. One could 
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regard the current education system in the Solomon Islands as promoting external lifeworld realities 
that are not transplantable into domestic realities, nor do they promote pride in cultural diversity. 
However,  
Systems are built up through education and steering media that objectify social relations such that 
there is no interpretive understanding required to participate in these systems. Money is a great 
example of this. Market relations do not require people to have the same culture, speak the same 
language or even understand what the other person is saying at all. It is just an exchange of goods 
and that is the limit of that social relation. Another example is political power where individuals are 
made to understand authority based upon an individual occupying a seat of office. 
The colonisation of the lifeworld occurs when the technical rationality of the system comes to 
annex the lifeworld so that instrumental rationality gains communicative power and penetrates 
social discourse. This creates illegitimate social norms which are justified by the technical 
rationality of the system rather than by the discursive rationality of the lifeworld. Instrumental 
reality is defined as, a specific form of rationality focusing on the most efficient or cost-effective 
means to achieve a specific end, but not in itself reflecting the value of that end. This strikes at the 
core of social logic driving resource extraction regimes.  
Such systems need to be re-grounded in the lifeworld from an anthropological perspective. 
Democratisation of communicative power can strengthen the public sphere, which is an area of 
social life where discursive relations come to interpretive agreement. Systems that serve the public 
sphere and dissolve hierarchical bias can improve the requisite social fabric required for meaningful 
discourse.  
Self-deception, and thus systematically distorted communication, is possible only when the 
lifeworld has been 'colonised' by instrumental rationality. Here a social norm comes into existence 
and enjoys legitimate power even though it is not justifiable. This occurs when means of mediating 
instrumental ideas gain communicative power such as when financial or administrative resources 
are used to advertise a viewpoint. When citizens take the resulting consensus as normatively 
relevant, the lifeworld has been colonised and communication has been systematically distorted. 
The 'colonisation' metaphor is used because the use of steering media to arrive at social consensus is 
not native to the lifeworld. The decision making processes of the systems world must encroach on 
the lifeworld in a way that is in a sense imperialistic: ‘When stripped of their ideological veils, the 
imperatives of autonomous subsystems make their way into the lifeworld from the outside—like 
colonial masters coming into a tribal society—and force a process of assimilation upon it. The 
diffused perspectives of the local culture cannot be sufficiently coordinated to permit the play of the 
metropolis and the world market to be grasped from the periphery’ (Oliga, 2007). 
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Extending upon this logic, epistemological constructivism is based on the notion that cognitive 
development depends on two determining factors. On the one hand, cognitive development is 
dependent on a persons own, individual cognitive structures. On the other hand, it relies on the 
persons environmental conditions. Accordingly, the main focus is placed on the relationship 
between the social and material environment of a person (objective reality or life conditions) and on 
the individual perception (subjective experience or lifeworld).  
Kraus reformulates Husserl’s lifeworld concept in a systemic, constructivist way (Kraus, 2014; 
Kraus, 2015). Kraus defined "lifeworld" and "life conditions" as follows: 
 Life conditions, mean a person’s material and immaterial circumstances of life; 
 Lifeworld means, a person’s subjective construction of reality, which he or she forms under 
the condition of his or her life circumstances" (Kraus, 2015). 
This logic underpins the conceptualisation of state power distortion factors, individual life condition 
factors and the experienced reality supported by the cultural background and subsequent identity of 
persons within communities.  
2.3. Conceptual Framework 
The logic outlined in Section 2.2 has been applied to the state and individual factors that are driving 
power distortions and resultantly underpinning the systematic separation of individual and state 
level factors as defined in this thesis. State level factors are illustrated in Figure 2.2 with individual 
life condition factors in Figure 2.3. The lifeworld in Kraus’s terminology within the conceptual 
framework applied in this thesis can be viewed as the outcome of combining individual life 
condition factors with the broader factors relating to the social and economic environment fostered 
by state.  
This logic has been augmented and applied to the objective factors that are driving power 
distortions at both the individual and state level. At either level, when a critical mass of de-
stabilising factors is reached a self-reinforcing lifeworld power trap ensues (see Figure 2.1). The 
application of this logic can greatly assist in understanding how individuals are empowered and 
how they can become perpetually powerless and victims of a dictatorial regime at a local or state 
level.  
A distinction also arises between individual and state factors. State factors have an overwhelming 
impact on any individual factors and can over-ride gains made in individual empowerment. Figure 
2.1 outlines the power trap that ensues when a critical mass of factors aligns at a state level, 
becoming self-generating. A disaggregation of these factors is presented in Figure 2.2 and 2.3. 
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These factors are intrinsically linked, and the overall conceptual framework that illustrates these 
connections and relationships is presented in Figure 2.4. A power trap can result at both levels of 
disaggregation. The impact of an individual power trap may be localised however when 
destabilising state factors accumulate to reach a critical mass, this can impact the entire complex 
and lead to, in acute circumstances, severe economic instability, violence and societal chaos. This 
has been the case recently in the Solomon Islands. 
2.3.1. Distortionary Factors 
Distortionary factors that over-ride the impact of potentially empowering factors are context 
specific. These factors operate at multiple societal levels and can be efficient blocking or 
amplification mechanisms to socially equitable growth and are subsequently defined as power 
distortion factors modelled on the preliminary work of Holden (2009). This original work focused 
on broad, high level institutional dynamics and associated social realities. This thesis and 
conceptual framework emphasises and approaches the problem from a more disaggregated and 
granular perspective.  
When positive factors align, power traps are avoidable, individuals are empowered and state level 
factors harbour a social environment that is stable, equitable and sustainable. The framework is not 
specific to developing nations and could be used to study analogous social dynamics in any region 
with the appropriate supporting contextual understanding and data.  
A clear distinction to make is that an individually empowered citizen can still experience a 
lifeworld power trap if state factors are overwhelming. An educated and informed citizenry can 
combat this in a democratised public sphere with discourse that highlights such deficiencies and 
seeks to address them. Accumulating a critical mass of citizenry on such factors takes time and can 
be a very slow process depending upon the surrounding social fabric and capacity of formal 
institutions. Social maladies associated with substance abuse and long-term disenfranchisement 
compound this issue. Seminal literature outlines how these factors can feed into and strengthen 
poverty trap
2
 style dynamics which again can lead to more rapid social unrest and 
disenfranchisement in some instances (Carter and Barrett, 2006; Sachs, 2006; Kraay and McKenzie, 
2014).  
In essence, this conceptual framework provides the foundation of understanding for grounding 
economic analysis in the social realities in which they are operating. Improving the understanding 
of these embedded realities can enhance overall understanding of power dynamics and improve the 
livelihoods of those individuals suffering from the associated maladies.  
                                                          
2
 Any self-reinforcing mechanism which causes poverty to persist. 
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Figure 2.1. State Level Power Trap (Self-Reinforcing/Natural Resource Based) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2. State Level Power Trap Factors 
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Figure 2.3. Individual Level Power Trap Factors 
 
 
Figure 2.4. Power Distortion Complex (Overall Conceptual Framework) 
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Figures 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 illustrate that there can be extreme, moderate and ideal situations that 
contribute towards overall stability or instability. The reality is that no nation has the perfect 
solution and so there will always be factors that are better or worse than others. Learning from past 
mistakes in this regard could however dramatically improve the design of any system moving 
forward which seeks to combat such dynamics. The key point is that there is a tipping point, that 
once reached, can take a long time to reverse. This tipping point triggers a positive feedback loop, 
amplifying the effects of other factors on the complex. Many powerful examples abound from early 
civilisations through to modern examples in countries like Venezuela, Zimbabwe and Argentina 
(Galeano, 1997). Venezuela’s downfall was catalysed by Dutch disease and resource curse effects 
stemming from oil wealth (Hausmann, 2003). Zimbabwe’s agricultural and natural resource wealth 
and the power void left after claiming independence triggered a rapid demise of the nation’s 
economy (Brett, 2005). In Argentina the selling of its state owned enterprises and assets influenced 
by exchange rate pegs and international currency pressures resulted in a collapse of the nation’s 
once prosperous economy (López Murphy et al., 2003).   
2.3.2. Power 
Kraus developed a special form of constructivism which deals with the epistemological perspective 
of power (Kraus, 2014). Instead of focussing on the valuation and distribution of power, Kraus 
confronts what the term describes. Coming from Max Weber’s definition of power, the definition of 
power is split into instructive power and destructive power. Instructive power means the chance to 
determine the actions and thoughts of another person, whereas destructive power means the chance 
to diminish the opportunities of another person. Importantly educational outcomes can fit into both 
categories and therefore have the ability to influence both instructive and destructive power 
dynamics.  
How significant this distinction really is becomes evident by looking at the possibilities of rejecting 
power. Rejecting instructive power is possible but rejecting destructive power is not. By using this 
distinction, proportions of power can be analysed in a more sophisticated way, helping to 
sufficiently reflect on matters of responsibility. 
Kraus defined ‘instruktiv power’ and ‘destruktiv power’ as follows: 
 ‘Instructive power means the chance to determine a human’s thinking or behaviour’ 
(Dependent on the instructed person’s own will, which ultimately can refuse instructive 
power); 
 ‘Destructive power means the chance to restrict a human’s possibilities’ (Independent of the 
instructed person’s own will, which can’t refuse destructive power) (Kraus, 2014). 
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The aforementioned provides, from a philosophical standpoint, an introduction to the logic that 
underpins the conceptual framework guiding this thesis. Being able to better conceptualise the 
social fabric upon which power dynamics materialise and the intersection with education and 
culture can greatly assist in exploring the impact of individual factors and provide more informed 
perspectives to guide policy and discourse. 
2.3.3. Combined Dynamics 
The historical evolution of pivotal literature shows how this thinking has evolved. The role of 
communicative action and discourse in the public sphere will be critical to improving outcomes 
associated with natural resource led growth in the future. Being able to conceptually frame power 
distortion dynamics predicated on natural resource development in this way can improve 
understanding of the factors involved and how they interact with one another.  
Extreme power distortions lead to extreme reactions and regimes that can have a long lasting 
impact. Much of the extremism that is gaining traction in the world today is underpinned by 
unequal and unsettled disputes within many realms that fester into acute violence and extremism, 
not discourse (Jegede et al., 2015). When this impacts youth populations these ideologies are 
subsequently carried across generations. Power distortions, allow unequal and biased regimes to 
operate and if they can find funding establish themselves as impactful social forces.  
Social coordination and systemic regulation occurs by means of shared practices, beliefs, values, 
and structures of communicative interaction, which may be institutionally based. We are inevitably 
lifeworldly, such that individuals and interactions draw from custom and cultural traditions to 
construct identities, define situations, coordinate action, and create social solidarity.  
What has been poorly understood within developing nations suffering adverse growth outcomes is 
the fabric of society upon which these phenomena play out. Combining useful elements of related 
research to explain and assist in the understanding of what are at their very essence human issues 
will improve the knowledge of such dynamics. A separation from this reality has resulted in 
spurious and compartmentalised findings that do not properly appreciate the intricate 
anthropological environments within which these dynamics are operating.  
2.3.4. Youth 
Youth comprise the overwhelming majority of citizens in terms of population in many developing 
nations. They are also the societal cohort most susceptible to recruitment associated with defending 
or perpetuating regimes associated with dictatorial power (Cohn and Goodwin-Gill, 1994; 
Crombach et al., 2013). Understanding the personal factors contributing to individual 
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disenfranchisement as well as co-ordinated social action is integral to promoting and mitigating 
such outcomes.  
Due to their social standing and contiguous political economy dynamics, youth are not able to 
influence outcomes effectively and so in essence are the victims of the aforementioned dynamics. A 
forward looking perspective dictates that they will inherit the problems of the previous generation 
as well as the informal institutional blueprints for maintaining control.  
The population of youth in a ‘power-trapped’ country like the Solomon Islands is defined by 
marginalisation, high levels of unemployment and under-employment and having low levels of 
education and trust. Additionally, they have limited ambitions for the future in terms of seeing ways 
to secure and improve their livelihoods. Their limited political influence and thus engagement in 
improving their life situation through collective action of one form or another creates myriad issues 
that this research will further expose. In reality, many succumb to substance abuse, depression and 
criminality (KIP, 2015; Quinn, 2016). The case study analysis presented in Chapter 8, 9 and 10 
investigates these characteristics and provides some preliminary solutions for the Solomon Islands.  
2.3.5. Anthropological Grounding 
Anthropology scholars have been seeking to understand how those who live or work in the shadow 
of extractive industries confront these complexes that transform their lifeworlds and how they 
negotiate or contest the economic, social, ecological and not least moral orders in which extractive 
capitalist developments are embedded (Gordon, 1977; Taussig, 1980; Nash, 1993; Ballard and 
Banks, 2003). June Nash’s iconic, ‘We Eat the Mines and the Mines Eat Us’ provides a confronting 
reality of this within the Bolivian nation (Nash, 1993). Golub (2014) chronicles narratives of the 
Ipili tribe in relation to resource development around the Porgera mine in Papua New Guinea 
(PNG), documenting the transformation of the identities of the Ipili people. People who had to be 
refined and transformed in order to circulate in the national and international arenas of law, policy 
and ideas that accompany and buttress transnational capitalism (Golub, 2014). The Solomon Islands 
face similar problems to PNG in a less developed economy that is seriously considering a transition 
from logging to mining (Allen and Porter, 2016).  
The anthropological factors of power dynamics should be seen more broadly as a process of re-
contextualising the study of natural resource extraction with respect to the social relations in which 
it is embedded. Many of the current forms of analysis and prescriptions are blunt and general, 
divorced from the intricate tissue of kinship ties and moral relations in societies. The complex 
presented in Figure 2.4 seeks to better address this understanding. The ethnographic contributions 
within this realm highlight the necessity to comprehend intricate human social relations. The ways 
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in which these dynamics entrench, unsettle or generate new forms of inequality, friction and 
dispossession in regions is not well understood (Papyrakis, 2017). 
This process of social re-embedding requires both a historical and geographical re-contextualisation 
that prioritises human lifeworld realities. A ground up approach to this research is imperative to 
understand such complex and context specific problems. More refined research agendas that are 
more nuanced and progressive in their capacity to incorporate the lifeworlds and epistemologies of 
those affected by power trap dynamics will benefit scholars and practitioners greatly (Gilberthorpe 
and Rajak, 2017).  
The lifeworld concept depicts this social background in a manner that greatly enhances the ability 
of power distortion factors to explain associated dynamics relating to social instability and political 
economy dynamics which have already been well explored by the literature. This enhanced 
understanding can promote the effectiveness of previous research in guiding this future agenda. 
2.4. Summary 
Key impediments to the implementation of institutional reforms that promote market development, 
poverty reduction and education advancement are political in nature. The system which governs the 
functioning of these institutions can suffer from power distortions. Windfall wealth from natural 
resources can amplify such effects markedly. A great deal of focus has been placed upon the 
negative side-effects associated with this form of wealth in the literature (Auty, 1993; Sachs and 
Warner, 2001; Frankel, 2012b). How natural resource wealth is classified, valued and disseminated 
is fundamental to an accurate understanding of power dynamics and will be discussed throughout 
this thesis. Given the intrinsic relationship between money and power, top down rents from natural 
resource projects concentrates economic and political power unequally.  
To understand and decipher how to combat such issues, the problem must be considered in a tiered, 
multi-dimensional sense. Individuals become part of regimes and social structures that allow power 
complexes to operate. Therefore to understand how state level, institutionalised power complexes 
operate one must also understand the individual level factors that allow such complexes to be 
maintained. Neutralising power traps needs to be a considered, methodical and well informed.  
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Chapter 3 – Natural Resource Led Growth  
(Competing Theories and Bias)  
“Luck, you see, brings bitter friends”. ― John Steinbeck. 
3.1. Overview 
The previous chapter provided the conceptual framework and seminal logic guiding the thesis and 
introduced the paradoxical assertion that natural resources led growth can have negative social 
consequences. This chapter combines elements from different focal points within the literature on 
natural resource led growth. This provides an important understanding of the links and connections 
between theory and the varying nomenclature used to discuss such growth outcomes across vast 
time periods. There has been much confusion, detracting from the underlying message. If these 
theories and divided research agendas are combined as an evidence base, much more can be learned 
from their findings. This chapter unites the themes that underpin this extensive research agenda, 
contributing to the understanding of power distortions at an individual and state level catalysed by 
resource wealth.  
Each of the major competing theories and categorisations has been discussed, where possible, in a 
diachronic fashion to provide the reader with a better sense of place within the literature and to 
explain how the theories fit within the passage of time. The social and economic factors that were 
influencing research and associated theories at a place in time can then be cross referenced to guide 
the composition of useful veins of research that may be from a different time period but influenced 
by the same social dynamics. The extensive literature associated with natural resource led growth is 
examined in this chapter and seeks to further develop a broad understanding of factors contributing 
to power distortions at an individual and state level in this regard.  
3.2.Background 
Many commentators outline that the main assets of developing nations are their natural assets 
(Repetto et al., 1989). This includes their natural resources and their people. Extreme forms of 
power distortion can turn these assets into liabilities. The way in which natural resources are 
categorised, subsequently valued and accounted for at present would seem erroneous on the basis of 
the associated impacts which are so costly and yet not classified (Borucke et al., 2013; Harris and 
Roach, 2013).  
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How natural resources contribute to the process of development has been a concern for nations 
since civilisation began. At the turn of the twentieth century, academics attempted to explain 
development trajectories via staple commodities influence (Buckley, 1958; Watkins, 1963; Innis 
and Drache, 1995). This was largely associated with positive development outcomes and was more 
focused on explaining the subtle differences in these within Canadian borders although the 
reasoning was later extended to America, Australia and Argentina (McCarty, 1964; Pomfret, 1981; 
Schedvin, 1990; Innis and Drache, 1995; Altman, 2003; McLean, 2013).  
Around the 1950s these concerns became central to the development agenda associated with the 
poor economic performance of Latin American and African countries. Structuralists reacting to the 
neo-classical prescriptions argued that there were three main objections to specialisation in natural 
resources. Firstly, Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1950) posited the deterioration of terms of trade as 
the fundamental issue for natural resources as opposed to industrialised goods. Prebisch (1950), 
emphasised several types of demand and supply rigidities as a way of explaining a continuous 
downward trend in the relative price of primary commodities relative to manufacturing. Countries 
geared towards natural resources would not benefit from increases in world demand associated with 
world income growth. They posited that their demand growth was slower than that for 
manufacturers, because of technical change and in particular the capacity to displace natural 
materials by developing synthetic alternatives. It was argued that this was concentrated mostly in 
manufacturing, “they do not provide the growing points for increased technological knowledge, 
urban education, the dynamism and resilience that goes with urban civilisation, as well as the direct 
Marshallian external economies” (Singer, 1950, p. 476).  
Secondly, scholars argued against resource driven growth by focussing on price instability of 
commodities. Countries that relied heavily on commodity exports would therefore be very 
vulnerable to fluctuations which would affect their economy not only via abrupt changes in tax 
revenues but also via changes in the rate of exchange and local investments (Nurkse, 1958).  
Finally, a third group of scholars perceived that in developing countries, commodity exporting 
undertakings were typically dominated by multi-national companies. They set about illustrating the 
repatriation of the benefits. Local development was very limited and in many respects the projects 
operated as isolated enclaves with very few positive externalities in the country in which they were 
working (Singer, 1950; Hirschman, 1958; Singer et al., 1975). These three schools of thought in 
relation to scholarly inquiry are useful in outlining the multi-faceted impacts natural resources have 
on different economies and how they are thought about.  
From a development perspective Rostow (1961) posited that natural resources had been what 
underpinned growth in now industrialised counties and would do the same for countries about to 
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develop. These theories were being developed at a time when communism was the great social fear 
of the western world. In the 1970s and 1980s in general natural resources were seen as a blessing 
for developing countries (Drake, 1972; Balassa, 1980; Krueger, 1980).  
In reality much of the disagreement was essentially a war of words between development 
economists born in developing nations and development economists prescribing ideologies aligned 
with government policy in developed nations. Scholarly enquiry into the Washington Consensus 
and the New Deal provide eloquent examples (Williamson, 2000; Hawley, 2015).  
These theories will be discussed in more detail to minimise confusion and fuse together meaningful 
insights from literature seeking to explain growth and development trajectories of nations 
underpinned by natural resources.  
3.3. Clearing up Confusion 
Traditional economics was primarily concerned with efficient, least cost allocation of scarce 
resources assuming economic rationality and purely material, self-interested orientation towards 
decision making (Marshall, 1890). This literature attached positive connotations to natural 
resources. Political economy literature focused on the social and institutional processes through 
which groups of economic and political elites influence the allocation of scarce resources concerned 
primarily with the interplay between economics and politics and the division of power (Ricardo, 
1817; Mill, 1848; List and Colwell, 1856; Lal, 1991; Ross, 1999; Rosser, 2006).  
Development economics literature emphasised the efficient allocation of scarce or unproductive 
(idle) resources and the interplay between the private and public domain as well as economic, 
social, cultural, political and institutional mechanisms (Sen, 1988; Todaro, 1989; Ray, 1998; Meier 
and Stiglitz, 2001). In general, within all of these strands of literature natural resources were seen in 
a positive light and the focus was largely on how they could best be utilised. 
The European colonial powers had a dramatic and long lasting impact on economies with the 
introduction of three powerful and tradition shattering ideas; private property, personal taxation and 
the requirement that taxes be paid in money rather than in kind (Boswell, 1989; Todaro, 1989; 
Acemoglu et al., 2001; Banerjee and Iyer, 2005; Yoo and Steckel, 2010; Albouy, 2012). These 
ideas combined to erode the autonomy of local communities and to expose their people to many 
new forms of potential exploitation (Todaro, 1989; Friedmann, 1992).  
More recently, a resource curse perspective has evolved that is a paradoxical perspective, focusing 
on the negative associations between growth and resource wealth. In short, the bigger the ratio of 
natural capital to total capital, the more likely a negative economic growth outcome, as measured by 
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standard economic benchmarks (Knack and Keefer, 1995; Vyas and Kumaranayake, 2006). In acute 
circumstances, the resource curse is driven by the annexation of resources and a slow disintegration 
of the social fabric of the nation or community in which they exist.  
Broadly distilled, the literature states that the primary drivers of the paradox are currency 
appreciation, commodity price volatility and political economy distortions that combine with three 
types of asymmetry: asymmetric information, principal-agent and bargaining power (Humphreys et 
al., 2007a). This perspective however largely disregards the dynamic local intuitive knowledge 
arising directly from practical experiences and traditional knowledge bases (Nesheim et al., 2006). 
Focusing on broad macroeconomic analysis in regions with inherently unreliable data means that 
this intuitive local knowledge needs to be promoted to assist in understanding the problem.  
Understanding the individual subtleties that are associated with different resources that possess 
diverse corporate, commercial and economic underpinnings is of utmost importance. The political 
economy and associated sovereignty of the natural resource assets in question are integral to any 
policy prescriptions having a meaningful and lasting impact (Barma, 2011). Deriving prescriptions 
and anecdotal evidence from developed nations and applying them in developing areas seems 
unwise as it does not account for the true nature of the problem.  
The four key players involved in the economic and political interplay are: (a) international 
companies; (b) national companies; (c) governments; and (d) citizens. How these resource 
extraction enterprises operate is incredibly important to understand, particularly the associated 
pitfalls with each classification (Yergin, 2011). The underlying anthropogenic reactions remain 
rather constant across time in relation to the folly that ensues with any new wealth in a region 
(Frankopan, 2016). Smith posited the ‘paradox of value’ with respect to water and diamonds3 and it 
is this paradoxical claim that in many respects strikes at the heart of the misgivings of the resource 
curse paradox (White, 2002). What we value is subjective. Understanding this subjectivity and the 
social environment guiding it can greatly improve the knowledge of such resource fuelled social 
unrest.  
3.4.Oil 
Given the overwhelming impact oil has had with respect to economic growth it is an essential 
commodity to understand in more nuanced detail. Oil before the petrol powered motor vehicle era 
gained its first practical use as fuel for lighting, illustrating the remarkable impact an associated 
                                                          
3
 Diamonds have not been rare stones since 1870, when huge diamond mines were discovered in South Africa. Soon 
after the discovery, the British financiers behind the mining companies in South Africa realised the diamond market 
would become saturated if steps were not taken. In 1888, they set two audacious goals, namely monopolize diamond 
prices and stabilize the market. 
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industry can have on the demand for a primary commodity (Downey, 2009; Tarbell, 2009). It is 
important to keep this in perspective given the size and impact the oil industry has today (Tarbell, 
2009). Over the years, oil now has a plethora of ancillary uses ranging from plastics, synthetic 
fibres, bitumen (a waste stream from the refining process) and numerous others. Oil has also shaped 
the composition of markets and strongly influences the price and techniques with which all other 
commodities are traded (Downey, 2009).  
Growth outcomes and related economic phenomena associated with oil have overwhelmed the 
resource curse literature due to its strategic economic importance and the value of the commodity 
within the current market context (Gelb and Grasmann, 2009; Bjorvatn et al., 2012; Ross, 2012; 
Torres et al., 2012; Ayelazuno, 2013; Ross, 2014). Although it is a notable commodity with 
perverse and widespread impacts on economies, a partisan emphasis on oil has been at the peril of 
less well understood commodities (Humphreys et al., 2007a).  
Insights derived from studying resource curse dynamics associated with oil cannot be immediately 
transcribed to other commodities (Karl, 1997; Ross, 2014). Conversely the study of oil within this 
realm has highlighted the need to understand the importance of commodities with distortionary 
economic potential (Gelb and Grasmann, 2009; Ross, 2012; Liou and Musgrave, 2013). This is 
highlighted with examples of spices, textiles, fabric and numerous other commodities (Milton, 
1999; Nabhan, 2014; Paine, 2014; Frankopan, 2016). 
To illustrate these points more tangibly, consider for instance the key differences between revenue 
streams derived from point source resources such as oil to more diffuse resource streams such as 
fisheries or fur (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2008; Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2009). It may 
seem farcical to compare oil to fisheries and fur, however their histories have a great deal in 
common. Developing nations have the potential to derive abundant wealth from many different 
resources that are defined by a range of characteristics. Policy prescriptions and research agendas 
will need to be tailored to account for these differences with respect to the rights that are attached to 
subsequent ownership. These property rights in their varying compositions and practical 
applications will be discussed specifically in Chapter 6. 
There is now robust evidence tangibly linking hydrocarbon development and social unrest caused 
by political power distortions (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2005; Fearon, 2005). Ross (2014), argues that oil is, “making authoritarian regimes more 
durable, increasing certain types of corruption, and triggering violent conflict in low and middle 
income countries” (p.2). 
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3.5. Social Development and Natural Resources 
The influence of historical, cultural, and religious forces in the development process is seminal to 
improving understanding of how countries grow and decline (Soedjatmoko, 1985). Accordingly, 
applying aspects of the development literature with this consideration allows the efficient harvesting 
of ideas that are specifically related to the impacts of natural resource windfalls on human 
psychology. An important consideration to make is the subjectivity of the authors with respect to 
the timing and surrounding circumstances associated with theory generation. In general, until the 
resource curse dialogue started to have an impact in the early 90s resources were still seen primarily 
as a blessing, associated primarily with positive growth sentimentalities. Individuals in earlier 
periods of history were more intimately tied to their natural setting and in many ways it 
immediately dictated life or death. Current urban populations do not exhibit the same connection or 
understanding. 
The esoteric componentry of economic growth in different regions means that much of what can be 
useful to developing economies that has been illustrated by developed nations, such as institutional 
designs, are of limited applicability due to the disparate nature of their societies (Holden, 2013). 
Copying institutional blueprints and installing them in developing settings will likely not work as 
the requisite human capital required to support and maintain their functioning may not be present. It 
takes time and investment to build this human capacity. Therefore these nations can serve as a 
useful guide with respect to institutional apotheoses, while being mindful that such institutional 
frameworks cannot simply be transplanted into a developing context as the same social capital 
which facilitates effective administration does not exist.  
Individuals must be safe, secure and personally empowered and not suffering from an individual 
level power trap before state level transplanting of ideas can work sustainably. There is a need to be 
able to readily identify factors at a state level that can produce a favourable environment for the 
other slow, methodical change to occur. A great deal of research has explored the impact of 
institutions. However, far less attention has been focused on the individuals that can allow them to 
function effectively (Sawyer and Gomez, 2012; Sarmidi et al., 2014).The effectiveness of policies 
prescribed to assist such endeavours can be greatly assisted by understanding contextual social 
realities in more detail. This will be developed further within the case study of the Solomon Islands 
in Chapter 8, 9 and 10.  
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3.6. Staple Theory of Growth 
The staple theory asserts that the export of natural resources, or ‘staples’, from Canada to more 
advanced economies has a pervasive impact on the economy as well as its social and political 
systems (Innis and Drache, 1995). The theory originated in the 1920s with work by Mackintosh and 
Innes, a summary of their contributions is comprised within Buckley (1958). The impact of staples 
on cultural change is examined in Innis and Drache (1995). A negative growth outcome associated 
with later developments of this theory with respect to a reliance on primary commodity driven 
growth is defined as a ‘staple trap’ (Auty, 2001a). This implies reliance on a narrow range of staple 
commodities in national income accounts for export, normally characterised by a rudimentary 
production base. This links the earlier staple theory literature with the more recent natural resource 
curse literature, illustrating the importance of diachronic awareness of associated theories.  
The authors concurred that Canada was an economy underpinned by natural capital however their 
views differed. Mackintosh saw a continuing evolution toward a mature industrialised economy 
based on staple production, whereas Innis saw a tendency for Canada to become permanently 
locked into dependency as a resource hinterland. The authors developed their original theses with 
writings on the political economy of Canada at the time, these works are best summarised by 
Buckley (1958); Watkins (1963). This work attempted to further explain and describe the trade and 
cultural link to Europe which this form of economic development permitted as well as the 
institutions and political culture that surrounded it. Innis interpreted this relationship within Canada 
as a relationship between "heartland" to "hinterland" (Innis, 1930). The periphery, or hinterland, is 
dominated by the core, or heartland. His writings argued that the core was dependent upon the 
search for and accumulation of staples which were located in the hinterland to perpetuate the 
economy therefore it sought to advance economic and political power by exploiting this region. 
This point is reverberated by Lipton (1977).  
Innis believed that the fur trade created the geographical boundaries of Canada (Innis, 1930). 
Initially the relationship between the Canadian interior and eastern ports led to Canadian unity and 
its distinctiveness from the United States. In hindsight this has more to do with overarching political 
forces associated with empire expansion and who owned and possessed the power to distribute 
rights (Horwitz, 1982). In effect the government or sovereign power has a monopoly on the ability 
to produce and regulate these rights.  
Innes emphasised the importance of fur as a staple product which in his mind consequentially 
resulted in the northern half of the continent remaining dependent on Britain for trade, making 
much of the country essentially British for so much of its history (Innis and Drache, 1995). Watkins 
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revived these writings within the realm of resource capitalism (Watkins, 1963). The transferability 
of this original work in relation to nation states dependent upon primary industries and resource 
extraction has become more prominent in recent times (Findlay and Lundahl, 1992; Altman, 2003; 
Wright, 2003).  
While the theory originally described the evolution of the Canadian state, it has since been used to 
study the economies of many nations that are dependent upon resource extraction and primary 
industries. The theory was used to explore the Australian, American and Argentinian experience to 
explain how developing countries could capitalise on their abundance of natural resources 
(McLean, 2013). Rapid growth ensued when Multi-National Corporations (MNC’s) invested in 
these sectors and provided economic linkages, employment, government revenue, infrastructure and 
technological transfer. The countries histories in this regard due to contextual and legislative 
underpinnings differ greatly. Given the composition of the Solomon Islands and it resource 
dominated export portfolio understanding the misgivings of a staple trap are relevant and important 
to appreciate within their own context. Although the resources and actors are different the concepts 
and issues arising are of a similar nature. 
Different staple commodities due to their overwhelming economic importance but underlying 
differences that related to auxiliary processing and administrative requirements, spurred different 
growth trajectories and fostered different societal capacities (Altman, 2003). More recently, 
applications of staple theory of growth is applied to fluctuations in colonial Singapore by Choy and 
Sugimoto (2013), finding economic instability and growth can both be outcomes of foreign trade. 
The metaphor used by Blattman et al. (2007), certain nations flourished by picking a few winners in 
the commodity lottery as engines of growth, but the price paid by the colony’s residents for those 
tickets was instability in their incomes and earnings.  
3.7. Dutch Disease 
The Dutch ‘disease’ refers to the economic side effects faced by a nation state during and preceding 
a boom based on rapid primary commodity growth via a new discovery or rapid increase in price of 
a pre-existing resource. This can cause a real appreciation in currency crowding out alternative 
sectors within the economy and decreasing international competitiveness of the entire macro-
economy. The booming sector is stereotypically involved in the extraction of natural resources such 
as oil, natural gas, gold, copper and diamonds. Additionally the production of cash crops such as 
coffee and cocoa is now receiving attention (Edwards, 1984; Dube and Vargas, 2006; Angrist and 
Kugler, 2008; Dube and Vargas, 2013).  
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The term ‘Dutch Disease’ was coined by the economist magazine (The Economist, 1977). This does 
seem a little bit premature when in reality Bob Gregory had already described the effects in relation 
to the shrinking of the non-mining sector during the resources boom. There is a plethora of 
literature that explicates the theory, most notably in early works of (Corden, 1984; Van Wijnbergen, 
1984; Kremers, 1986; Krugman, 1987).  
As the definition of a ‘resource’ has broadened and alternative channels have been recognised it 
seems not to matter what the source of the windfall or booming sector but the mere presence of it 
(Arkes et al., 1994; Kameda et al., 2002). A key distinction is whether the resource itself is 
classified as being extractive or productive, as well as its associated labour intensity (Dube and 
Vargas, 2013; Ross, 2014).  
A resource boom crowds out other sectors of the economy, the size and duration of the boom will 
be the primary determinants of auxiliary implications (Corden and Neary, 1982; Corden, 1984; 
Karl, 1997; Sachs and Warner, 1999; Cleary, 2011; Sheehan and Gregory, 2013). Evidence does 
indicate that in a developing economy with less economic complexity the effects could be 
particularly pronounced and overwhelming (Corden, 1984; Gouy, 2011; Rajan and Subramanian, 
2011). Historically in many instances a boom attracts the best employees from other sectors which 
on the surface is not problematic. A sustained gravitation can be overwhelmingly detrimental to the 
ability for a nation’s economy to remain productive once the boom is over. Given the importance of 
human capital and knowledge retention within an economy this can have long-run consequences if 
the knowledge associated with these alternate sectors is lost.  
More recently, Rehner et al. (2014) evaluate the presence of regional Dutch disease effects in Chile. 
They argue that Northern Chilean regions with their primarily copper export sector do exhibit signs 
of the Dutch disease. This does not necessarily reduce or slow economic growth according to the 
authors. However because of their mineral resource dependent economies they are especially 
vulnerable to economic shocks. This lack of economic diversity can significantly affect long-term 
welfare. The more complex an economy, the greater the chances of capitalising on externalities 
associated with learning-by-doing and unexpected consequences associated with innovation 
(Schank et al., 1999; Torvik, 2001). This is particularly relevant to the Solomon Islands given the 
overwhelming primary commodity dependency of the economy. This will be discussed further in 
Chapter 8.  
The original Dutch disease phenomenon now forms part of the overarching and broader resource 
curse thesis as one of the channels. The term however is used colloquially in many contexts to 
attempt to describe the associated implications of a sudden windfall on a nation’s economy and the 
effects on pre-existing industries and institutions. The term is now synonymous in many regards 
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with the negative impact caused by a booming sector on other components of the economy. What it 
does not and should not be used to describe is the violent and rapacious dynamics that underpin 
acute resource curse dynamics. The Dutch disease literature has not focused on the psychological 
underpinnings of these violent dynamics but more the economic implications of one overly 
influential sector. Within the context of this thesis, the important dimension of this literature is its 
promotion of the understanding of the social psychology associated to booming sector and windfall 
gains.  
More recently it has been observed that distortionary impacts from natural resource windfalls can be 
catalysed by different determinants, such as aid and foreign investment (Gouy, 2011; Rajan and 
Subramanian, 2011). The popularised use of the term has led to it being used in many contexts. 
Economists have applied the theory to examine episodes such as the impact of the flow of American 
treasures into sixteenth-century Spain and gold discoveries in Australia in the 1850s (Forsyth and 
Nicholas, 1983; Davis, 1995).  
The term ‘money rain’ is one eloquent example of extrapolating basic tenants of the basic 
preconditions of Dutch disease. ‘Money rain’ is used to describe windfall dynamics associated with 
natural resource discoveries in Papua New Guinea (Gilberthorpe, 2016). This term is drawn from 
research and the local description of such effects (mani ren), where it is used to describe the 
unearned resource rents generated by the extractive industry that are controlled by a small number 
of elites (Gilberthorpe, 2016). This also provides a telling illustration of the importance of the 
contextual realities surrounding such theories and even the names they are given.  
Understanding each of these theories can assist in framing the logic required to meaningfully learn 
from the past development outcomes associated with natural resource led growth if grounded in 
contextual realities. Cross referencing past experiences of other nations with current realities in the 
Solomon Islands also provides a powerful footing with which to evoke change in how their 
resources are currently managed and rights distributed. Understanding the social conditions that 
lead to negative outcomes associated with advantageous pre-conditions will require a more complex 
understanding of human group interactions. 
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Chapter 4 – The Resource Curse, Overview, Evolution and 
Modern Perspective 
“The battlefields of World War I established the importance of petroleum as an element of 
national power when the internal combustion machine overtook the horse and the coal-
powered locomotive”. ― Yergin (2011) 
4.1. Overview 
The previous chapter employed the resource curse theory as a point of comparison to guide the 
assessment and frame commentary on associated theories of natural resource led growth with 
positive connotations. This chapter examines the resource curse literature in more detail to explore 
the contributions and weaknesses of the theory itself and further describe the negative implications 
associated with natural resource wealth. The theory has been influential not only in shaping how 
resources are viewed, it also represents a distinct evolutionary step in the logic that influences 
growth and development assertions. As indicated in Chapter 3, many of the previous theories 
addressing growth and development trajectories associated with natural resources were aligned with 
positive assertions or were addressing the economic consequence of the prioritisation of one sector 
over another. The resource curse literature marks a distinct discontinuity in how natural resources 
are viewed and introduced the paradoxical assertion that they can cause negative growth outcomes, 
severe social unrest and in acute circumstances war. The transformation of natural resources into 
financial capital and the ownership of these resources provide the impetus for distorted and 
manipulative power structures to be maintained and strengthened. The idiosyncrasies of this 
transformation process will be addressed in detail within Chapter 7. 
Resource rich nations should be able to outperform resource poor nations, and prior to the 1970s 
they mostly did. But fashionable interventionist policies inadvertently expanded scope for rent 
seeking which misallocated the revenue and led to growth collapses in most resource rich countries 
from 1973-1997. These collapses were on a scale that attracted considerable research interest and 
caused the economies of resource-poor countries to outperform those of the resource- rich ones, at 
least for a while. Corruption and the policy distortion it accommodates are the keys to the resource 
curse. The literature to date has outlined what economic policies can be implemented to avoid the 
resource curse. What is not well understood is how to manage specific political conditions so as to 
implement them. The desideratum of this thesis is to advance the understanding of the mechanics of 
power in such regions by studying the impacts on those that are the impartial victims of these power 
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struggles and inheritors of the social fabric created by such circumstances, the youth. Applying a 
progressive and nuanced analysis of this literature can assist in understanding dynamics currently 
afflicting countries such as the Solomon Islands, a resource dependent nation and promote 
understanding of the surrounding economic environment impacting the youth in the nation. The 
curse is neither universal, inevitable or unavoidable. The social fabric of a nation greatly enhances 
the purported impacts associated with such a paradox. 
The resource curse literature is grounded in growth and development outcomes. Theories in this 
tangential literature will be introduced into the discussion to clarify understanding and highlight the 
limitations of specific frameworks used to examine the impact of natural resource led development. 
Contributions from the resource curse literature that promote a disaggregated and nuanced 
understanding of the paradox will be identified and discussed with respect to the contextual realities 
of the Solomon Islands case study.  
4.2. Background 
Principal literature outlining and catalysing thoughts about the resource curse appear in Auty 
(1993); Auty (1994); Sachs and Warner (1995); Auty (2001b); Sachs and Warner (2001). There 
were 13 scientific papers that explicitly referred to the resource curse in 1995, while in 2005 there 
were over 500 and in 2015 over 2360. Scholarly interest has most certainly been on the rise, the 
evidence though, has been far from conclusive. The relevance and importance of improving 
research agendas within this realm is extensively discussed in an eight paper special issue 
(Papyrakis, 2017). This will be detailed in Section 4.5. 
The contradictory nature of the resource curse literature due to the complexity of factors impacting 
its inception have generated a plethora of contradictory evidence which is nothing short of 
bewildering at times (Papyrakis, 2017). However upon closer inspection, a lot of this contradiction 
can be readily explained by subjectivity. A synthesis of the theory and findings suggest that the 
curse is largely context-specific, dependent upon the type of resources, socio-political institutions, 
relationships with the macro, meso and micro economy, as well as individual lives and human 
psychology; the latter of which has only become a point of inquiry in recent years (Gilberthorpe and 
Rajak, 2017; Papyrakis, 2017).  
The associated theories discussed in the previous chapter provide the pretext to the inception of the 
resource curse thesis put forward by Auty (1993). The theory should serve as a warning to all 
nations (Frankel, 2010; Frankel, 2012b). Orthodox economists typically prescribe to a world where 
there are trade-offs, a winner and a loser. This perspective permeates much of the logic 
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underpinning binary frameworks that are used to analyse the impacts of natural resources (Obeng-
Odoom, 2012). However narratives tied to monolithic scenarios of blessings and curses 
oversimplify a complex and multi-faceted situation with disparate outcomes for different social 
classes (Obeng-Odoom, 2012).  
The resource curse literature has been engaged in an extensive discourse over the validity of the 
theory, how it is measured, actors involved and how to prevent it (Corden, 1984; Auty, 1993; Ross, 
1999; Sachs and Warner, 1999; Sachs and Warner, 2001; Humphreys et al., 2007a; Frankel, 2010; 
Frankel, 2012b; Ross, 2012; Dobbs et al., 2013). Statistically, there have been numerous studies 
that find no evidence to support the resource curse hypothesis (Delacroix, 1977; Davis, 1995; Herb, 
2005; Alexeev and Conrad, 2009). The inconsistency in findings is underpinned by the functionality 
of capital, financial markets, the political economy and specific contextual realities. A formal 
overview of this literature can be found in Stevens (2003); Rosser (2006); Frankel (2010); Van der 
Ploeg (2011); Torres et al. (2013); Papyrakis (2017). Comprehensive case studies are provided by 
Auty (2001b); Maloney (2002); Hausmann and Rigobon (2003); Rodrik (2003); Sala-i-Martin and 
Subramanian (2003); Kalinoe and Leach (2004); Otusanya (2011).  
Leading authors also provide prescriptions for policy makers on how to avoid the curse (Humphreys 
et al., 2007a; Humphreys et al., 2007b). The resource curse can be isolated into drivers, channels or 
intensifiers of the phenomenon. The terms associated with such dynamics are not interchangeable 
and do not represent the same phenomena, each needs to be carefully understood and seeks to 
explain particular points of intersection with negative development outcomes.  
The theories primary application has been in developing nations which are poised to lose or gain the 
most if unfavourable outcomes are realised. This is due to their economic composition and the 
magnitude of change that can occur as a result of a natural resource windfall relevant to surrounding 
livelihood realities. Socially, the effects of a natural resource curse include lower levels of 
education, health and infrastructure development (Power, 2015). In more acute circumstances, a 
curse can catalyse severe social unrest and war (Ballard and Banks, 2003; Le Billon, 2004; Le 
Billon, 2008) 
Contradictory findings relating to the resource curse persist due the subjectivity and eccentricity of 
human psychology and political nature in which the theory operates. The types of the resources 
themselves and the types of revenue streams associated amplify or diminish such impacts. This is 
augmented where the natural resource rents emanate from ‘point’ source resources (Perez-Pla, 
2011). The capital intensive nature of these operations concentrates rents and ownership, but this is 
not solely a dynamic produced within the mining fraternity. Agricultural commodities that require 
large capital investment in infrastructure produce analogous dynamics. Although agricultural 
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commodities are included in some assessments of extractive industries in early literature, the trend 
has been to move away from agriculture when assessing the resource curse and to focus on 
extractive industries. The agricultural sector has been utilised more as a point of comparison to 
illustrate effects of crowding out of this sector. This sector is the largest and most influential in 
many developing nations. Not enough credence has been given to it in this regard. Agricultural 
commodities are seen as being produced and not extracted. However given the unsustainable rates 
of production in many sectors as well as harvesting rates in others, many of these industries are in 
fact extractive in nature. Forestry in the Solomon Islands provides a telling example (Allen and 
Porter, 2016). Many agricultural commodities and underlying ownership structures pertaining to 
property rights dramatically impact the lives of individuals in the same fashion as extractive mining 
enterprises. Given the magnitude of operations such as forestry and palm oil plantations, it could be 
argued that in certain settings the impact is even greater (McCarthy and Cramb, 2009). The impact 
of logging and the recent onset of palm oil plantations in the Solomon Islands continue to cause 
myriad issues in this regard (KIP, 2015). 
4.3. Growth and Development Literature 
The resource curse is concerned with negative development and growth outcomes in regions which, 
theoretically speaking, have the pre-determinants of success. Therefore understanding the growth 
and development literature and the associated schools of thought is integral to interpreting the 
evolution of the resource curse theory and other theories attempting to explain economic failure or 
success based on natural resource endowment.  
Since the 1960s there has been a divergence between the growth trajectories of countries with 
differing resource base intensities. Resource poor countries for certain periods outperformed 
resource rich nations in preceding decades. Although this can be partially explained by 
manufacturing led growth in resource deprived nations, the difference in growth trajectories with 
respect to resource led growth is more acute than would be expected under normal conditions 
(Mellor, 1995).  
Most surprisingly the revenues derived from mineral and resource wealth does not seem to have 
been translated into further progressing the growth of countries who also have an abundance of 
agricultural potential (Mellor, 1995). In many instances it has led to competition, to the detriment of 
the more sustainable and more modest revenue streams associated with agriculture (Sachs and 
Warner, 1997a; Sachs and Warner, 1997c; Sachs and Warner, 1997b; Sachs and Warner, 1999; 
Sachs and Warner, 2001). World Bank data illustrates that GDP growth per capita of the resource 
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profuse countries declined after the oil shocks in the 1970s (World Bank, 2015). Conversely 
resource-deficient (manufacturing-led) countries actually accelerated with respect to the same 
metric (World Bank, 2015).  
How the associated theories of growth and development have evolved will be central to any 
informed synthesis of the resource curse literature as their tangential evolution has strongly 
influenced the underlying scholarly logic. The concept of growth and development are inexorable 
linked, however they are each given specific credence and distinction within the literature. The most 
concise distinction that can be made is that the development theory applies to ‘developing’ nations 
and growth literature encompasses the entire gamete of nations. Distinct schools of thought were 
influencing scholarly discourse in this regard.  
There are three distinct paradigms of development discourse from an economistic perspective that 
attempt to answer what causes poverty and ‘underdevelopment’. This was led by development 
economists since the emergence of the term ‘Third World Nations’ after WWII (Slater, 1975). Early 
theorists within the development realm substituted the terms ‘backward areas’ and ‘underdeveloped 
areas’ for ‘Third World’ (Baster, 1954; Hoffman, 1967; Arndt, 1993).  
These can be summarised as follows. 
 Modernisation school – largely informed by Keynesian and orthodox economics; 
 Underdevelopment school – based on political economy history and interpretation of the 
emergence and global expansion of the global capitalist economic system; and 
 Neoliberal school – informed by liberal political philosophy, particularly libertarian strand 
and neoclassical economics. 
Importantly this economistic view fails to highlight the importance of feminism, see Chowdry 
(1995); McEwan (2001); Cornwall and Whitehead (2007). These three distinct paradigms also 
disregard post-development theories.   These are well summarised and synthesised within Ziai 
(2007).   
According to modernisation discourse ‘Third World’ backwardness was caused by deficits in the 
factors of production. Most had abundant land and labour but insufficient capital (Lewis, 1955). 
The assumption was that states with an abundance of natural resources could overcome this capital 
shortfall thanks to primary commodity exports and attractiveness to investors (Ross, 1999; Ross, 
2012).  
The underdevelopment school disagreed and argued that Europe’s accumulation of wealth and 
prosperity was caused by the exploitation of labour and natural resources in colonial territories. De-
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colonisation merely changed the guise of the institutions that were doing the extracting (Hoogvelt 
and Hoogvelt, 1982; Yew, 2002).  
Exploitation through colonialism was direct and achieved through formal methods of control. Neo-
colonialism is more indirect and as a result the control structures more difficult to identify, for 
example, dominance-dependence (Palma, 1978; Chilcote, 1981; Johnson, 1981; Hunt and Morgan, 
1996; Yates, 1996; Ashcroft et al., 2003; Smith, 2005).  
Resource curse theorists, informed by neoliberal economics, largely vindicated the 
underdevelopment assumptions, however they added the caveat that this natural resource 
endowment would cause growth, only if, neoliberal development policies were enacted. To the 
underdevelopment school this exploitive regime does not operate, using the Asian Miracle as the 
example to illustrate the point (Lall, 1996). In many ways, the tigers became the epicentres for the 
new world of high finance and globalisation of trade. Given that Hitler rose from the ashes of WWI, 
a more concerted global effort was made to ensure that other nations, such as the destroyed 
Japanese empire, did not repeat history. As a result many favourable trade deals were done to 
ensure their success (Barbieri and Levy, 1999). Given the military prowess of developed regions 
they had stronger negotiating powers than many other developing nations.  
During the mineral and oil booms of the 70s and 80s mineral rich countries like Mexico, Venezuela 
and Nigeria, to name a few, accumulated unserviceable debt instead of savings, effectively 
disproving the assumptions of modernisation theory (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart and Baker, 2000; 
Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). The basic premise is that resource rich developing nations will only 
realise the effects of the curse if they do not follow export orientated, ‘free market’ development 
policies.  
Historically a primary channel for the resource curse is long term volatility and insecurity in 
commodity prices. For decades, there has been great scholarly debate questioning the contribution 
that primary commodities had to developing nations from an export perspective (Harvey et al., 
2010). There is a line of argument that it is these commodities that make available surplus foreign 
exchange to enable importation of equipment and specialised goods, with embodied innovation that 
further promote development. In short, promoting terms of trade (Blattman et al., 2004; Blattman et 
al., 2007). Maintaining free markets and openness to trade is an ideology for promoting 
development and subsequent economic growth within an economy (Harrison and Rodríguez-Clare, 
2009; Ramondo and Rodríguez-Clare, 2009; Baldwin, 2011; Lee, 2011; Gaitan and Roe, 2012).  
The aforementioned discourse highlights the diverse array of scholarly standpoints that underpin the 
analysis of resource dependent economies to grow and develop or stagnate and decline. It is 
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important to keep in perspective the fact that there have been many nations with abundant natural 
resources that have achieved remarkable success. Additionally, wealthy democracies attracted 
roughly ten times more foreign investment in all types of mining, per square kilometre, than either 
the developing world, or the countries of the former Soviet Union (Ross, 2012).  
How the resource curse acts as a process which contributes to uneven development within nations 
has not been investigated nearly as much as how it has contributed to uneven development between 
nations. Nor has the literature addressed the negative consequences for resource economies that 
overall appear to have beaten the resource curse yet have resource producing regions that are 
economically lagging and or vulnerable in ways consistent with the dynamics of the theory.  
Critical re-examination of the resource curse divorced from obsessions with growth has spawned 
research which seeks further explanations for the persistence of a nation’s inability to capitalise on 
resource endowments. Examples include analysing broader human development indices and 
sustainability indicators (Atkinson and Hamilton, 2003; Bulte et al., 2005; Dietz et al., 2007; 
Daniele, 2011). The current literature in this regard will be discussed in Section 4.5. 
4.4. Measurement/Definitional Problems 
Practically speaking, all of the different terms, definitions, measurements and ways of viewing the 
problem really over complicate two simple human issues, greed and theft. Collier and Hoeffler 
(2004), acknowledge this and examine the implications during a civil war. The greed and grievance 
model is critiqued as an over simplification, see for example Keen (2008). The difference in the 
choice of words used to describe the same phenomena in the literature lies within the subjectivity 
associated with poverty and underdevelopment. Alternative terms are also used to describe the same 
phenomena, for example, ‘the curse of wealth’ (Galeano, 1997) and the ‘paradox of plenty’ (Karl, 
1997; Ekmen, 2011).  
To the resource curse theorists viewing the problem through the lens of neoliberalism, internal 
factors such as political corruption, rent-seeking, lack of transparency and good governance cause 
the resource curse. To the political economists on the other hand, external factors such as the 
volatility of world commodity prices, capital flight, tax evasion, colonialism, imperialism, neo-
colonialism and globalisation cause underdevelopment. The autarkic policies largely rejected by the 
resource curse theorists but endorsed by the political economists of the underdevelopment discourse 
are what delineate the two ideologies.  
Scholars have sought to substantiate the impacts of a resource curse in terms of the impact from 
particular commodities, for example, oil, minerals, forest resources, and agricultural crops. The 
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main differential has been how ‘natural’ resources are defined, with the key point of delineation 
being ‘produced’ agriculture as opposed to ‘extracted’ minerals (Humphreys et al., 2007a).  
Much of the data that describes and illustrates positive and negative growth outcomes within 
nations from natural resources use inconsistent measures of value and in many instances analyses 
condensed time periods. Figure 4.1 and 4.2 provide an overview of wealth per capita with a 
standardised financial measure, Geary-Khamis dollars (Maddison, 2003).  
 
Figure 4.1. GDP Per Capita (1800-1950)
4
 
 
Figure 4.2. GDP Per Capita (1950-2010)
5
 
                                                          
4
 Author calculations based upon: The Maddison-Project, http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm, 
2013 version. 
 
5
 Author calculations based upon: The Maddison-Project, http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm, 
2013 version. 
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The vast majority of the resource curse literature is underpinned by observational data with difficult 
to measure phenomena such as quality of institutions (Brunnschweiler, 2008; Costa and Santos, 
2013; Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2014; Porter and Watts, 2016; Collier, 2017).  
There is a trend towards sub-national data to attempt to improve granularity. However how the data 
is collected and stored seems to be problematic (KIP, 2015). Revenue streams associated are also 
collected and dispersed in myriad ways, such as, royalties, corporate taxes, concession fees, transit 
fees, signing bonuses, in-kind payments and revenues from state-owned companies. Different types 
of revenues may accrue to different arms of the state, like oil and finance ministries, state-owned oil 
companies, and local governments and may or may not be transferred to a central account. 
Supplementary indicators, like the World Bank’s ‘non-tax revenue’ measure, typically fail to 
capture many of these revenue streams (Ebel and Yilmaz, 2002; Morrison, 2009). Research and 
analysis predicated upon such data will be inherently unreliable. Recent evidence
6
 of the corruption 
mechanics and annexation techniques relating to resource extraction projects details the associated 
commercial structures and rationale. This should not be viewed lightly, it is the first time this 
information has ever been made publically available.  
Alternative measurement approaches are exemplified by Knack and Keefer (1995); Ross (2008); 
Haber and Menaldo (2011); Ross (2012); de Soysa and Gizelis (2013). These approaches are more 
formally summarised and synthesised by Frankel (2010); Azarhoushang and Rukavina (2014); Ross 
(2014). Auty (2001b) proffers an indicator of sustainability termed ‘genuine saving’. This indicator 
attempts to account for the effects of natural resource depletion and environmental degradation in 
measuring national savings. The conclusion is that investment quality is of greater importance than 
the notion of solely focusing on saving. Studies utilising measures of resource abundance instead of 
exports do not find a negative relation with growth. Stijns (2005) quantifies this by using reserve 
and production data on resources, rather than export shares, concluding that there is no effect on 
growth. Brunnschweiler (2008) with an index of natural wealth per capita finds a positive 
relationship between resource abundance and growth.  
The diversity in characteristics associated with different resources, different periods of time and 
different social fabrics have led to a rather confusing array of findings with respect to the existence 
of a curse. What remains consistent is that natural resources have the potential to strongly influence 
the social characteristics of communities. Inconsistent definitions and measurement approaches are 
a consequence of trying to understand the root cause of a complex and multi-faceted problem.  
                                                          
6
 “Friday 5 February at 08:30 CET, WikiLeaks releases a collection of documents that open up a corrupt multi-billion 
dollar war by Western and Chinese companies grab uranium and other mining rights in the Central African Republic 
(CAR) and escape paying for the environmental consequences.  
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Individual nations possess widely ranging characteristics on myriad levels, not just economic. 
Consequently, the predictive power of regression analyses attempting to determine the causal 
relationship between resource abundance and economic growth have been limited at best. The key 
to explicating more meaningful analysis and using this preliminary research to guide national policy 
makers will lie in addressing the problem from a disaggregated, human perspective. A divorce from 
the quest to prove if a curse exists should liberate scholars, allowing for less emphasis to be placed 
upon the statistical robustness of broad macroeconomic findings (Ross, 2014). 
4.5. Overview of the Latest Literature 
This section will present an overview of the most recent literature that follows the evolutionary 
logic of the recent eight paper special issue summarised in Papyrakis (2017). This literature 
supports the case for disaggregated, ground up research agendas that give seminal credence to the 
anthropological and psychological factors that drive this phenomena. This overview also clearly 
demonstrates the truly global nature of the resource curse and contributes to establishing a platform 
of evidence to better explain the relationship between natural resource wealth and socio-economic 
development. These papers are summarised as follows: 
 Gilberthorpe and Rajak (2017) - This anthropological approach to the resource curse 
provides a complementary methodological toolkit to analyse how resource extraction 
generates and reshapes social relations between corporate actors, state officials, and the local 
population. This is vital in understanding how existing forms of extraction entrench, unsettle 
or generate new forms of inequality, friction and dispossession in resource curse affected 
areas. This paper specifically focuses on power distortions underpinned by dynamic social 
relationships. Recent developments in social psychology can substantially improve 
knowledge in this regard, providing the link between institutions and in situ human 
behavioural dynamics.  
 Van Der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2017) - Explore new quantitative approaches. These include 
the use of data on big oil discoveries, the use of natural experiments, a preference for within-
country econometric evidence and a focus on localised impacts in the vicinity of mineral 
activity.  
 Collier (2017) - Proffers that a critical mass of informed citizens (on the spatial and 
temporal assignment of resource ownership) can be a prerequisite for avoiding 
psychological biases that lead to conflict and excessive spending in a mineral-rich context.  
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 Hilson and Laing (2017) - Detail a gold mining economy built around local small-scale 
operators does not avoid the resource curse pitfalls, at least in the absence of a strong 
institutional framework. 
 Porter and Watts (2017) - Find that local governance can create reform space and a 
‘resource curse escape’, even when the general political environment at the country level is 
far from favourable.  
 Auty (2017) - Provides a comparison of economies with very similar initial conditions other 
than their mineral endowment attributing divergent development paths (and government 
policies) to their differences in hydrocarbon rents.  
 Voors et al. (2017) - Find that neither diamonds nor the quality of local governance explain 
local variation in conflict intensity against the backdrop of prolonged civil war in Sierra 
Leone.  
 Papyrakis (2017) - promote and emphasise the importance of mineral rich countries 
participating in the Extractive Industry Transparency experience a reduction in corruption 
levels.  
This special issue draws together numerous methodological approaches and numerous perspectives 
that have been influential within this literature. The resource curse is presented as a manifestation of 
social psychological factors. The catalyst for these destructive psychological factors that result in a 
resource curse is the windfall wealth attached to many natural resources. Given that many of these 
windfalls occur in regions where they will have an even greater relative impact due to the 
composition of the surrounding economy these impacts are amplified even further. The volume of 
money associated with natural resource projects overwhelms other social relationships, corrupts the 
rule of law and changes the social psychology of the impacted region. A disaggregation of actors 
and groups involved in this dynamic can greatly improve prescriptions which seek to alleviate and 
remedy such issues.  
The narcotics trade and the windfall profits on offer display the same social psychology 
characteristics. A worrying trend in this regard is the more recent commercial collaboration between 
terrorist groups and drug cartels, see for example (Asal et al., 2015). Such dynamics are not 
contained within borders and the worrying rates of substance abuse and development of the youth in 
the Solomon Islands would provide worrying signs with respect to these realities (Quinn, 2016). 
Improving the understanding of the impact of windfalls on social groups, no matter what the source, 
is integral to promoting the understanding required to deal with a resource curse more effectively 
and to avoid such dynamics in the future. Although the resource curse is a theory connected 
conceptually to natural resources, understanding the social dynamics associated with windfall social 
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psychology across a range of catalysts could greatly benefit the required understanding to 
differentiate between the impacts of different resources.  
Gilberthorpe (2016) explores the money rain phenomena, effectively a windfall profit as defined 
within the thesis, and looks at this impact of mining windfalls on a tribal group in PNG. This is the 
neighbouring country of the Solomon Islands and in many ways is seen as being the more advanced 
and developed older brother. Given the worrying trends developing in the nation as a result of a 
large natural gas project, this research is timely and novel. The author looks at promoting the 
medium of film as a way of studying and monitoring the impacts of extractive industries. A novel 
and warranted approach to the issue that is plagued with definitional and data issues.  
Much of the anthropologically focused literature explores the cultural aspects of the resource curse 
and the complexity of tailoring solutions for indigenous populations with little exposure to a market 
transaction-based economy (Bainton, 2008). Tensions between administrative interests and 
indigenous communities in natural resource abundant nations often results in social instability and 
conflict (Watts, 2001; Arellano-Yanguas, 2011). Several studies critique the rhetoric of 
‘sustainability’ and ‘corporate social responsibility’ that in practice produce results that are nothing 
of the kind (Benson et al., 2010; Gilberthorpe and Banks, 2012).  
4.6. Summary 
There is now a wider recognition that the resource curse is a much more complex phenomenon than 
previous attempts to define it. The manifestation of this phenomenon depends on several factors 
such as the type of natural resources, the way their relative importance is measured in an economy 
and the socio-political institutions which distribute power (Papyrakis, 2017).  
Although diverse in its scope, the trend within the resource curse literature has been from 
macro/country level analysis, towards the meso (regional) and micro (community) levels (Ross, 
2014). Generally, the move in the literature is away from international drivers towards a more 
granular sub-national approach. Importantly, scholars are increasingly turning to within-country 
studies for greater disaggregation of economic responses and exogenous identification of impacts. 
This supports the approach employed by this thesis. 
Literature exploring the development impacts of the extractive industries at a community level are 
comprised within Ballard and Banks (2003); Banks (2006); Bainton (2008); Banks (2009); 
Gilberthorpe (2014); Golub (2014); Gilberthorpe and Rajak (2017). Individual agency and 
community relationships have been the focus. Recent literature has also employed child mortality 
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data to determine the impact of resource wealth on children’s health in regions impacted by a 
resource curse, see Makhlouf et al. (2017) and Wigley (2017).  
Developing a better understanding of how individuals become disenfranchised and become victims 
of power traps can significantly improve the understanding of resource curse dynamics and 
associated power distortions. Recent literature emphasises the aforementioned and comments that 
‘it is only more recently that new disaggregated data have allowed us to identify (possibly more 
accurately) the localised impacts in the vicinity of mineral activity’ (Van Der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 
2017).  
Scholarly endeavour must begin to disaggregate factors that are driving these issues within a 
framework that enables understanding of the problem to be improved. Continually producing 
contradictory conclusions based on macroeconomic modelling will not benefit this agenda. A 
consensus on how to view the problem needs to be worked towards so that context specific, ground-
up research can be tailored to individual settings of acute relevance. The eight recent papers 
produced in this regard makes a significant contribution to this endeavour (Papyrakis, 2017).  
Properly understanding these issues is imperative and where this improved understanding can have 
the biggest relative impact is in regions where the data is inherently unreliable. After extensively 
reviewing the literature in this realm it appears that far more emphasis and attention has been placed 
upon how to derive insight from datasets than rethinking how the data is collected, the validity of it 
and subsequently the accuracy of conclusions drawn from it. This thesis provides a platform, 
conceptual framework and case study of how to undertake such future efforts.  
The resource curse literature has significantly improved the understanding required to effectively 
formulate and synthesise key factors that contribute to the mechanics of power. This understanding 
greatly improved the efficiency of research within the Solomon Islands with respect to the pre-
identification of pivotal factors of concern and influence. Additionally, the theory has now been 
applied outside of the natural resources realm and has been used as a framework to attempt to 
explain the ‘intellectual resource curse’ (Novicevic et al., 2002). Applications also include, ‘the 
carbon curse’ Friedrichs and Inderwildi (2013), as well as the ‘financial curse’ (Shaxson and 
Christensen, 2013; Law and Singh, 2014). This illustrates that the anthropological factors are the 
binding element of a paradoxical result to seemingly favourable conditions occurring. 
Understanding the social conditions that lead to negative outcomes associated with advantageous 
pre-conditions will require a more complex understanding of human group interactions. 
 No country is immune from experiencing a curse due to the temporality of the constantly evolving 
social and economic fabric of nations. When a critical mass of youth is impacted by resource curse 
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dynamics the social characteristics that transpire, such as corruption, can become entrenched and 
systemic across a generation. The youth are the conduit between short-term disenfranchisement, 
coupled with violence and chronic, long-term instability resulting in a failed nation state with little 
hope of a better life for those living within its borders. The youth must become a focus of research 
moving forward. They have not been to date and this is a glaring omission.  
  
Chapter 5 – Formal and Informal Institutions 
In institutionally weak environments the presence of large resource rents can provide a 
“prize value” to state capture. – Fearon and Laitin (2003) 
5.1.Overview 
The previous chapter distilled the essence of the resource curse literature to promote a more 
nuanced understanding of the phenomena as well as highlighting focal points for new 
research. This chapter examines and details the impact of institutions on the growth 
trajectories of nations from national level ideological perspectives down to community level 
informal social networks. This is achieved by disaggregating the institutional literature into 
constituent parts as well as assessing the key differences between formal and informal 
structures. The intent is to improve comprehension of how power is distributed, maintained 
and employed within settings that are defined by institutional weakness and dysfunction.  
The institutional literature becomes fundamental to meaningfully understanding the social 
dynamics that are fortifying corrupt power structures in nations rich in resource wealth. It is 
also an integral aspect of better understanding the impact this has on the impartial, powerless 
victims of these regimes, the youth. An effective understanding of the institutional 
componentry of such issues is essential to any meaningful policy prescription. In many 
instances, it is the commandeering of pre-existing institutions by those in power that render 
much of the prescriptive policy approaches rather toothless. Transparency and education are 
the central components. Implementing this practically and holding those abusing positions of 
power accountable also requires functioning institutions and therefore the problem can be 
somewhat circular in nature.  
This chapter provides an assessment of the institutional factors contributing to group social 
dynamics from a broad, empire level perspective, down to the informal social institutions 
influencing those involved in localised regimes. To achieve this end there is a need to also 
understand the original inception of these institutions, why they were put in place historically 
and whether that matches the current form and function they resemble.  
Informal institutions are poorly understood. However their impact in nations that have less 
well developed formal institutions is overwhelming. This is particularly relevant to the case 
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study of the Solomon Islands. Understanding these informal social dynamics at large can 
dramatically improve the comprehension of decisions being made by individuals within it.  
Property rights, although an integral institution with respect to power derived from natural 
resource wealth have been largely isolated from the dialogue within this chapter so that it can 
be discussed separately. This chapter focuses instead on the institutional arrangements that 
disseminate power. The defining characteristics and separate focused discussion of property 
rights and their impact on the administration of power will be explored in Chapter 6.  
 In countries such as the Solomon Islands legislative, regulatory and customary barriers block 
the divisibility of rights or fail to enforce rights, creating insecurity for rights holders 
(Boudreaux, 2005). These situations mute the incentive structure that exists when property 
rights are robust and contracts are respected. The majority of the Solomon Islands are 
controlled under customary title. There are however many inconsistencies between customary 
law and the constitution as well as numerous ways of undermining any pre-existing law with 
a new act of parliament. In addition, there are nine separate provinces and respective 
provincial governments empowered to make laws impacting resources and the broader 
natural environment. This characteristic renders any previous well intentioned legislation 
powerless and provides key areas of nodal power distortion that are targeted by companies 
seeking to take advantage of this (KIP, 2015). This is the same blueprint of corruption that 
has been followed in PNG to gain access and control over gold and natural gas reserves 
(Laurance et al., 2012; Golub, 2014; Boutilier, 2017). Better understanding the role and 
impact of community empowerment and the informal power channels in this regard is pivotal 
to mitigating corruption and rent-seeking. The Misima case study from a PNG gold mining 
community emphasises the fact that although communities experience dependency, they also 
become active agents who arrange circumstances for their own benefit (Boutilier, 2017).  
The Solomon Islands has traditional authority structures and a formal democratic authority 
structure consisting of provincial and national governments. Traditional clan authorities and 
custom are recognised as the governance institutions in matters related to land control and 
use. The customary laws are administered by clan leaders, who attain their positions neither 
through inheritance nor through democratic elections. As in many traditional rural societies, 
they are chosen by consensus, with the preferences of elders carrying a great deal of weight 
(Platteau and Abraham, 2002). Although they are not elected in a formal sense, their 
leadership has received popular assent. Moreover, the national government recognises them 
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as legal authorities. This setting of legal pluralism and its impact on local communities will 
be additionally explored in Chapter 6 and 7.  
5.2. Background 
Institutions set the rules of the game and subsequently increase the predictability of the 
decision-making situation. This allows for a detailed understanding of the strategies and 
linkages among decisions being made in this regard where the process is transparent 
(Heywood, 2000). Institutions consist of formal rules and informal constraints.  
Helmke and Levitsky (2004) provide the following definition, “formal institutions are openly 
codified, in the sense that they are established and communicated through channels that are 
widely accepted as official … informal institutions are socially shared rules, usually 
unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned 
channels”. Informal institutions are equally known but not laid down in writing and they tend 
to be more persistent than formal rules (North, 1997). While a stable formal institutional 
framework is a pre-condition for sustainable resource management, informal institutions play 
a crucial role in this sector. An analysis of informal social codification is addressed within 
section 5.7 to promote the understanding of this comparatively poorly understood realm.  
The significance of institutional composition and functioning in explaining the positive 
outcomes associated with natural resource wealth is widely accepted (Glaeser et al., 2004; 
Rodrik et al., 2004; Acemoglu et al., 2005; Fatás and Mihov, 2005; Nelson, 2008; Butkiewicz 
and Yanikkaya, 2010). How institutions have impacted growth trajectories of nations is well 
articulated in North (1989); North (1990). It would be insufficient, however, to attempt to 
explain the underpinnings of power distortions and associated social dynamics solely via 
institutional factors, there is simply more to the problem as highlighted by Papyrakis (2017). 
Influential dialogue with respect to the connection between resource wealth and institutional 
arrangements illustrates that this is a key area that will affect change in the future (Acemoglu 
et al., 2005; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Mehlum et al., 2006a). Scholars have more 
generally focused their efforts on the effect of institutions on economic growth and their 
potential with respect to building social capacity (Matthews, 1986; North, 1994; Knack and 
Keefer, 1995).  
Institutions within the context of this analysis are defined as, “systems of established and 
embedded social rules that structure social interactions” (Hodgson, 2006). A broad 
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framework of formal rules and informal restraints is articulated by North (1990). More recent 
work regarding the formal and informal nature of institutions stressing the importance of 
social capital can be found in Edwards and Ogilvie (2012). Within the literature different 
definitions of an ‘institution’ can lead to confusion as well as misleading relationships 
between growth and institutional influence.  
The role of institutions in society is an idea grappled with in seminal economic prose on the 
topic over one hundred years ago by Veblen (1899). The institution of private property and its 
intersection with respect to resource management and common pool resources provides 
useful insights (Hardin, 1968). Many of the themes remain ostensibly relevant (Feeny et al., 
1990). Much of this work resonates with the principles of inter-generational equity put 
forward by Hartwick (1977).  
The impact of institutional composition has been measured and explored in myriad ways 
within the literature. A brief summary will be provided to present the points of emphasis 
made and points of inconsistency within this realm and what small developing economies 
may be able to contribute to furthering this understanding. 
Countries with certain institutional preconditions have a rather specific set of dynamics that 
seem to follow a similar path if supporting social conditions exist (Poelhekke and Van der 
Ploeg, 2007; Cotet and Tsui, 2010; Harding, 2013). This is further substantiated by Sachs 
(2007) and examined with the hypothesis of two possible development outcomes with strong 
and weak institutions by Gradstein (2008). A threshold estimation technique is employed by 
Sarmidi et al. (2014) to reveal a point at which institutional quality adversely impacts growth. 
The specific case of Nigeria exemplified by Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2008) 
confirmed the aforementioned findings by looking at broader measures of institutional quality 
and proxies concluding that ‘waste and corruption’ was the driver of negative growth. 
Acemoglu et al. (2001) employ a mortality rate approximation to estimate the effectiveness of 
institutions on economic performance, finding a large impact. Interestingly, in regions where 
the chance of survival for European colonisers was greater different institutional 
arrangements were implemented. In those where survival rates were low extractive states 
were established.  
It is imperative to understand and frame how power is administered and balanced by certain 
institutional arrangements. There is a need for malleability however some institutional 
structures which are focused on long term planning horizons must remain stable and 
unchanged to give people the confidence in them. It is very important for researchers to make 
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a clear distinction between policy and institutions, this is highlighted by Rodrik et al. (2004); 
Brunnschweiler (2008). Zenthöfer (2011) stress the importance of policy decisions not 
institutions. The observation that sound institutions seem to be able to alleviate the symptoms 
of a resource curse is not a rule that can be universally applied (Mehlum et al., 2006b; Costa 
and Santos, 2013). Authors such as Lane and Tornell (1996) stress the importance and 
relevance of pre-existing institutional quality. Norway provides a telling illustration of this 
(Larsen, 2004; Holden, 2013; Cleary, 2016).  
Research elucidates the difficultly of transplanting institutions and policies, this is explained 
in terms of slow moving institutional culture and fast moving politics (Roland, 2004). This 
can be a rather useful way of conceptualising the issues that evolve. Roland (2004) further 
stresses the importance in having diversity in institutional blueprints. Tsai et al. (2011) 
further expands upon this point with respect to social diversity, trust and institutions.  
Frankel (2012a), concludes that small developing nations have a lot to teach the world as they 
are more malleable and adaptable institutionally however this can also lead to their demise 
(Rodrik, 2003). The importance of studying small natural experiments to further understand 
the impact of natural resource windfalls is further promoted by Collier (2017). Chapter 6 will 
address this with respect to the pivotal institution of property rights, providing context and 
illustration within the Solomon Islands.  
Many developing nations are characterised by government bureaucracies that are manipulated 
to the benefit of a select few. When provincial administrations become as powerful as the 
national assembly due to windfall wealth these regions influence the overall functionality of 
all related institutions such as the rule of law. When this occurs at a national level and the 
nation’s army is used to enforce such subverted uses of power, systemic corruption occurs 
informally as a countervailing social reaction to a failed nation state (Rotberg, 2002; Rotberg, 
2003).  
Many nations that have only more recently crafted new national identities and constitutions 
or the rules for people in that civilisation to live by. Historically these were carefully crafted 
by religious leaders, philosophers and politicians alike who were attempting to rewrite the 
framework by which people’s lives would be lived (Lutz, 1984). One polarising modern 
example would be East and West Berlin or in other words ‘capitalism’ and ‘socialism’ 
(Borneman, 1991). The internal dynamics that are ensuing as a result of underlying tribal 
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rivalries in nations such as the Solomon Islands constitute similar characteristics based on 
divided ideologies.  
The relevant institutional history that has strongly influenced current institutional structures 
and whose genesis relates and helps to explain their current form will now be provided. 
5.3.Colonialism, Empire and Trading Leagues 
The implementation and mentality behind empire building has impacted every nation on 
earth. Many of these empires were built on wealth acquired from myriad different sources. 
Initially these empires produced whatever they could that would receive that largest arbitrage 
value and take advantage of what the region had to offer (Paine, 2014). A historical context 
can be garnered from Sokoloff and Engerman (2000) in relation to the role of institutions in 
the New World. A time series analysis of colonisation is provided by Boswell (1989). 
Codification of human behaviours and supporting narratives for these behaviours is a very 
important factor in world history in relation to the power of the state, as well as the associated 
geopolitical forces. The crusades serve as a prime illustration (Gombrich, 2005).Although the 
modern nation state may be a relatively new concept the state like power centers that have 
existed throughout the last millennium have dramatically influenced and set the foundations 
for the modern nation state (Wilson, 2011).  
Modern legislation is intrinsically linked to biblical doctrines, the church and the state as 
power centers have worked in unison for centuries. Historically, the pope was the only one 
who could communicate directly to the word of god, therefore the church knew best. 
Religion, as it were, has a monopoly on morality in this regard (Anderson, 1988; Anderson 
and Tollison, 1992; Inglis, 1998). It has only been in more recent history that these codes 
have been more abstractly defined with respect to biblical underpinnings. Like the biblical 
and church segregation, the rule of law has followed much the same path which given the 
history and seminal logic that underpins both is not at all surprising (Kriegel, 1995).  
Kriegel (1995) also emphasises that European liberal democracies would have been 
impossible without the political basis provided by the lawful state first developed by 
monarchies. She also shows that early modern centralised states became liberal insofar as 
they developed a centralised legal system, rather than a centralised administration. In 
developing these ideas, she presents a picture of the state as a major force for human liberty. 
The institutions themselves however are not sufficient and cannot be transplanted, 
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accompanying social and human capital is fundamental to their functioning. Without it the 
underlying informal social institutions will override and corrupt any formal institution that is 
established.  
The blue print of colonialism was conducted globally (Lewis, 1957; Stutz and De Souza, 
1998; Horowitz, 2004; Bernstein, 2009; Shorto, 2013). The spread of an empire state of mind 
has moved from continent to continent over the centuries (Boswell, 1989). What remains the 
same is the fact that to be a winner in the exchange there must also be a loser (Galeano, 
1997). The structure and composition of the winning and losing teams has evolved from early 
civilisational structures to corporations and trading leagues acting on behalf of an entire 
nation or group of nations. The complexity and temporal nature of many of these pacts, 
treaties and agreements that make this form of wealth accumulation possible are constantly 
changing. The core principles however remain the same.  
Seminal multi-national companies such as the Dutch East Indies or the British East Indies 
provide telling narratives into the complexities surrounding the ever evolving role of the 
crown, the state, the church and local citizens (Gaastra, 2003; Robins, 2012). Social pressures 
coming from the European nations in response to the exploitation of people and nations 
brought about by these companies were elucidated in myriad ways. One rather colorful 
example was that of the fictional character Max Havelaar and the now world famous author 
Multatuli (Eduard Douwes Dekker). This novel changed the approach and attitudes of many 
Dutch people in relation to the impact the company was having in faraway lands, Indonesia 
(Hofstede, 2004; Salverda, 2005; Zook, 2006). This movement has now given way to 
formalised management philosophies and fair trade societies (Raynolds et al., 2004; 
Czarniawska-Joerges and De Monthoux, 2005).  
Given that most of the global trade was controlled very narrowly, much of the world’s fate 
was decided by a few people attempting to wrestle control of a monopoly into the right 
hands, the results of which were both disastrous and spectacular (Letwin, 1954). Evidence 
abounds of the implications and ability to control strategic territorial areas for purposes of 
being able to transport these commodities (Palais, 1959; Gaastra, 2003; Gombrich, 2005; 
Fremont, 2007; Shorto, 2013; Paine, 2014). The costs and risks associated with trade and 
shipping were also changing (Hummels, 2007).  
A poignant example of the complexity of these early trade relations and political economy 
power struggles which transcend the national political arena is illustrated by the power of the 
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Hanseatic League, not dissimilar to a modern day equivalent of OPEC (Palais, 1959; Rotz, 
1977; Colvin, 2008; MacGregor, 2014). How to define state power boundaries becomes an 
interesting quandary when considering an entity like the Hanseatic League
7
 (Palais, 1959; 
Rotz, 1977; Colvin, 2008). The League operated in countries with complete autonomy when 
it was at the height of its powers (Paine, 2014). A reminder of its influence and power is 
Lufthansa airlines.  
Before the time of modern nation states it was the houses of leading families of the time that 
were trading partners. This is a very important consideration given one of the key factors 
constraining power trap dynamics are trust and transparency. Historically this simply gets 
back to knowing who you were dealing with. Tudor England serves as a powerful example 
(Thurley, 1993). This history illustrates that the known and trusted family unit when stable 
was able to be the platform from which the nation also derived its stability and signaled to 
trading partners from different cultures and backgrounds that they were a secure trading 
partner. The Medici family in Florence is another prime example. 
Given the influential impact that external power bases have had on the Solomon Islands, with 
the British colonial administration keeping this history in perspective is integral to 
meaningfully understanding the current structure of that nation’s administration. A setting of 
legal pluralism underpins and heavily influences the political economy of the nation. The 
legacy left by the colonial administrators in the region cannot be understated and still strongly 
influences outcomes at a national policy level.  
5.4. Political Economy 
Political economy is the study of production and trade and their links with custom, 
government and law. It is the study and use of how economic theory and methods influence 
and develop different social and economic systems, such as capitalism, socialism and 
communism, and it analyses how public policy is created and implemented. Since various 
individuals and groups have different interests in how a country or economy is to develop, 
                                                          
7
 Dollinger (1970) and Lloyd (2002) provide evidence to suggest that the Hansa’s origins lie in the 12th century. 
The word originally meant, ‘band of men’ but became used to describe the medieval guilds. At its peak in the 
15
th
 century the Hanseatic League was an alliance of some ninety self-governing German speaking cities. The 
key point is that it was outside the control of the Emperor and the imperial institutions as well as member cities 
being outside the region such as Stockholm, Riga, Bergen and Danzig. The Hansa has no officials, no seal, no 
statutes, no navy, no ships, these were all individually owned by merchants.  
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political economy as a discipline is a complex field, covering a broad array of potentially 
competing interests.  
How a state’s natural resource wealth influences its economic development based on the 
functioning of power stemming from this wealth is well defined in Ross (1999); Auty 
(2001b); Auty and Gelb (2001). Political economy or the politics of power is influenced by 
many different sources, not just natural resources. However, many nations that are severely 
indebted, low income countries are also primary commodity exporters so the connection with 
natural resources is effectual (Ross, 1999). The quality of the government itself is well 
examined within (La Porta et al., 1999).  
From a political economy standpoint terms like ‘resource curse’ and ‘underdevelopment’ 
describe the same effect but from different ideological standpoints. In colloquial terms, what 
is being described is how societies, communities and individuals react when they realise the 
potential of what has been taken from them. These theories describe the inability of nations to 
take advantage of favourable circumstances. How they form groups and interact in such 
instances is seminal to understanding such issues so that effective prescriptions can be made 
to mitigate negative effects. As these groups begin to realise and better understand missed 
opportunities or deceitfulness, civil unrest, violence and community depression normally 
ensue (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). Urdal (2008)find that youth bulges increase the risk of all 
three forms of political violence, especially in states with great male surpluses. Youth bulges, 
when coinciding with high levels of urban inequality, is the only form of demographic 
pressure to statistically increase the risk of Hindu-Muslim rioting within their study (Urdal, 
2008). 
A comprehensive literature review of the political economy of the resource curse can be 
found in Rosser (2006). The author posits that positive resource wealth management 
strategies should be studied to learn which policies and institutions promote development. 
However, policy prescriptions are not transferrable due to the complexity and esoteric social 
dynamics that make each nation unique. The political economy of the resource curse is very 
well defined and explained by Ross (1999). The development path and associated colonial 
legacies will also be very different for every nation and provide an important platform of 
understanding with respect to the modern institutional arrangements. Many colonial empires 
have laid the foundations of the rights to resources, these are integral to understanding the 
impact of current control and ownership structures.  
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The relationship between political regimes and social progress is termed the ‘first law of 
petro-politics’ by Friedman (2006) with respect to oil rich states. These claims are refuted by 
Wacziarg (2012) using a variety of time series and panel data methods over a wide range of 
country subsamples and time periods, finding strictly no evidence in favour of this so-called 
‘First Law of Petro-politics’. Importantly, the variable construction within the modelling is 
not robust or accurate and should be viewed with caution. Exploring the relationship between 
price and a manufactured measure of democracy is unreliable due to the fact that the measure 
contains assumptions that are not able to be standardised across different contextual realities.  
Haber and Menaldo (2011) find that increases in resource reliance are not necessarily 
associated with authoritarianism. Indeed, in many instances, the results suggest a resource 
blessing. However this is again temporal and context based. A statement or finding of this 
nature does not in any way then become a general rule for other regions that are exposed to 
similar dynamics. It merely provides a warning to those that possess similar social and 
economic dynamics to manage the wealth accordingly. In many ways this has been the 
largest contribution of the resource curse thesis, be warned, know the risks and act 
accordingly (Auty, 1993; Auty, 1995; Auty, 2001b; Auty, 2007; Auty, 2009). 
Institutions can be moderated by political power balances and fractionalisation (Lane and 
Tornell, 1996; Caselli, 2006; Nitzan and Bichler, 2009; Bjorvatn et al., 2012). What 
economic policies can be employed to avoid negative growth impacts associated with natural 
resources is addressed within Bakwena et al. (2009); Luong and Weinthal (2010). The role of 
political institutions is assessed by Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2014). Using a sample of 133 
countries over a period from 1970 to 2005, they find that resource revenues deteriorate 
contract enforcement if political institutions lack vigour. Incentive structures surrounding 
resource rights are the key to understanding what is driving the potentially negative social 
dynamics (Robinson et al., 2006). Important literature in this regards includes (Rodrik, 1997; 
Rodrik, 2003; Robinson et al., 2014).  
Huber et al. (1993) assesses the impact of economic development on democracy and 
emphasises the importance of change resulting from the class and social structural changes 
brought about by industrialisation and urbanisation. Additionally the analysis concludes that 
democratic prospects are much better in ‘Third World’ countries without a significant group 
of large landholders and with a significant agrarian middle class. Zakaria (2007) expresses 
concern surrounding the rise of illiberal democracies. This follows from and extends upon the 
research included within the original paper (Zakaria, 1997). 
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Crude oil democracies and political regimes are explored within Dunning (2008). Ramsay 
(2011) explores the link between oil rents, political institutions, and civil liberties, concluding 
that the effect of oil price shocks is larger than might be expected. Tsui (2011) reports that a 
large oil windfalls such as the one realised by Iraq pushes a country’s democracy level almost 
twenty percentage points below trend after three decades. Treisman (2000) concludes that 
longer exposure to democracy predicted lower corruption within their analysis. Tavares and 
Wacziarg (2001) conclude that democratic institutions are responsive to the demands of the 
poor by expanding access to education and lowering income inequality, but do so at the 
expense of physical capital accumulation.  
Understanding the underlying context in which the principles of democracy are operating will 
be fundamental to framing power dissemination in the Solomon Islands and other developing 
nations promoting such systems of governance. Any well intentioned policy or institutional 
structure can be subverted. Thus, a disaggregated, local perspective is required to accurately 
assess the impact of such designs. Democracy per se is not a universal panacea, it can be 
moulded to meet the needs of those in the system if the surrounding social fabric is corrupted.  
Promoting accountability and being able to effectively enforce with the rule of law 
manipulation and corruption of the political system is made more difficult by the fact that 
large volumes of wealth is able to additionally corrupt the functioning of legal institutions. 
This problem is circular in nature and large windfalls tend to override the ability of both the 
political administration initially and as a consequence the legal frameworks are weakened. In 
severe circumstances, they further facilitate manipulation. The rights to resources are the link 
between power dissemination and its intersection with institutional arrangements as well as 
cultural assignment of rights. The dichotomy of communal ownership structures as opposed 
to private property rights in the Solomon Islands provides a telling example. This will be 
further explored in Chapter 6. It is the institutions that are creating and enforcing the 
ownership of rights pertaining to the resources and therefore how these rights are determined 
and enforced will be strongly influenced by the political economising of power. Extreme 
power distortions impacted by voluminous resource windfalls can over-ride the legal 
foundations of a nation or influence them so strongly that their intended outcomes are 
transmuted, see for example Leite and Weidmann (1999); Dalgaard and Olsson (2008).  
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5.5. Legal Institutions 
It is the complex of actors and institutions that determines how and to what extent the 
principles stated in the legal constructs of a society shall be translated into social 
consequences (Berlins and Dyer, 2000). The primary legal rule is basically a statement of a 
desired social outcome. The law machine is the mechanism for bringing it about. Primary 
legal rules merely define what society asks. The mere request affects social behaviour to 
some extent although very little is known about the nature and intensity of that effect. To 
learn about the legal system in any society, an expanded vision and understanding of the 
complex of legal structures, actors and processes which allow the law to function is needed. 
By studying merely the rules of law, a lot of the important detail is missed (Merryman, 1981). 
Common law is a uniquely English development (Plucknett, 2001). Before the Norman 
conquest, different rules and customs applied in different regions of the country (Plucknett, 
2001). However, after 1066, monarchs began to unite both the country and its laws using the 
King’s court. Justices created a common law by drawing on customs across the country and 
rulings by monarchs (Caenegem, 1988). These rules developed organically and were rarely 
written down (Caenegem, 1988). By contrast, European rulers drew on Roman law and in 
particular a compilation of rules issued by the emperor Justinian in the 6th century that was 
rediscovered in 11th century Italy (Mousourakis, 2003). With the Enlightenment of the 18th 
century, rulers in various continental countries sought to produce comprehensive legal codes 
(Zimmermann, 2009). 
Today the difference between common and civil legal traditions lies in the main source of 
law (Merryman, 1981). Although common-law systems make extensive use of statutes, 
judicial cases are regarded as the most important source of law, which gives judges an active 
role in developing rules. For example, the elements needed to prove the crime of murder are 
contained in case law rather than defined by statute. To ensure consistency, courts abide by 
precedents set by higher courts examining the same issue. In civil-law systems, by contrast, 
codes and statutes are designed to cover all eventualities and judges have a more limited role 
of applying the law to the case in hand. Past judgments are no more than loose guides. When 
it comes to court cases, judges in civil-law systems tend towards being investigators, while 
their peers in common-law systems act as arbiters between parties that present their 
arguments. 
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Civil-law systems are more widespread than common-law systems. The CIA World Factbook 
puts the numbers at 150 and 80 countries respectively. Common-law systems are found 
only in countries that are former English colonies or have been influenced by the Anglo-
Saxon tradition, such as Australia, India, Canada and the United States. The Solomon Islands 
also falls under this umbrella at it was once part of the British protectorate. The impact of this 
history and current legal setting will be examined further with respect to the Solomon Islands 
and land access in Chapter 6.  
Civil-law jurisdictions could be considered more stable and fairer than common-law systems, 
because laws are stated explicitly and are easier to discern. But English lawyers take pride in 
the flexibility of their system, because it can quickly adapt to circumstance without the need 
for Parliament to enact legislation (Merryman, 1981). In reality, many systems are now a 
mixture of the two traditions, giving them the best of both legal worlds.  
Given the setting of legal pluralism in the Solomon Islands and subsequent manipulation by 
international actors it is relevant and important to consider the potential impact and broad 
guidance provided by international law. As the nation is still developing its legal system the 
evolution of analogous legislation within the international law arena may provide useful 
guidance.  
The history of international law is well detailed within Fassbender et al. (2012). A further 
analysis is added by Horowitz (2004). How international norms develop through the use of 
law is analysed by Nadelmann (1990), within the setting of prohibition. Determining 
‘ownership’ of the oceans played out in a similar fashion (Steinberg, 1999). The organisation 
establishing the rules for the game as well as who is able to enforce them has a very large 
bearing on the overall functioning of any law (Mazower, 2009). How this plays out in the 
world of abundant capital and ever increasing connectedness becomes a fascinatingly 
complex narrative (Brenner, 1999; Kaplinsky, 2000; Henry et al., 2001).  
The implication and relevance of international law and human rights is well detailed in 
Simmons (2009). Given that the rule of law guides social behaviours this becomes a very 
important intersection with political economy in a nation and between nations. It also has a 
powerful bearing on what we as a global human society will accept (Koh, 1998; Goodman 
and Jinks, 2004; Ratner et al., 2009; Simmons, 2009).  
Transcending the legal/court based view of the world leaves many of these eventual business 
decisions placed at the level of international diplomacy and relations, effectively the 
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globalisation of world politics (Baylis et al., 2013). For a concrete examples consider the 
League of Nations or what we now know as the United Nations (Walters, 1965; Northedge, 
1986; Simma et al., 2002).  
The resources of a country belong to the people of that country. Conceptually, this is why it 
would be unjust for PNG to drill horizontally and extract gas from the Solomon Islands. 
Analogously, when a violent dictatorship gains and sustains its power by force, it is stealing 
from the country and its people. Where property rights violations are legalised in 
international exchange the problem is amplified.  
A group that overpowers the guards and takes control of a warehouse may be able to give 
some of the merchandise to others, accepting money in exchange. He who pays them 
becomes merely the possessor, not the owner, of the loot. Contrast this with a group that 
overpowers an elected government and takes control of a country. Such a group, too, can give 
away some of the country’s natural resources, accepting money in exchange. In this case, 
however, the purchaser acquires not merely possession, but all the rights and liberties of 
ownership, which are supposed to be and actually are protected and enforced by all other 
state courts (Wenar, 2008, p. 13).  
A substitution of right by force frequently takes place in key cases where there appears to be 
an acute power struggle or a power void. Frequently, dictators are installed by force precisely 
to take control of a nation’s resources for specific interest groups who have a narrative of 
entitlement to justify their actions.  
The rule of law with respect to the resource curse dynamics is investigated in Norman (2009). 
Contract enforceability is highlighted and discussed in Libecap (1993); Edwards and Ogilvie 
(2012). Costa and Santos (2013) make use of a Rule of Law Index to investigate the 
effectiveness of institutional arrangements in managing the resource curse symptoms in 
regards to hydrocarbons. The legal environment, its impact upon financial development and 
subsequently long-run economic growth is analysed by Levine (1999). 
Within the Solomon Islands there are several points of legislative weakness that are being 
exploited and used to undermine formal legal institutions and traditional structures with 
respect to property and resource ownership. The context provided within this section provides 
the relevant background to better understand these specific weaknesses and points of concern 
discussed in Chapter 6. 
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5.6. Social Institutions  
How people organise themselves in pursuit of a common purpose becomes particularly 
relevant when the formal legal frameworks that can provide this direction are not functioning. 
Groups that are marginalised and disenfranchised can form in rebellion against the state 
(Clastres, 1987; Scott, 2014). A poignant and modern illustration of how a state possesses, 
utilises and maintains its power is detailed within Mann (1984); Fukuyama (1999); 
Fukuyama (2004). 
This literature expands upon the conceptual frameworks contained within what was 
considered a tyrannical publication in its day on state power, ‘The Prince’ by Machiavelli 
(Machiavelli, 1532). Adding modern narratives to its original structure illustrates its timeless 
accuracy in many respects. This logic can greatly assist those in developing nations design 
effective policy which considers the mechanics of power with respect to those nations that 
have a stake in the development trajectory. Such historical examination can greatly assist in 
contextualising current power complexes. Many developing nations exhibit characteristics 
that other nations have faced in the past. Drawing upon the knowledge of these development 
outcomes given specific circumstances historically can improve the understanding of current 
circumstances and highlight those which have produced negative results so that they may be 
avoided.  
Since the end of the Second World War, countries rich in natural resources have typically 
performed well during times of general global prosperity however they have also fallen 
victim to spectacular downturns in the wake of exogenous shocks. Weak public institutions, 
political instability, inequitable distributions of wealth, and high levels of corruption appear 
to be common features of these economies (Karl, 1997). These episodes can become 
extremely acute and concentrated causing chaos and instability that renders any pre-existing 
system powerless (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998). 
Literature within this realm has been approached from two distinct angles, economic 
investigation on ‘social’ issues and social research on ‘economic’ issues. Olson (1982) 
addresses the problem of political stability increasing the power of special interest lobbies 
that lead to economic inefficiencies. This analysis further emphasises the importance of 
understanding the surrounding social complexities and psychologies in addition to the 
institutions themselves. Olson (1982) shows that democratic institutions can also be distorted 
by special interest groups and nodally powerful actors.  
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The importance of ‘social infrastructure’ in explaining the output of workers in different 
nations is explored within Hall and Jones (1999), concluding that differences in institutions 
and government policies are driving the disparities. The impact and susceptibility of 
institutional structures to be manipulated and the role of broader culture is explored within 
the social programming literature. Hofstede et al. (1991) refers to this form of social 
programming as software of the mind. This is a novel way to look at and understand many of 
the individual psychological factors contributing to broader social dynamics. This type of 
research and logic greatly assists in explaining many of the social dynamics that occur as a 
result of language, education and human interaction within groups, broadly defined as 
culture. An alternative logic which promotes interventionist logic, see Chang (2002). An 
accurate critique of free trade and associated capitalistic policies are also well argued within 
(Chang and Grabel, 2014). From the perspective of equality also see Wilkinson and Pickett 
(2010).  
The importance and seminal nature of social capital with respect to social dynamics is well 
presented by Woolcock (1998); Woolcock and Narayan (2000). The importance of social 
capital is further discussed by Knack and Keefer (1997), finding that trust and civil norms are 
stronger in nations with higher, more equal income distribution and better educated ethnically 
homogenous populations. Woolcock and Narayan (2000) conclude by arguing that a 
significant virtue of the idea and discourse of social capital is that it helps to bridge orthodox 
divides among scholars, practitioners, and policymakers. The very definition of social capital 
which attracts great disparity in literature is best synthesised by Woolcock and Narayan 
(2000); Adler and Kwon (2002).There has been an increasing trend in explaining many 
growth anomalies with respect to social variables, these being social cohesion, institutions 
and growth (Easterly et al., 2006). Schotter (2008) utilises game theory to explore the rigidity 
of economic theory of social institutions. 
A central tenant of any policy or institutional framework with respect to social applicability is 
trust (Tsai et al., 2011). Accurately defining what is being observed can prove to be as 
difficult as the econometric and statistical analysis employed thereafter. Trust is a pivotal area 
for future research within the social institutions realm (Lewis and Weigert, 1985; Fukuyama, 
1995). Trust and transparency are included as an individual factor within the state level 
conceptual framework in Chapter 2. Without transparency trust becomes faith based and 
subjective from an administrative perspective. Kolstad and Wiig (2012) find that in highly 
corrupt societies institutional improvements that reduce corruption may also undermine trust. 
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This will be problematic for anti-corruption policy approaches adopted to address these 
problems. This concept is further extended by analysing the concept of social technologies 
which support physical technologies (Nelson, 2008). 
Steinbeck, in his novel ‘The Pearl’ provides a powerful example and accompanying social 
narrative of Kino’s Pearl that is extended upon in academic literature by Kolstad and Wiig 
(2012). The paper asks the question, do natural resources reduce trust? They conclude that 
institutional improvements that reduce corruption may also undermine trust, which poses 
difficult challenges for anti-corruption policy. They also find a non-linear relationship 
between corruption and trust, indicating that the effect of natural resources on trust depends 
on the initial corruption level of a country. This supports the underlying logic of the 
individual life condition factors being intrinsically linked and overwhelmingly impacted by 
state level power dynamics, advocated by this thesis. Corruption is incredibly difficult to 
measure and the actors involved are constantly changing. Therefore, results of this nature 
should be viewed with some scepticism. Corruption exists in every nation, not just 
developing nations (Murray and Frijters, 2017). The question really becomes who and what is 
responsible for creating corrupt societies? Greed would seem to be part of the natural human 
condition in varying degrees of severity. The result of introducing a catalyst with a windfall 
gain element attached that increases social group competition needs to be better understood in 
this regard. The Solomon Islands’ current social frailties have been triggered by the 
withdrawal of a colonial administrative force. The resulting power void has triggered intense 
internal competition within national factions resulting in severe civil unrest. A greater 
understanding of the nation’s social institutions could dramatically improve policy 
formulation that seeks to mitigate against such adverse impacts. This will involve better 
understanding the exchange and interaction between informal and formal institutions which is 
not well understood.  
5.7. Informal Institutions 
Informal institutions are socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, 
communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels. Informal restraints 
sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions and codes of conduct differ from more formal codes 
such as constitutions, laws and property rights. Informal institutions such as customs or 
behaviour patterns are central to how a society functions. 
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As mechanisms of social interaction, institutions manifest in both formal organisations, such 
as the U.S. Congress, or the Roman Catholic Church, as well as in informal social order and 
organisation, reflecting human psychology, culture, habits and customs encompassing 
subjective experience of meaningful enactments. As a distinguishing characteristic, formal 
institutions are explicitly set forth by a relevant authority and informal institutions are 
generally unwritten societal rules, norms, and traditions. 
Accurately conceptualising and exploring the role that informal social dimensions play within 
power dynamics is an area that could considerably contribute to a more detailed 
understanding of problems associated with corruption. Better understanding such dynamics 
associated with social organisation can better inform policy in a prescriptive sense.  
To properly understand the levels and interconnection between power dynamic factors, 
informal institutions need to be well understood. This can then form the basis of more 
rigorous and focussed data collection to assess the ancillary impacts, included within the 
Solomon Islands’ case study. By employing a case study an enhanced understanding of such 
informal institutions which can be difficult to define and measure, can be explored within the 
setting to better frame the intersection with formal institutions. Understanding the correlation 
between the two will be imperative to designing practical and meaningful research moving 
forward as well as accurately understanding the current impact of informal institutions. Given 
the current circumstances being faced within the nation the relationship between the two 
needs to be more effectively understood before additional legislation is designed to combat 
the current social maladies (Fox and Walsh, 2017).  
Many successful organisations past and present do not have strictly formal codes that are 
readily apparent (Collier, 2008; Pettenkofer and Gambetta, 2011). The old trading companies 
were notorious for their secret committees and behind the scenes organisation of deals that 
were more in line with their own opaque company constitutions than of the nation states in 
which they were operating (Philips, 1940). How groups form within the fabric of the social 
and political factors that are unique to each setting can give insight into the probable 
outcomes that ensue (Skarbek, 2010; Skarbek, 2011; Skarbek, 2014). There are varying forms 
of such opaque constitutions governing groups of people trying to control resources. A telling 
modern example is that of the Mexican Mafia, by way of an example within Skarbek (2011). 
A constitution outlines the Mexican Mafia’s internal governance institutions (Blatchford 
2008, 44; United States v. Aguirre et al. 1994, 7). The rules of the constitution are 
summarised below: 
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 A member may not be a homosexual; 
 A member may not be an informant; 
 A member may not be a coward; 
 A member must not raise a hand against another member without sanction; 
 A member must not show disrespect for any member’s family, including sex with 
another member’s wife or girlfriend; 
 A member must not steal from another member; 
 A member must not interfere with another member’s business activities; 
 A member must not politic against another member or cause dissension within the 
organisation; 
 Membership is for life; 
 Membership mandates assaulting/killing all drop outs; 
 The Mafia comes first—even before your own family. 
 
A conspicuous example of resource abundance, weak institutions and violence begetting 
power in this fashion is documented in the origins of the Sicilian Mafia and Sicily’s sulphur 
rich mines (Buonanno et al., 2012). The very foundations of the Sicilian Mafia has its roots in 
resource curse dynamics, in their case associated with sulphur mining (Gambetta, 1996; 
Buonanno et al., 2012). The threat of violence is as powerful as violence itself and this allows 
many power structures such as the mafia style power traps to maintain control without always 
executing a threat (Nieburg, 1962).  
Once the power control structure exists it can then be applied to many other trades, regions 
and commodities. That is, once the social group has learned the recipe, it can be repeated in 
other realms and settings. Examples abound of this within the world of organised crime and 
the most profitable consumable commodities on the planet, narcotics (Becchi, 1996; Saviano, 
2014). Previously these narcotics industries have been underpinned by the chemical 
processing of raw commodities, which in real terms are crops that are harvested and 
processed in a mechanised agricultural sense. The social psychological characteristics 
associated with the windfalls of producing lucrative narcotics from natural resources may 
provide useful natural experiments to further expand the understanding required to mitigate 
the negative impacts of power distortions from analogous dynamics. The resource in question 
seems to be arbitrary, the fact that it is demanded is what is important as this is what creates 
the market. This marketplace due to the nature of the business provides a unique insight into 
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the informal institutional structures governing what may be the world’s biggest industry 
(Thoumi, 2005). The interaction between the illegal narcotics industry and terrorist 
organisations with respect to the promotion of trafficking through disaffected regions and the 
need to finance destructive ideologies exemplifies the issue. Windfall revenues are able to 
distort social psychologies, the extent to which this is possible based on the predeterminants 
of social capital in specific regions is not well understood.  
An interesting illustration of the longevity of informal social institutions and associated 
ideologies remaining in practice and transplanting into a pre-arranged group structure 
although surrounding circumstances have changed can be witnessed within football firms 
(Bebber, 2015). Many previously institutionalised ideologies that are no longer relevant are 
lived out and expressed on the social stage that football creates. Many cities that were 
dominated by particular ideologies carry on these traditions informally within the group 
structures that exist within these communities. The competitive stage that football provides 
draws these emotions and forms of expression into a very visible form, violence and 
destruction of property is not uncommon. Racism, based upon outdated beliefs of racial 
superiority, reflecting institutionalised views of a particular period have long been expressed 
through the theatre of football (Back et al., 1999).  
This is an important point to consider as knowing where to look to gain an understanding of 
the informal social ideologies guiding and influencing groups of people is equally as 
important as the more formal structures codified into law. The role of perception in inter-
group relations is analysed within Xiao et al. (2016). The role and influence of collective 
emotion is well illustrated by Bar‐Tal et al. (2007); Halperin and Sharvit (2015). The 
importance of gateway groups and dual identities as conduits to dialogue facilitation is this 
arena has great potential to improve outcomes (Levy et al., 2017a).  
Many of the social ques and codes that structure the way we act and behave are broken by 
swearing an allegiance to a new set of codes which then undermines the most basic human 
social unit, the family (Arregle et al., 2007). This really then does become the political drama 
that has played out over the centuries with respect to increased individual freedoms or 
increased communal structure (Hoppe, 2013). An approach to these problems is taken up in 
Bernard (1966). In modern society, it is the law that is guiding this behaviour and these 
principles of social interaction as the guiding morality once underpinned by the church has 
waned in some regions of the world. The differences and similarities that exist between 
countries becomes very important in being able to understand the implications of conjoined 
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national psyches that peruse a common overriding ideological objective (Popper, 1945; 
Williamson, 1985; Marx and Engels, 2002).  
With respect to extreme instability caused by power voids, the constituent social group 
dynamics emulates prison gang style social orders (Skarbek, 2014). If one holds the 
assumption that power trap dynamics weaken and sometimes destroy underlying cultural ties 
it would be in every practitioners best interest to properly understand the appropriate wisdom 
associated with gang style dynamics in regions where power ownership is policed with 
violence. This natural experiment of extreme forms of competition and intimidation within a 
controlled environment of informal, yet codified dynamics that govern such social institutions 
could provide extremely useful insight into the psychology impacting influential resource 
wealth.  
Social psychology and the connection with intractable conflicts which constitute the reality of 
many natural resource led growth trajectories in developing nations is comprehensively 
analysed within Halperin and Sharvit (2015). This is particularly relevant when considering 
the youth dynamics in the Solomon Islands and the future prospects for this cohort within the 
setting of acute social unrest that resulted in many deaths justified by tribal ideologies.  
The aforementioned social orders are all are different in some way, some more subtle than 
others however the common thread that binds them is the constant threat of violence of 
varying degrees of severity for non-compliance (Skarbek, 2010; Skarbek, 2011; Skarbek, 
2014). The more severe the act of violence the less the act needs to be carried out to maintain 
the same perceived threat level. One may not have to look very far for many worrying 
examples of this within the current global landscape, in many regions it has almost become 
the norm (Juergensmeyer, 2005). Modern day terrorist organisations provide extreme and 
acute examples of all the aforementioned dynamics (Kruglanski and Fishman, 2009). Better 
understanding these acute symptoms associated with power and social groups can improve 
much of the understanding required to formulate effective policy in this arena (Levy et al., 
2017a). See also, Cohen-Chen et al. (2016).  
A major issue that is not addressed well is what happens when innocent and impartial victims 
are caught up in this unrest. This trend among religiously affiliated youth is becoming a 
worrying phenomenon (McCue and Haahr, 2008; Kruglanski et al., 2013). Innocent victims 
being exposed to these destructive social attitudes is what ends up perpetuating the cycle of 
violence. This propagates the evolution of these social phenomena in ways that become 
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increasingly more complex and divergent from original groups (Žižek, 2002; Zizek, 2004; 
Žižek, 2008). This makes many of the dynamics more difficult to understand or even be 
aware of unless you are an active member (Horowitz and Schwartz, 1974; Žižek, 2002; 
Matsuda et al., 2013). Knowing how to accurately define and identify such a social group is 
also difficult and integral to any attempt to resolve related maladies (Esbensen et al., 2001). 
How to promote and establish dialogue with social groups who have diametrically opposed 
ideologies will be imperative to peacefully understanding and resolving extreme group 
behaviours (Atran, 2010). Many religious texts, folklore, maxims and related narratives 
provide justification for such actions when transformed by biased and un-related agendas. 
Throughout history much of this code of conduct for human behaviour was substantiated 
from religious teachings and texts. Many of our national constitutions are rooted in the 
ideology of biblical verses in some way, certainly in relation to the treatment of other people 
(Oomen, 2011). In fact many of Europe’s wars were fought over reasons concerning church 
and state (Dunn, 2006). A convincing argument about the overwhelming importance of 
cognition and its impact on human nature supports the importance of researching what shapes 
the knowledge of individuals in societies (Atran, 1993). The role of the media and advanced 
social networks connected on a global scale through the internet is influential. In societies 
such as the Solomon Islands that are poorly connected internally and to the outside world 
more rudimentary forms of analysis will be required.  
The setting of disenfranchisement and informal power structures that govern many marginal 
youth in the Solomon Islands needs to be further explored to properly understand these 
mechanics. A characterisation of marginalised youth in Honiara is included in Chapter 9 to 
promote this endeavour.  
5.8. Summary 
Many disenfranchised and desperate youth with no prospects of a better life turn to 
enterprises that function by codified laws and rules in the informal dimension of the 
economy. Because of the obvious difficulty and risk associated with collecting good data and 
understanding this realm it has been poorly understood. The impact however of these 
informal economies is enormous, wide spread and must be given proper credence within 
research if self-reinforcing power dynamics are to be broken.  
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The range and diversity of institutions comprised within resource led power distortion 
dynamics have previously created a great deal of unnecessary complexity and confusion. The 
literature seeking to understand the institutions that govern and distribute power within this 
realm are really seeking to explain how social groups organise, function and are influenced to 
achieve agendas prescribed within specific settings. This augmented and simplified 
understanding can greatly assist in understanding the function of social organisation 
predicated on institutional codes which order developed societies. It can also help to elucidate 
factors that need to be better understood in regions where formal institutions are not 
functioning effectively. These informal and formal constitutions set the agenda for the 
perceived rights of citizens upholding these values. Property rights are key institutions that 
determine the use of resources and influence the behaviour of resource users. Bromley (1991) 
defines property as a benefit stream, according to which to have property is to have control 
over that stream. This institution will now be specifically addressed in addition to the 
influence and impact it is having in the Solomon Islands with respect to unrest, instability and 
disenfranchisement of the nation.  
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Chapter 6 - Property Rights  
“Land is not the primary means for generating livelihood but often also the vehicle to 
accumulate wealth and transfer it between generations”. – De Janvry et al. (2001a) 
6.1. Overview 
The previous chapter has detailed the medley of formal institutions that contribute to the 
functioning of power and the influence of informal institutions that are less emphasised in the 
literature. This is specifically relevant to the Solomon Islands given the setting of legal 
pluralism. In this regard, communal ownership and private property structures can both result 
in the same negative outcomes with respect to resource exploitation when accountability, 
divisibility and transparency are not prioritised.  
This chapter addresses the notion of these rights specifically. Natural resources require 
commercial and legislative frameworks to assign ownership and legitimacy to those who 
assert power over them. Property rights provide the basis for this legitimacy and assignment 
of ownership. The link between property rights and growth is full of counter examples 
(Demsetz, 1967; Anderson and Hill, 1975; Anderson and Hill, 1990; De Soto, 1990; de Soto, 
2001; Levmore, 2002; Roberts and Robinson, 2013).  
Understanding the complexities, subtle nuances and concerns within this realm with respect 
to natural resource development and local communities is integral to designing meaningful 
prescriptions. This chapter will develop this logic broadly before providing relevant 
background in the case study setting with respect to property rights and the connection to 
natural resource ownership.  
6.2. Background 
The seminal work of Demsetz (1967) provides the foundations of an economic theory of 
property rights. Until the 1990s, property rights in developing countries did not receive the 
same attention that other factors relating to sub-optimal growth did. This seems to stem from 
the fact that property rights are well defined and established in developed nations and have 
subsequently been taken for granted (Knack and Keefer, 1995). Much of the literature in the 
1990s was subjugated by analysis of property rights in former soviet nations (Allina-Pisano, 
2007). 
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Property rights are now emphasised as a cardinal driver of many phenomena associated with 
natural resource exploitation and development paradigms (Roberts and Robinson, 2013). 
These rights take many forms, operate under numerous guises and depending upon the 
definition of property applied can be rather vague and confusing. However, this is part of the 
game and intrinsic reality of how power within the formal structures of rights and legislation 
can be diverted to operate counter to the original conceptions.  
Influential studies claim that colonial legacies explain the origins of development, promoting 
property rights and thus account for the modern world income distribution (Acemoglu et al., 
2005). Conversely, property rights and their relationship to negative economic growth is 
outlined by Wenar (2008), in relation to a flaw in commodity markets that allow tyrants to 
receive payment for resources that fuel further anarchy.  
In short there are numerous channels via which property rights and resource ownership can 
distort power dynamics (Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2004). A property rights view of power 
distortions from an explanatory sense is far too simplistic and fails to recognise all of the 
other anthropogenic factors that allow for the very existence of property rights and 
institutions that manage them in the first place. This has been emphasised and addressed in 
Chapter 5. The importance however of property rights as an institution impacting natural 
resource development cannot be understated. The setting of legal pluralism in the Solomon 
Islands provides the ideal reality for this interaction to be explored further. Key informants in 
the nation have highlighted the ability of both communal title and private property to produce 
negative social outcomes, displacement and marginalisation (KIP, 2015). Section 6.5 will 
explore why this is possible and what might be done to remedy such outcomes.  
An important consideration is that in rural areas of most developing countries, land is not 
only the primary means for generating a livelihood but often also the vehicle to accumulate 
wealth and transfer it between generations (De Janvry et al., 2001a). The impact of property 
rights can impact the next generation and it is therefore an intrinsic link between current 
institutional structures and the livelihoods of future generations. The decisions being made by 
those currently in power will intimately affect the lives of those in that nation who inherit 
these decisions and structures.  
At the state level property rights are the conduit between natural resources and capital 
accumulation. This occurs ultimately through processes of financial transformation which 
will be discussed and detailed in Chapter 7. These rights and their enforcement impacts 
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power dynamics at both the individual and state level and have the potential to impact 
communities inter-generationally if codified into legislation or culture. This is the reason land 
and property right disputes are the major source of unrest in the Solomon Islands (ANU, 
2011). Resolving manipulation of the administration that controls and distributes these rights 
will be seminal to securing prosperous, empowered futures for the current generation and the 
next.  
6.3. Access to Land  
An extensive literature exploring the impact of land reform can provide an enhanced 
understanding of property rights and the impact that they can have on the growth trajectory of 
a nation. Understanding this literature also builds understanding of the dichotomous reality of 
the philosophies comprised within divergent national level economic visions. The Solomon 
Islands is poised to undergo rapid economic transformation therefore the lessons learned from 
previous attempts to reform access to land will provide useful insight in this regard. These 
reforms are based upon modifying underlying property rights structures and they therefore 
determine the right to access land. Access to land and individual ownership is not the panacea 
that simplistic views within the literature promote (De Janvry et al., 2001b).  
Because land is immobile, land markets are localised, with several important consequences. 
Land sales markets are normally highly segmented, especially in countries with a dualistic 
distribution of ownership and where sales by large farmers to small holders are virtually 
absent. One explanation is that it is costly to subdivide large farms so as to make them 
suitable for smallholder cultivation. Similarly, transaction costs either discourage small land 
transactions or drive them into the informal market (Deininger and Binswanger, 1999). El-
Ghonemy (1999) documents the great land reforms of the twentieth century. More recent 
applications of land reform in Africa are contained within Deininger et al. (2008); Holden 
and Otsuka (2014). 
Many developing nations experience the problem of optimum access to farmland and this 
remains a serious unresolved issue (Holden et al., 2001; Holden and Otsuka, 2014). This 
issue is characterised by high efficiency and welfare costs, wide spread environmental 
consequences and volatile political manifestations (De Janvry et al., 2001a; De Janvry et al., 
2001b).  
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It would seem that the immense difficulties associated with the political economy dimension 
needs greater attention at a disaggregated level, taking into account the myriad informal 
factors influencing the success of any reform (El-Ghonemy, 1999). From a practical 
perspective, the implementation of continuous mechanisms of adjustment are seen as a way 
to mitigate against one time and largely dramatic historical events (Christodoulou, 1989). 
Many of these events have been underpinned by claims to ownership and property rights 
justifications which result in severe social unrest.  
There are many variables and drivers of problems in the land reform arena such as market 
failures, institutional gaps, institutional design, financial transformation of land assets and the 
associated interaction with human livelihoods (De Janvry et al., 2001a; De Janvry et al., 
2001b; Deininger et al., 2012). However there are also positive outcomes being realised. In 
Latin America, under pressure from a growing feminist movement, many countries have been 
revising legislation and codifying women’s rights in land titling programs (Deere and Leon, 
2001; Holden et al., 2006; Deere and De Leal, 2014).  
Land markets are viewed as failing the poor because there are a number of benefits to 
ownership that are all internalised in the price of land as well as a number of costs involved in 
the transaction. Given that the poor have no accumulated savings to cover these costs, a 
subsidy may be required that covers the overpricing of the land (De Janvry et al., 2001b).  
Learning from the past and also understanding the complexities of individual cases is 
essential. This is particularly relevant in regions that have constantly changing and evolving 
power structures which distribute property rights and are, in many respects, a fundamental 
tenant of livelihood security. The literature on land reform can guide the formulation of 
meaningful analysis by providing illustrations of what can happen in certain settings. Given 
the characteristics of property rights fuelled violence and livelihood instability caused in the 
Solomon Islands this is of seminal importance at present given the withdrawal of military 
forces keeping peace in the nation (Fox and Walsh, 2017). This setting and the current 
property rights intersection in the Solomon Islands will be discussed in more detail in Section 
6.5.  
6.4. Land, Governance and Power 
Governance is the manner in which public officials and institutions acquire and exercise the 
authority to shape public policy and provide public goods and services. This is intrinsic to 
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understanding property rights as an institution as it provides the link to where power is able to 
be distorted within the political mechanics of associated public officials.  
Pressure to develop natural resources caused by a multiplicity of factors has intensified the 
need for policies that reflect this importance. Land is not only a key productive resource, 
asset and safety net but also a key determinant of political power impacting across the 
generational divide (Binswanger et al., 1995). Ensuring property rights in their various forms 
can minimise power distortions and displacement caused by land tenure insecurity will be 
integral to assisting any nation develop peacefully (Deininger and World, 2003; Deininger et 
al., 2012; Holden and Otsuka, 2014). The deeply entrenched and emotive nature of land, its 
cultural significance as well as associated contextual complexities has the effect of dividing 
local communities not empowering and uniting them (KIP, 2015). 
Context based idiosyncrasies are of vital importance when designing any land distribution 
policy impacting land tenure security (Acquaye and Crocombe, 1984; Ostrom, 1990; Feder 
and Feeny, 1991). Without this emphasis and careful consideration of internal vested interest 
the chances of making progress in addressing key land policy challenges are likely to be 
much reduced (Deininger et al., 2012; Deininger et al., 2014). As developing nations look to 
develop key natural resources the surrounding property rights structures, their susceptibility 
to power distortions within formal and informal channels needs to be well understood.  
Three key reasons summarise why more progress has not been made on land governance to 
date as outlined by Deininger et al. (2012):  
 The technical complexity of land management and administration and the need to 
make policy trade-offs;  
 The political sensitivity and, in many cases, institutional fragmentation of the land 
sector; and 
 The country-specific and sometimes local nature of land tenure arrangements that 
makes simple institutional transplants impossible.  
Land administration itself is complex and multi-disciplinary. Sectors associated with its 
administration are wide ranging and diverse. These include law, information technology, 
geodesy, geomatics and surveying, economics, urban planning; anthropology, as well as 
environmental, social and political sciences (Deininger et al., 2012). If the human capital and 
associated social capital is not there to support these institutions which administer these 
various disciplines then there will be no meaningful, practical outcomes realised. Given the 
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sensitivity of the sector to severe unrest this is incredibly problematic. Transplanting an 
administrative system that is legally sound in a social environment not equipped for its 
functioning can promote manipulation of the institutions administration by those with the 
required knowledge of its functioning (KIP, 2015).  
A key challenge is to create malleable frameworks that help improve overall system 
performance rather than focus on over engineered approaches that may only be appropriate 
from a disciplinary perspective (Deininger et al., 2012). This is a double edged sword 
however and can also create the necessary legislative environment for manipulation and 
corruption. Given that property rights and access to land impact livelihood sustentation across 
generations, this must be carefully considered (KIP, 2015).  
The global nature of the problem and accompanying history of a complete disrespect for 
traditional ownership adds complexity to the issue (Margulis et al., 2016). What drives the 
global desire for this land still seems to be subjective in nature, although there are some clear 
trends (Arezki et al., 2015). Teklemariam et al. (2015) posit that extending the stakeholder 
theory of management to the global governance of transnational land acquisition can 
significantly aid in resolving conceptualisation limitations for inclusive transnational land 
deals. 
Due to the fact that control of land and property rights are a key determinant of economic and 
often political power this sector is penetratingly political. Lin (2009) provides a powerful 
example of this interplay in China. In many countries, the sector is characterised by a high 
level of institutional fragmentation where the responsibility for formulation and 
implementation of land policy is dispersed among ministries and institutions in different 
sectors
8
. This is a corollary of economic and political importance and the vested interests that 
require control of the land to further their agendas. Crossed purposes, mixed agendas and 
division of responsibility between levels of government also add additional complexity, 
disjointed approaches and high transaction costs (Frankema, 2005). When dealing with this 
complexity, objectively measurable information based on technical issues needs to be the 
focus. Subjective perceptions that could be interpreted as politically motivated need to be 
mitigated (Franco, 2010). 
Property rights and land tenure configurations have evolved over long periods in reaction to 
environmental constraints and resource endowments. These are often indicative of societies’ 
                                                          
8
 For example, lands, justice, finance, agriculture, forestry, environment, urban affairs and housing, mining and 
energy. 
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values and norms. External factors such as colonisation have also significantly affected land 
administration arrangements and institutions. Therefore, when assessing the institutional and 
administrative issues pertaining to land tenure, local knowledge relating to the idiosyncratic 
detail of each case needs to be highly valued (Deininger et al., 2012). Initiatives undertaken 
that have not taken this local knowledge and public sentiment into consideration have 
objectionable impacts (Deininger et al., 2012). This commentary is in line with the overall 
premise of this thesis. Promoting this understanding is paramount to broad state level policies 
translating into the conceived, community level outcomes they were intended to have.  
Many innovations have been made within this realm attempting to combine existing 
indicators in more innovative ways for example, the International Property Rights Index 
under the patronage of Hernando de Soto, see Levy-Carciente (2015). Such broad proxies can 
serve as a basis for diagnosis of potential issues and promote policy dialogue if the data is 
reliable. The paradoxical nature of such a reality is that normally this is where the data is 
most in need of improvement. For example, in the Solomon Islands there is no system in 
place which allows for customary land to be surveyed and registered (KIP, 2015).  
Deininger et al. (2012) outlines four key criteria that would enable practitioners to generate 
data in a replicable and cost effective way which can be used to establish more nuanced 
policy dialogue and subsequently more impactful planning:  
 Sufficient standardisation to allow qualitative comparison across countries and, more 
important, identification of good practices that could be transferred between 
countries;  
 Use of quantitative information as much as possible to provide ways to eliminate 
subjectivity, to verify information, and to compare over time and (ideally) across 
locations within a country; 
 Comprehensive coverage of relevant issues and a link to actionable policy 
prescriptions; and  
 Applicability at sufficiently low cost to generate debate and consensus among 
stakeholders to allow follow-up measurement and to contribute to substantive 
harmonisation and coordination.  
These serve as a useful guide to practitioners. The importance of understanding the 
individual, context specific realities of regions and their associated land governance 
frameworks cannot be understated. To know how power is being organised and asserted 
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within the political architecture that surrounds these rights can elucidate the unintended 
outcomes such legal constructs are producing. How this plays out in settings like the 
Solomon Islands can provide a useful illustration of these complexities and identify key areas 
of weakness that are able to be exploited by those in control of the administrative process.  
6.5. Land Policy and Reform in the Solomon Islands 
At present within the Solomon Islands there exists a philosophical trade-off between 
customary title and private property with respect to economic development of the nation. 
Private property is promoted as the panacea to the nation’s economic growth concerns. 
However, there are innumerable examples of overt manipulation of this institution for the 
benefit of a few, to the detriment of the majority (KIP, 2015). Communal title can in many 
regards provide a disincentive to foreign investment that can protect and empower local 
livelihoods (KIP, 2015). However, any system can be manipulated and what needs to be 
focused on is the social componentry which make equitable administration of either system 
possible. This disaggregation can then highlight areas of concern or potential manipulation 
within the system such that prescriptions and policy can be targeted at addressing these 
deficiencies.  
This section illustrates and rationalises the numerous, overlapping and inter-related dynamics 
relating to the property rights with respect to land and resource ownership. Understanding the 
history of such institutional arrangements in the Solomon Islands can provide a more precise 
and consummate explanation of how the associated legislative architecture became what it 
did. Property rights and their associated systems and frameworks can act as a conduit for 
external interests gaining access to local resources. Understanding the composition and 
administrative history of this institutional channel greatly contributes to the knowledge of 
property rights in this setting.  
Again much of the literature in this realm that assists in making useful comparisons will be 
drawn from land reform and land policy research in the nation. The historical foundation this 
provides forms an important understanding of why in many respects the policies and 
outcomes have evolved the way they have.  
Prior to colonisation, customary law regulated land tenure. In 1893 the Solomon Islands was 
declared a protectorate of the British. Since then, land policy was a blend of foreign concepts 
as well as local principles. Land policy since the protectorate is complex but is categorised in 
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four phases by (Tagini, 2001). These categorisations are made with respect to the dominant 
government ideology at the time. They are also well summarised in the earlier periods in 
Scheffler and Larmour (1971).  
6.5.1. Waste Land Period (1893 – 1920s) 
The dominant theme of this period in relation to land policy was alienation of native lands in 
order to establish foreign companies. This was pivotal to financing the newly established 
protectorate. Additionally the colonial government converted land for development projects. 
This was accomplished by means of Kings’ (or Queens’) regulations (Ruthven, 1979). The 
first land transaction was done pursuant to Kings Regulation No. 4 (Tagini, 2001). 
Subsequently this alienated large tracts of land to Pacific Islands Company Ltd, allowing 
them to develop coconut plantations. Similar regulations now commonly known as ‘waste 
land’ regulations were enacted in 1900, 1901 and 1904 (Ruthven, 1979). These regulations 
further estranged land from the native people to foreign interests.  
In 1914 the Land Regulation ended purchases of land in the nation by foreigners. This phase 
of development was characterised by dissatisfaction from customary land owners which was 
underpinned by the fact that they received little or no payment for their lands that were 
alienated. Land policy then was enforced by the British government with the objective of the 
region ascertaining economic dependence.  
6.5.2. Redistribution Period (1920s – 1940s) 
This period was defined by unjustly acquired land during the waste land period being 
returned to native owners after adjudication. The adjudicating body was the Phillips 
Commission
9 
(Ruthven, 1979). Although established in 1914 the commission had little 
impact until 1919 due to the overshadowing of efforts in the First World War. “Judge Phillips 
heard 55 claims against land alienation and returned large tracts of land either because there 
were defects in the original conveyances, wrong definition of boundaries or because the 
waste lands were found not vacant” (Tagini, 2001). The colonial administration was 
sympathetic to local sentiments because it understood the ramification and connection 
between local dissatisfaction and the impacts on economic growth.  
                                                          
9
 The Commission was named after the Commissioner, Judge Phillips. His predecessor however, was 
Commissioner Captain Alexander who dealt with 20 claims before he departed in 1920. 
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6.5.3. Land Registration Period (1940s – 1970s) 
This era was defined by land registration. The Allan’s Commission made the 
recommendations for the land registration which was set up in the late 1940s was not 
implemented until 1957 due to the Second World War (Tagini, 2001). Land registration was 
undertaken pursuant to the Land and Titles Ordinance (1959).  
During this phase land registration was sporadic and unpredictable (Acquaye and Crocombe, 
1984). In 1968, the Lands and Titles Ordinance was amended to provide for a systematic 
settlement (registration). Systematic registration occurs in a methodical manner and in an 
orderly sequence, district by district, village by village, block by block, parcel by parcel, 
throughout the territory concerned (Acquaye and Crocombe, 1984). During 1965 and 1978, 
thirteen schemes were implemented (Acquaye and Crocombe, 1984). However to put this 
into perspective only 6,990 hectares or 0.25% of the total land area of the Solomon Islands 
was registered land.  
The Local Court and the Customary Land Appeal Court was also established during this 
period. This transitioned the role of adjudicating from the Land Commissioner to the 
Courts. The Courts’ role in keeping land records was important in land administration. 
Freehold titles to land held by non-Solomon Islanders were transformed into 75 year leases. 
These leases were subject to the foreign investor developing the land, a principal example 
being where Solomon Islands Plantations Limited was situated (Crocombe, 1987). 
It is also relevant to include within this section the relevant background within this period as 
the Solomon Islands pushed for independence after the end of WWII. Stability was restored 
during the 1950s, as the British colonial administration built a network of official local 
councils. On this platform Solomon Islanders with experience on the local councils started 
participation in central government, initially through the bureaucracy and then, from 1960, 
through the newly established Legislative and Executive Councils. Positions on both 
Councils were initially appointed by the High Commissioner of the British Protectorate but 
progressively more of the positions were directly elected or appointed by electoral colleges 
formed by the local councils. The first national election was held in 1964 for the seat of 
Honiara, and by 1967 the first general election was held for all but one of the 15 
representative seats on the Legislative Council (the one exception was the seat for the Eastern 
Outer Islands, which was again appointed by electoral college). 
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Elections were held again in 1970 and a new constitution was introduced. The 1970 
constitution replaced the Legislative and Executive Councils with a single Governing 
Council. It also established a 'committee system of government' where all members of the 
Council sat on one or more of five committees. The aim of this system was to reduce 
divisions between elected representatives and the colonial bureaucracy, provide opportunities 
for training new representatives in managing the responsibilities of government. 
It was also claimed that this system was more consistent with the Melanesian style of 
government, however this was quickly undermined by opposition to the 1970 constitution 
and the committee system by elected members of the council. As a result, a new constitution 
was introduced in 1974 which established a standard Westminster form of government and 
gave the Islanders both Chief Ministerial and Cabinet responsibilities.  
6.5.4. Land Recording Period (1980s – Present) 
The government has not prioritised land issues and the previous policies that existed were 
carried forward. This has caused tensions amongst native landowners and uncertainty 
amongst foreign investors. 
Such issues are multi-faceted and complex, resulting in the government exercising a 
minimalist approach to their intervention. However, in 1994, with the enactment of the 
Custom Land Records Act (Cap 132), landholding groups were obliged to voluntarily record 
their land boundaries. Due to the massive financial burden required to facilitate such 
reporting this has not been a practical act to implement.  
6.5.5. Current Setting 
There are several important legislative loopholes that are exploited to facilitate natural 
resource extraction and land use in the Solomon Islands. This formally illustrates that well 
intentioned institutions can be manipulated to produce, legally sound yet contradictory 
outcomes with respect to their original intentions.  
To avoid land being permanently lost to foreign ownership, the Constitution of Solomon 
Islands provides that only a Solomon Islander or a limited class of people (e.g. companies 
registered and majority owned by Solomon Islanders) can permanently own land (Art. 
110). This however results in nodal power distortions amongst local elites that are able to act 
on behalf of other individuals and hence exercise power that is not appropriately conferred.  
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Customary laws in Solomon Islands are not uniform and differ from province to province. 
Customary law is recognised as a source of law under the Constitution, however it can be 
overridden by the Constitution or an Act of Parliament (s. 144; Sch. 3). Given the systemic 
corruption that currently exists within the current parliamentary system of the Solomon 
Islands this creates a pivotal weakness and point of manipulation within legislative 
frameworks. Furthermore, the translation of customary law in practice was to be provided by 
Parliament, although the Customs Recognition Act (2000) is not yet in force. The effect of 
this constitutional provision, together with the Land and Titles Act [Cap. 133], is that 
customary law forms the basis for land and forest ownership in Solomon Islands. Given the 
disenfranchisement and environmental degradation caused in the nation by logging, mining 
and land clearing it is obvious this legislative system is able to be easily corrupted (KIP, 
2015).  
The government can also compulsorily acquire land for a public purpose (s. 71), or by leasing 
the land to the Commissioner of Lands or a Provincial Assembly (s. 60), after which it is then 
registered as a perpetual estate. Given that major natural resource projects could be 
categorised as having a public purpose, given the revenue streams associated with them, this 
creates an alarming scenario. In simple terms all current legislation can be over-ridden with a 
new act of parliament or a justification of public purpose, both of which would be relatively 
straightforward to facilitate in the current social environment (KIP, 2015). These issues are 
not only making the people of the Solomon Islands susceptible to forces of external 
corruption with respect to land but it is also fuelling already problematic internal unrest (Fox 
and Walsh, 2017).  
The system of customary (tribal) land tenure has been preserved since Independence. The law 
provides that customary land is to be occupied, used and disposed of in accordance with 
current customary usage (s. 239(1), Land and Titles Act). However to illustrate the reality of 
the legal environment with respect to forestry, the major resource export for the Solomon 
Islands, an alarming picture emerges. Ordinarily, the granting of timber rights over customary 
land to a third party would also breach the prohibition on disposing of customary interest in 
land, but this is permitted because of a specific exemption under the Forest Resources and 
Timber Utilisation Act (s. 43). Again, clearly illustrating the corruptibility of the government 
administration and outlining the inability of legislation to impact and protect those outside the 
decision making process.  
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Legally, where forest is found on customary land it is ‘owned’ in accordance with customary 
law (s. 239(1), Land and Titles Act ). However under customary law, ownership of land may 
be separated from the right to use land. This fragmentation of ownership and use rights 
provides a powerful example of the complexity surrounding property rights, land use and 
resource ownership. The fragmentation of these rights is not itself detrimental. However the 
manipulation of the associated legal definitions has resulted in further inconsistencies in 
decision making and promoted further fragility of livelihood sustainability (KIP, 2015). 
Those impacted are inherently distrustful of the government and see the only way forward in 
this regard as promoting a friend or community member to a position of power so that a share 
of the corrupt revenue can be realised (KIP, 2015). This further entrenches corruption in the 
system and perpetuates these social psychologies in other sectors.  
The Forest Resources and Timber Utilisation Act, which allows a person (or group) to grant 
timber rights over land even though they are not the ‘owner’ of the land powerfully illustrates 
a legal corruption channel disenfranchising large numbers of people in the nation at present. 
The Solomon Islands is currently preparing a National Land Use Policy through the Land Use 
Planning Division of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, although this is yet to be 
approved by Cabinet (KIP, 2015).  
Since the protectorate, land policies relating to communal ownership have hindered some 
major economic developments. Many potential foreign investment projects did not proceed 
because the cost of acquiring land and establishing the investment has been too high and too 
risky. Only those projects with elevated windfall potential are therefore targeted to offset this 
risk. Forestry is a telling example.  
Internally, unsettled disputes and uncertainty make it very difficult for a more mature and 
secure land market to develop. It is not as simple as merely converting land to a certain type. 
Administratively, there needs to be deliberation and further consideration given to customary 
title being an option for the Solomon Islands to establish their economic future on (KIP, 
2015).  
The complexity of land tenure arrangements and the overlapping government policies 
influenced by the political economy involved in the situation make the matter complex and 
multi-faceted (KIP, 2015). This can be best illustrated with the use of a recent example:  
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The people of Temotu province have voiced their opposition to plans for bauxite 
mining. An Australian company Pacific Bauxite has secured a licence to prospect the 
island and its representatives are in the island's capital Lata this week. 
Some local people are opposed to their presence and have set up roadblocks to stop 
them from travelling around the island. A spokesperson for the community, Sir John 
Ini Lapli, who is also a former governor general of the Solomon Islands, said the issue 
had divided families and tribes, making the situation very tense. 
"Because the great majority of people do not want this. Just the few that these people 
are working with. And there is a real possibility for clashes between the landowners, 
tribal groups, even relatives themselves if the government is not clear cut about how 
to deal with this." 
He said the granting of the prospecting license happened virtually overnight after a 
period of political instability resulted in a change to the leadership of the provincial 
government (KIP, 2015). 
6.6. Summary 
Broadly speaking, the link between property rights and growth is weak and history is full of 
counter examples. What is important to understand within the conceptual framework of this 
thesis is that due to the administrative capacity required to function effectively, the institution 
of property rights can be readily manipulated. What needs to be better understood is the 
impact that the social setting has on the ability of such institutions to function effectively.  
History indicates that the solution is not straightforward and requires a great deal of local 
expertise and knowledge of more idiosyncratic methods when dealing with complex, 
contextual social and cultural systems. This knowledge can be greatly improved by first 
understanding all of the nuances involved with administering property rights. This knowledge 
can then be transposed over the pre-existing analysis of land reforms that dissect the diverse 
array of property rights regimes and associated state compositions. This can allow for the 
formulation of an effective platform from which to start more granular, disaggregated 
research that can better explain the anthropogenic factors influencing such dynamics in the 
Solomon Islands.  
Commercially, property rights are the conduit between natural resources, asset creation and 
assignment of ownership. Institutions that administer these rights due to their influential 
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nature are susceptible to issues relating to the governance of these rights. An institution that 
acts legally but still disempowers and disenfranchises its citizens is not only ineffective it 
creates a form of social paralysis with respect to evoking the necessary changes and enforcing 
the rule of law. The fragmentation of ownership and use rights could provide a useful basis 
for livelihood protection within the institution of property rights if the administrative process 
is able to be better protected against corruption and subversion. The inordinate sums of 
money involved in many large natural resource development projects have made this 
difficult.  
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Chapter 7 – The Idiosyncratic Attributes of Natural and 
Human Capital 
“Natural resources can sever the social contract that exists between state and citizen, 
creating get rich quick power mongering rather than long term investment”. – Green (2012). 
7.1. Overview 
The previous chapter disaggregated the influential factors associated with property rights, the 
conduit between natural resources, asset creation and ownership. How the Solomon Islands 
administrative capacity evolved and institutionalised these property rights was also outlined 
to better explain the current situation of systemic government corruption and civil unrest this 
has catalysed.  
This chapter will address the constituents of this natural capital, the rights to which are 
institutionally administered. Disaggregating the anthropogenic componentry that facilitates 
natural resource asset creation leads to an enhanced perspective of where power can be 
subverted. This is addressed by disaggregating factors that contribute to the transformation of 
in-situ natural resources to capital stocks and ultimately fungible, mobile currency. The 
idiosyncratic nature of this transformative process within developing nations is analysed to 
locate pivotal areas of importance with respect to transformative policy.  
Given the anthropogenic nature of financial systems and associated institutions there is a 
pressing need to understand the intersection with human capital. In many developing nations 
the human capital required to effectively administer and appropriate rights associated with 
natural resource development may not exist. The development of a nation’s natural capital 
should move in tandem with developing human capital. When this does not occur glaring 
information asymmetries occur which facilitate severe discounting of natural resource assets 
leaving less to invest in education and development of people. Many are displaced and 
marginalised by the geographical realities of resource projects. Effective institutions need 
well educated, effective personnel to operate. Therefore any development agenda which does 
not consider this a priority will foster the pre-determinants of a readily exploitable state.  
The anthropogenic systems that create wealth from natural resources means that human 
capital and natural capital are intrinsically linked.  
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7.2. Background 
At present all natural assets first need to be transformed through what could best be described 
as a process of financial transformation
10
, making natural assets tangibly valuable within 
modern commercial frameworks (Repetto et al., 1989). Natural capital is spent as if it were 
revenue, as if it were going to come back next year without any problems. Many natural 
resource assets are extracted in a non-renewable fashion (Groth and Schou, 2007). Energy 
resources are a clear illustration of this (Ewers, 2015). 
Within the global network and embedded supply chain these natural assets are viewed by 
developing nations as the key inputs to their industrialised processes. These primary 
commodities are not the reason why developed nations are rich and others are poor 
(Echavarría et al., 2016). These commodities are still however the keystones to which all 
other wealth can exist within the bounds and structures of the current economic system. This 
becomes less relevant as the world begins to operate on more synthetic forms of wealth 
(Nakamoto, 2008).  
Human consumption and natural resources have been placed at the heart of our current 
economic system and therefore have primacy within the development horizons of nations. 
Historically not only have these same commodities produced the food we eat and the clothes 
we wear but also the very currency itself that trade was facilitated with (Schaede, 1989; 
Eichengreen and Flandreau, 1997; Milton, 1999; Nabhan, 2014). Until science bestows upon 
us the required atomic particles to create the very building blocks of the resources we rely 
upon and henceforth particles and inputs to our current industrialised system from scratch we, 
as a global society, rely upon the natural world and associated systems to do this for us 
(Lederman and Teresi, 1993). The current transformative processes by which mineral 
reserves are created takes, in many instances, millions of years, however the revenue streams 
by comparison are incredibly short-lived. The ‘Hartwick rule’ gives us some preliminary 
form of interpretation for how these profits from natural resources should be spent to promote 
the longevity of the value they have created (Hartwick, 1977). Nature has bestowed upon us 
wealth in such complexity that we cannot begin to calculate its value due to the 
interconnectedness and utter complexity of the system. As human societies become more 
                                                          
10
 Financial transformation is my own term and refers to the process of turning a natural resource or hard 
commodity into a financially tangible and tradeable unit or stock. 
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urbanised this perspective is lost. It is therefore valued inaccurately and systematically 
undervalued (Røpke, 1994).  
Natural assets are not responsible for rent-seeking and corruption, these are human maladies. 
This seems to be forgotten within the literature at times, however re-invigorated perspectives 
of this ilk are filtering to the surface (Gilberthorpe and Rajak, 2017). The overwhelmingly 
market based view of the world in which policy makers and businesses view natural assets 
determine these outcomes.  
If natural assets are conceived as fixed stocks and as a windfall unconnected to past 
investment, the problem becomes one of distributing rather than creating more wealth. 
Natural assets are not a curse at all in the sense of inevitability; the curse, where it exists, is 
self-fulfilling. This provides a very necessary and critical component to understanding the 
underlying factors associated with seminal motivation behind power distortions at all levels 
and negative social outcomes associated with natural resource led growth. If the problem is 
one of wealth distribution as opposed to additional wealth creation very different social 
outcomes result. This represents the interplay between the dichotomous forces of 
collaboration and co-operation as opposed to all out competition.  
Although the literature differs slightly in its objective to explain causal factors driving natural 
resource led growth, it seems clear that there is one overriding commonality, the fact that the 
natural asset in question have been discovered and have a tangible price (Graeber, 2001; 
Graeber, 2014). The literature within this realm explores the various implications of 
volatility, trends, rent-seeking, investment decisions and fund management on the basis of the 
primal assumption that the resource is worth something tangible. The demand and subsequent 
price for different resources is temporal and historically many different commodities have 
shaped surrounding commercial enterprises. Nutmeg serves as a powerful example (Milton, 
1999). 
It seems that the growth retarding effects purportedly caused by resource abundance and 
primary production exports do not seem to address the root cause of the problem 
systemically. The problem does not seem to be solely associated with gradualist reliance on 
agricultural or resource based exports, but the individual, community and national psyche 
attached to sudden windfall gains (Arkes et al., 1994; Kameda et al., 2002; Kameda et al., 
2010). This can be caused by sudden unitary price increases or the discovery of a previously 
unknown reserve of a resource.  
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A useful analogy would be to think of a rich relative leaving a large sum of money to 
someone who has a productive role already in society related to managing wealth as opposed 
to someone who has never worked. It is likely the impact and ensuing spending trajectories 
would be very different. For an entire economy the process seems far more complex however 
this serves as a poignant illustration of the underlying factors involved in the outcome.  
Pivotal to effective use and development of natural resource assets is information and 
knowledge economics (Von Hayek, 1937; Boulding, 1966; Foray and Lundvall, 1998; 
Cooke, 2002; Loasby, 2002; Amin and Cohendet, 2004). The interplay between natural 
resources, education, experts and economic development is expanded upon by Gylfason and 
Zoega (2001); Easterly (2014). This understanding provides an important theoretical 
backdrop to power dynamics in resource abundant nations.  
To properly understand the drivers of power trap dynamics and be able to progress thought 
and knowledge within this realm it is imperative to acknowledge that natural resource wealth 
does not need to be produced in the industrial sense of production. It is simply extracted and 
can therefore occur independently of other processes in a country associated with macro-
economic development. This is not to say that there are not some technical processes that 
require skill and knowledge to remove and process natural resources. The unfortunate reality 
is that much of this human capital is imported and the knowledge base leaves once the project 
is finished. This minimises any positive effect that such industries could have on the human 
capital within developing nations, instead creating technical knowledge enclaves. Rent- 
seeking behaviour which exploits the gap between the cost of extracting resources and the 
value of the resource compounds the economic and political issues associated with natural 
resource development.  
The attributes of sovereignty and the identification of the principal and agent is the least 
understood but most important part of connecting political and economic theory to be able to 
better manage and explain the associated phenomena attached to natural resource wealth. The 
short circuiting of the very foundations, upon which many political processes rely, means that 
the normal government and political structures are not able to effectively manage the 
interplay, coercion and strategy that ensue. The un-official structures of power, coercion and 
control that result are not dissimilar to how the mafia controls the movement, sale and 
distribution of narcotics. All of these factors amplify and re-inforce power trap dynamics at 
the state level and introduce analogous life condition factors on individuals living in this 
setting. 
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Historical evidence illustrates that natural resources have underpinned learning, innovation 
and development. Thus a more comprehensive understanding of the conditions that contribute 
to development and growth would seem to be imperative (David and Wright, 1997; Ville, 
2005; Smith, 2007; Torvik, 2009; Andersen, 2012; Ville and Wicken, 2012; McLean, 2013; 
Brueckner et al., 2014; Gylfason and Zoega, 2014).  
The importance of issues such as timing of industrialisation, establishment of institutions and 
human capital seem to explain within economic terms why some resource abundant countries 
have succeeded while others have not (Larsen, 2004; Holden, 2013). Doubting or defending 
the dynamism of natural resource led growth seems to be the point the literature is missing; 
going in search of universal truths that are merely temporal is erroneous (McElroy, 2015). 
Each specific locality and commodity at different periods of time will produce results that are 
not consistent. Using natural resource industries as a platform to develop knowledge 
intensive industries, which could support economic development strategies is emphasised by 
McElroy (2015). This logic is what needs to re-invigorate policy makers and those in 
positions of leadership within the Solomon Islands. At present the rents from resource 
development are being squandered and not being invested into the people of the nation. 
Developed nations are able to rely upon human capital to produce new wealth and as a result 
become less reliant upon natural resources for economic prosperity. The Solomon Islands 
needs to invest in its people. If the nation wishes to develop economically the individuals of 
the nation must not be left behind with the benefits enclaved by the elite within the nation and 
taken off-shore with the impacts left to burden those left behind.  
Simply growing economically is also not a silver bullet, growth occurs in many instances to 
the detriment of social and environmental growth, finding this balance will be integral to any 
sustainable form of economic growth (Sawyer and Gomez, 2012; Gilberthorpe, 2014). 
Finally, Echavarría et al. (2016), conclude that much of the actual cases where abundant 
natural resources hurt nations have been cases of common theft by tyrants, often backed by 
imperial powers. This is an important point to consider given the dual realities being 
experienced in the Solomon Islands with respect to systemic corruption and promotion of 
economic development at a discounted rate due to social instability.  
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7.3. Natural Capital 
Natural capital is easy to incorrectly value because we are surrounded by it. It is only when 
the benefits nature provides are disrupted do we take notice (Hawken et al., 2013). Some 
nations have profited enormously from their natural resources, others have largely 
squandered this opportunity and some have simply had them stolen (Bromley and Cernea, 
1989; Drelichman, 2005).  
Historically natural resources are largely viewed as the primal building block of any nation. 
According to the current accounting frameworks we apply to quantify a nation’s wealth into 
categories such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP), they are a developing nation’s largest 
asset (Repetto et al., 1989; Auty, 2001b; Wright and Czelusta, 2006; Collier and Goderis, 
2007; Frankel, 2010). This categorisation also lends itself to numerous problems that lead to 
inaccurate calculations and conclusions being made (Costanza et al., 2009; Kubiszewski et 
al., 2013). For example, simply from a definitional perspective, Net National Product (NNP) 
would be a far more accurate way to calculate national wealth as it would take into account 
the loss of profit to foreign owners (Weitzman, 1976; Asheim, 1994; Sefton and Weale, 
1996; Dasgupta and Mäler, 2000).  
Countries that are not currently developed don’t have to exploit their natural resources if it 
means that as a result they will hurt the growth prospects of other sectors. These nations may 
be able to take advantage of ‘on the shelf’ technologies which can significantly increase their 
economic capacity (Lall, 1996). These nations have many different options and if they are 
looking at building associated human capacity in line with sectoral advancement it would 
have to be said that the minerals sector would have to be a choice at the bottom of any 
ranking index
11
.  
The wealth and potential of other sectors is often overlooked due to the overwhelming 
windfall psychology attached to revenue streams stemming from natural resource bases. The 
associated incentive structures created to facilitate this development is able to readily distort 
power and bias wealth distribution. Mining and forestry projects in the Solomon Islands serve 
as powerful illustrations of this subversion (KIP, 2015). 
There also exists the belief and related expectation that as nations get more developed, they 
are less natural resource intensive, as a percentage of total production (Echavarría et al., 
                                                          
11
 Examples include, Legatum Prosperity Index, Social Progress Imperative, Fund for Peace. 
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2016). The implied issue here seems to be that any relatable example within a developing 
context seems to be one of two things, a difficult path to follow or one that a nation would not 
aspire to.  
Historically, most developing countries experienced a colonial past, characterised by resource 
wealth extraction that transferred natural wealth from colonies to Europe and North America. 
In their cradle of development, European and North American economies were highly natural 
resource intensive, frequently extracting from their colonies. The associated impacts upon 
formal and informal institutional structures within the nation as well as social dynamics 
reflect this past. Understanding the current influential remnants of that past within each 
context is imperative to prescribing solutions. Considering what previously designed 
institutional structures were aiming to achieve can greatly enhance the understanding of their 
current forms and associated mechanics. There exists the expectation that as nations become 
more developed they become less natural resource dependent due to the development of 
human capital and other sectors which require its input.  
The central problem lies in the fact that repressive regimes, international governments and 
corporations systematically violate the property rights of the people who own those 
resources. Property rights determine the use of resources and influence the behaviour of 
resource users. The wealth associated with these natural resource assets distorts the 
functioning of formal and informal institutions that disseminate the right to access this 
wealth. In the Solomon Islands the legal loopholes and points of manipulation within the 
legal frameworks facilitate manipulation and corruption due to the minimal cost required to 
facilitate this (KIP, 2015). This not only undermines the authority of the state but clearly 
illustrates the weaknesses of the nodal distortions of power within the formal system of 
government. The rights to access resources can be granted by an individual with the right 
power given the structure of the administrative hierarchy (KIP, 2015). Not only is this 
problematic it renders much of the legislation that protects the livelihoods of local people 
powerless. This breeds dissent for the government and erodes the rule of law more broadly in 
the nation (KIP, 2015). The characteristics of these rights and legal loopholes are detailed in 
Chapter 6. The volume of wealth associated with natural resource projects means that the 
ability to distort and commandeer social and institutional administrations is amplified. The 
recent realities experienced within the Solomon Islands in this regard have set a worrying 
trend which does not seem to be improving (KIP, 2015).  
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7.4. Tangibility and Transformation of Natural Resource Wealth  
The immediacy and comprehensibility of mineral asset values, once discovered, inevitably 
adds pressure in and of itself to extract them. Using the family’s gold analogy, if you are not 
aware of it then life goes on as normal. It is once you become aware of it that things change. 
Gold is an obvious source of instantly gratifiable wealth given the ease of transformation 
from physical commodity to liquid cash due to anthropogenic processes related to metallurgy, 
cultural narratives and efficiency of financialisation.  
The immediacy of the transformation process of turning a raw commodity into currency 
seems to have a dramatic influence on the commodities that are most highly sought after. 
There is little prior knowledge required to be able to tangibly understand the value of a gold 
bar within any modern setting. A complex computer, mechanical part or genetically modified 
seed does not seem to symbolically represent wealth in the same fashion, although this is 
changing. The knowledge required to appreciate the value of such goods requires a requisite 
complex understanding of the economic system which creates wealth and value in the first 
place (Grant, 1991; Porter, 2008).  
The anthropogenically created financial processes that facilitate this transformation process 
become more efficient the more mature the market becomes. Booking barrels of oil due to the 
maturity of the oil marketplace has become even easier which has resulted in oil finds 
becoming more and more appealing. It seems that the readily tangible nature and immediacy 
of the profitability related to the vast majority of natural assets in addition to the incorrect 
valuations of these assets is largely to blame for the looting of them. There is little evidence 
to suggest that the negative externalities associated with many extractive processes are ever 
properly accounted for, this cost is borne by those in the country of extraction. South Africa 
provides a poignant example of this with mining waste impacting limited water resources 
(Adler et al., 2007).  
The importance and primacy of capital markets within the dynamic of resource 
transformation cannot be over-stated. Given their substantial first mover advantage, a form of 
monopoly power lies with developed nations and it would seem that the vast majority of the 
benefit will accrue to these regions. This is not a new observation but is merely summarising 
the implications of dependency theory with respect to this particular context and the influence 
able to be exerted by those providing the capital required to physically extract and process the 
commodities involved.  
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The same commodity at a different time and place may have no influential impact on the 
surrounding social environment. The demand for a commodity is what influences the 
associated social psychology and this is intrinsically linked to marketing (Chaudhuri and 
Majumdar, 2006). The demand for a primary commodity is a derived demand. This is 
consequentially calculated from the demand of the consumer/user of the final good. The 
marketing margins and price for the primary commodity (derived demand) will depend both 
on the marketing functions or value adding activities but may also include any rents extracted 
by market intermediaries. The technicalities and subtleties associated with price 
determination serve as a stark illustration to the associated problems and control structures 
that are embedded within the entire system.  
To illustrate the broad gamete of resources, locations, catalysts and periods of time 
emphasised by different authors to explain development paradigms, Frankopan (2016) 
emphasizes the importance of the silk roads and textiles as the shapers of world history. The 
impact of the spice trade and nutmeg in particular is emphasized by Milton (1999) and 
Nabhan (2014). The impact of shipping is emphasised by Andrews (1984); Thomas (2007); 
Bernstein (2009); Paine (2014).  
Resources that have had the potential to hijack the administrative systems that disseminate 
rights of access can be seemingly insignificant within a modern context. The purpose of 
illustrating this is to clearly show what has the potential to distort administrative institutions, 
a prime example being early Chinese porcelain. This product held both status power as well 
as embodied innovation which could not at the time be copied by Europeans
12
 (Jörg, 1982). 
For 151 pieces of Chinese porcelain the ruler of Saxony gave the ruler of Prussia 600 of his 
best soldiers. This white gold had extraordinary value. What is important to understand 
within the modern setting are what gifts or amount of money is able to corrupt institutions in 
nations that are seeking outside human capital to develop in-situ resource assets. The 
evidence from the Solomon Islands would indicate that in relative terms the amount of money 
required to disrupt and influence pre-existing institutions is incredibly small given the size of 
the projects being developed and associated revenue streams (KIP, 2015).  
Additionally, it is very expensive to complete geological surveys that allow nations to 
identify and account for natural resource wealth. This relates directly to the information 
asymmetries that allow power dynamics to be easily distorted. Principles associated with 
                                                          
12
 The white gold of Saxony would eventually be produced locally by Bottger, who had been put in prison by 
Augustus the Strong via trial and error. 
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surveying, geological assessment and geographical information systems (GIS) provide an 
excellent illustration of this knowledge asymmetry (Burrough, 1986). It is not worth anything 
if one does not know it is there in the first place and it is incredibly expensive to map and 
understand what is there in reality. There is a lot of guess work involved in preliminary stages 
which was presumably what led many such as Mark Twain to make remarks such as “a mine 
is a hole in the ground owned by a liar”.  
7.5. Currency 
Given the transcendental status given to currency within our current age it has become 
integrated into our daily psyche. This is where the codification of systematised human 
behaviour stemming from cultural norms becomes mathematised and behavioural economists 
attempt to fit equations to this logic. A very useful insight into this logic is provided by 
Cowan et al. (2000). The interactions and behaviours of our social realities, positioning and 
interactions with the nature of money
13
 are explored in great detail by Lawson (2016).  
Currency, depending upon the context and accounting classification, can be concurrently 
classified as a medium of exchange, trade facilitator, store of wealth, capital or an asset that 
generates revenue in the form of interest. Currency, despite myriad classifications and 
applications is the most readily identifiable, transferable and tradeable form of wealth that 
currently exists (Friedman and Schwartz, 1982; Ferguson, 2008).  
The ease of price discovery and the standardisation of its form are paramount to the global 
economic system functioning in the manner that it does (Ferguson, 2008). It is also the most 
unambiguous, standardised measure by which we account for wealth which is why it is so 
appealing. In short currency reduces the transaction costs of exchange.  
It is also appropriate when discussing issues within a more modern setting to be mindful of 
the historical context. Before US President Nixon disbanded the US gold standard, the very 
                                                          
13
 As a final general observation or inference, it appears in the end that there is little limitation as to the sorts of 
phenomena that human ingenuity can subject to processes of social positioning. If human beings are themselves 
positioned as components of communities (Lawson, 2012), artefacts are (amongst other things) positioned as 
components of other artefacts (Lawson, 2012), collective practices are positioned forms of the coordinating 
structure of a community (Lawson, 2016) and corporations are examples of positioned (sub) communities 
harnessed as components of the wider capitalist industrial community (Lawson, 2004; Lawson, 2015), it is 
forms of value that are positioned as money. And in a credit-as-money economy at least, this means that 
relational elements of the social structure themselves, namely specific forms of social (debt/credit) relations, are 
positioned items. However strange the latter form of positioning may seem, and however precarious may be the 
outcome, we should recognise that this is a condition around which the capitalist economy everywhere is 
organised (Lawson, 2016). 
  
112 
process of digging minerals from the ground in a bygone era was for modern solicitations 
effectively digging money from the ground (Eichengreen and Flandreau, 1997). The very 
purpose of it was expanding the capital stock with which a country could invest or in many 
instances repay debtors (Bloomfield, 1959; Eichengreen, 1992; Helleiner, 1993; Eichengreen 
and Flandreau, 1997).  
Without a functioning financial system, even of the most primitive kind that people have faith 
and trust in, as the name ‘fiat’ would suggest, trade will not occur in a form that can be 
advantageous to all parties involved (Kiyotaki and Wright, 1991). To put this into some form 
of historical context it is important to consider the standardisation of precious metal
14
 with 
the touchstone (Oddy, 1986). In the ancient world this was one of the seminal market and 
transaction innovations that initially stimulated trade from Greece to Persia, ultimately 
causing the construction of a huge commercial centre and library at Alexandria.  
Power distortions at the individual and national level are reinforced and intensified by the 
ability to incentivise, currency within the modern constructs of society provides a powerful 
seminal input to this mechanism at all levels. Given the size of the potential windfalls 
associated with resource projects and the nodal power dynamics associated with their 
administration in nations like the Solomon Islands this presents many problems. The ability 
to corrupt, provided by a platform of wealth disparity at the individual level, creates a perfect 
storm of factors that contribute to power distortion and power traps. Financial incentives and 
their associated diffusion are thus inextricably entangled with a technical knowledge of 
political economy.  
7.6. Capital and Risk 
The cost of capital and the detrimental impacts this can have on developing nations is 
amplified by sudden resource windfalls in many instances. For a comprehensive overview of 
associated problems see (Frankel, 2010).  
In developing countries, the cost of capital is invariably elevated by comparison to developed 
countries, with risk premiums reflecting negative investor sentiment and high risk metrics, 
not unlike the phenomena associated with the peso problem (Sill, 2000). The greater the 
perceived country risk, the more encouragement foreign capital requires to be attracted to 
projects. This encouragement frequently takes the form of increased returns, additional tax 
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 This was mainly gold at the time. 
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incentives or reduced royalty rates and favourable contracts of myriad forms (Damodaran, 
2003; Damodaran, 2008; Damodaran, 2012). The cost-consequence of this is of course 
ultimately borne by the developing country’s population, reducing welfare.  
7.6.1. Royalties 
An adverse effect on public capital can be mitigated by good institutions (Collier and 
Bhattacharyya, 2014). Rents from the depletion of non-renewable (mineral) resources reduce 
the public capital stock whereas rents from sustainable (forestry and agriculture) sources do 
not (Collier and Bhattacharyya, 2014). Which projects and revenue streams can be classified 
as sustainable is moot.  
Royalty payments can provide long term stability and prosperity if they are priced correctly 
and invested. When a severe discount is given to attract foreign interest or the royalty is 
siphoned off for personal gain and the revenue is consumed rather than invested instability 
arises. The contracts that determine these royalty rates, the knowledge of the value of the 
resource itself and what this money contributes to are integral to long term stability and 
equitable prosperity.  
Given the nature and embodied storage associated with mineral assets, there is therefore a 
trade-off. To provide a cheap and cost effective extraction base or take the time to more 
painfully negotiate payments that align with the true value of the resource. The latter requires 
a great deal of human capital, a long term strategy and minimal information asymmetries 
(Hendricks and Kovenock, 1989).  
7.6.2. Risk and Debt 
The usual proxy used to determine the perceived financial risk of a country is to compare and 
contrast the spreads on government bonds. This is not possible for the countries like the 
Solomon Islands because the sovereign government is not rated and there is no market for 
Solomon Island bonds. Unsurprisingly then, without some form of policy intervention the 
cost of capital in the Solomon Islands will be more elevated than usual. This in turn produces 
highly adverse outcomes for the development of capital-intensive infrastructure projects.  
Historical evidence supports the notion that the need to control risk associated with price 
volatility in primary commodities led to the initial inception of the now complex derivatives 
markets. Market speculation has now become an overwhelming pursuit, justified as providing 
market liquidity to those who utilise the markets for hedging purposes. The marriage of the 
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two sectors in the complex form we deal with today first came to be somewhat recognisable 
in its current form over 300 years ago in Japan
15
 for rice price stability (Hamori et al., 2001). 
This complex and intricate process of commodification and risk management now permeates 
even currency itself and is ‘underwritten’ by imperfect knowledge (Frydman and Goldberg, 
2007). 
Debt instrument choice is most strongly linked with the credit history of the issuing firm and 
the current credit quality of the issuer (Denis and Mihov, 2003). Firms with the highest credit 
quality exhibit a strong preference for public debt, while firms with credit ratings towards the 
middle of the spectrum tend to prefer bank debt facilities, while those at the bottom of the 
credit rating spectrum borrow from non-bank private sources at high cost (Berger and Udell, 
1998; Carey et al., 1998; Berger and Udell, 2006). This pattern broadly supports the model of 
Diamond (1991) in which borrowers with high credit ratings earn rents from their reputations 
with lenders. The existence of such rents is also consistent with observations made within 
Graham and Harvey (2001) that managers place a high priority on maintaining their existing 
credit rating. At the other end of the spectrum, non-bank private debt plays a unique role in 
accommodating the debt financing needs of entities with low credit quality (Kahan and 
Tuckman, 1993). 
Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) calculations (that is, the average cost of debt and 
equity capital deployed for a given investment), are employed for performance measurement 
and investment decision making purposes in a broad spectrum of contexts. However, while 
routinely determined in developed countries
16
, WACC calculations become particularly 
difficult to apply in developing nations for a myriad of reasons. In the case of developing 
nations with emerging markets, a number of studies have shown that the traditional WACC 
and the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), which derives cost of equity estimates, used in 
more mature economies do not work because of a lack of historical data on markets, deep 
market inefficiencies, the different nature of risks involved and bad statistical properties of 
any available time series. Seminal works of literature in this regard include (Bekaert and 
Harvey, 1995; Harvey, 1995; Diamonte et al., 1996; Erb et al., 1996; Godfrey and Espinosa, 
1996; Estrada, 2000) and. More recent additions have been made by Damodaran (2013). 
                                                          
15
 For many years, the Japanese government had prohibited the trade of futures bills because it was widely 
regarded as a form of gambling that caused rice prices to rise. However, when the price of rice fell to record 
lows in the late 1720s, the samurai (whose income was tied to the value of rice) saw their economic position fall 
relative to the merchant class, whose growing economic power worried the nation's elites.  
16 Simshauser (2014) provides one such example by calculating the Weighted Average Cost of Capital for 
merchant power generation in Australia. 
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The perceived risk involved with any investment will also result in the country hosting these 
operations paying a premium in some guise to counteract the investor sentiments (Sill, 2000; 
Frydman and Goldberg, 2007). The riskier a country the more they will have to encourage 
foreign capital to invest; this can take the form of tax incentives, reduced royalty rates and 
favourable contracts of myriad forms (Eaton et al., 1986; Cosset and Roy, 1991; 
Albuquerque, 2003; Damodaran, 2003; Damodaran, 2012; Hayakawa et al., 2013). This can 
subsequently create a platform for sustained corruption.  
7.6.3. Capital Markets 
The immaturity of capital markets in countries like the Solomon Islands and the difficulty in 
deriving even the most basic form of benchmark calculation helps to explain why attracting 
investment can be so difficult in the first instance (Sill, 2000). It also helps to explain why 
investments are priced at what would be describes as striking premiums in unrated sovereign 
nations. There must also be some element of circularity in this, if no formal benchmark 
exists, capital flows will face substantial frictions in the first place, which means limited 
prospects for a formal benchmark being formed in the future. 
Without access to capital markets, financial institutions and the greater economic network, 
which provides a profitable end use of the raw materials, the transformation from black 
sludge and red earth would not occur and these chemical elements would remain just that. 
Natural resource wealth does not need to be produced in the industrial sense of production; it 
is simply extracted and can therefore occur independently of other processes in a country 
associated to macro-economic development (Repetto et al., 1989; Auty and Mikesell, 1999; 
Auty, 2001b). This has numerous detrimental effects on human capital and the ability of 
national economies to grow productively and become more complex while in this phase of 
growth.  
Capital markets transform these immobile, in-situ assets into commodities with tangible value 
that are mobile, fungible forms of wealth that are not only transferrable but completely liquid 
once converted into currency. The efficacy of making minerals into currency is of seminal 
importance. Foreign investment and where the capital that funds projects is coming from 
becomes very relevant when more broad geo-political strategies are incorporated into 
national investment decisions (Moran, 2001; Todaro and Smith, 2011). This becomes a very 
impervious world where good evidence to support logic is sparse. 
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7.6.4. The Cost of Capital  
The usual proxy used to determine the perceived financial risk of a sovereign nation is to 
compare country credit ratings, spreads on government bonds or spreads on Credit Default 
Swaps (Damodaran, 2003; Damodaran, 2008; Damodaran, 2012).  
Figure 7.1 illustrates the total equity risk premium estimates (y-axis) versus country credit 
ratings (x-axis) using Damodaran’s (2015) data set. Equity returns are calculated by deriving 
the risk premium for mature equity markets (US S&P500) plus risk premiums for individual 
countries based upon their 10 year Credit Default Swap spreads, adjusted by a factor of 1.5x 
which at the time of writing reflects the relative volatility of equity markets and the market 
for Credit Default Swaps (Damodaran, 2013). 
 
Figure 7.1. Total Equity Risk Premiums and Country Credit Rating. 
(Simshauser et al., 2016) 
No such calculation is possible for the Solomon Islands. The sovereign government is not 
rated, there is no market for Solomon Island bonds and therefore no credit default swap 
spread exists. This is a widespread phenomenon as there are many countries that have no 
formal credit rating. Any crude calculation would be highly speculative and provide little 
value to the analysis within this thesis without creating additional complexity and confusion.  
Without policy intervention the WACC, discussed in Section 7.6.2, will be elevated for 
capital-intensive infrastructure projects characterised by asset specificity and asset 
immobility with a cost of equity likely to be 25+% and similarly elevated debt capital costs 
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(15+%) (Simshauser et al., 2016). This will adversely affect the development of capital 
intensive infrastructure projects in the Solomon Islands in the same way as other developing 
nations with analogous dynamics (Doh and Ramamurti, 2003; Ramamurti, 2003; Ramamurti 
and Doh, 2004).  
This creates a potential for destabilising impacts across many factors of the power trap 
complex due to the social characteristics of money and credit. As previously asserted, the risk 
that the international investor takes on will ultimately be passed on in the form of decreased 
welfare for local individuals. This underpins, from a financial perspective many of the 
ailments conceptualised within the resource curse thesis which needs to be more effectively 
remedied in developing regions. The inherent risk if this is not acknowledged and more 
effectively resolved is that this will catalyse even greater instability at multiple levels of the 
power trap complex.  
7.7. Summary 
This chapter has examined human and natural capital characteristics to explain the issues 
being faced by developing nations such as the Solomon Islands that have immature capital 
market structures. Specifically, the process of financial transformation of natural resource 
assets, the impact this has on individual and social psychology and what key factors amplify 
negative dynamics in this regard. The process of financial transformation of resource assets is 
a complex and multi-faceted process that is different in every nation. Enhancing this 
understanding in line with disaggregating the anthropogenic componentry that is seminal in 
this process leads to an enhanced perspective of where power can be subverted and where 
wealth can corrupt.  
The idiosyncratic nature and contextual specificity of this transformative process and 
aforementioned analysis outlines pivotal areas of importance with respect to the Solomon 
Islands. Policy recommendations in line with the analysis in this chapter that were published 
in Simshauser et al. (2016) will be discussed in Chapter 9. These practical policy 
prescriptions relate to leveraging from another countries credit security rating and utilising a 
development assistance budget in a more meaningful and productive sense. This can allow 
nations such as the Solomon Islands to receive assistance but also build internal capacity not 
dependency.  
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Human capital can be transformed via education, natural capital can be transformed with 
anthropogenically created financial systems of commerce. If the human capital is not able to 
keep pace with the transformative processes attached with commercial development of 
natural resources then information asymmetries cause further catalyse power distortions.  
Windfall wealth is able to subvert and corrupt administrations that distribute rights. These 
two forms of capital are intrinsically linked and advancing natural resource development 
without promoting human capital advancement creates instability, disempowerment and 
inequality with respect to the livelihood of citizens.   
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Chapter 8 – The Solomon Islands (Case Study) 
 
“I learned what I believe to be the secret of the South Pacific. Here nature is so 
awesome that it compels the attention. Other things being roughly equal, man lives 
most keenly who lives in closest harmony with nature. The nature of life in the islands 
commands attention to the vivid world and its even more vivid inhabitants”. - 
(Michener, 1974). 
8.1. Overview 
The previous chapter analysed the idiosyncratic attributes of natural capital and human 
capital as well as the specific relevance for regions experiencing natural resource led 
development. The processes of financial transformation associated with natural resource 
assets plays an influential role in the socio-political dynamics associated with it. The two are 
intrinsically linked. 
This chapter will introduce and provide a relevant overview of the broad Solomon Islands 
setting as well as the youth population within the capital city in Honiara. An overview of the 
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youth cohort and the education system will then be provided to illustrate the declining nature 
of outcomes for the youth population in the nation.  
The latter sections will explore the current prescriptions to such outcomes and introduce the 
cohort of youth associated with this research to promote the understanding of such issues. 
Understanding the youth cohort's experience in the Solomon Islands is fundamental to any 
sustainable social outcome associated with prescribing solutions to the current rates of 
general community disenfranchisement. Much of this is stemming from social unrest 
underpinned by systemic government corruption, tribal rivalries and insecure livelihoods. By 
way of qualifications, tribal rivalries refer to intra-ethnic rivalries, and not inter-ethnic 
rivalries as exemplified by the tension and conflict between Gualanese and Malaitans. With 
regards to the youth of the Solomon Islands, the majority are rural and are in schools. While 
their numbers have been increasing in Honiara, those marginalized in the capital city and its 
fringes do not constitute the majority. Many youth caught in this trap are impoverished and 
denied political influence. The exploiters are then able to ensure that power can be 
perpetuated with relative ease for another generation. Competency produces hierarchies that 
aren’t based on power and thus the link to meaningful vocational and educational outcomes.  
Thus, the experiences of the youth are central to any study of socially ingrained power 
struggles predicated upon temporal psychological shifts catalysed by natural resource asset 
windfalls. Only a focused study of the experience of the youth within this setting can 
accurately detail the problem and assist in informing policy as well as research agendas 
moving forward.  
To understand the impact and long term implications of resource curse style dynamics 
associated with natural resource led development in the nation, the experiences and impacts 
upon the youth needs to be accurately understood as they provide an insight into what the 
future will look like. Not understanding this cohort could be perilous in such nations and the 
recent ethnic tension in the nation provides a powerful example (KIP, 2015). Understanding 
this impact on the social development
17
 of the nation can significantly enhance associated 
outcomes. Carmignani and Avom (2010) find a higher dependence on primary commodity 
exports is negative for social development. The transmission mechanism seems to operate via 
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The definition used has been taken from Morris (2013), “social development is the bundle of technological , 
subsistence, organizational and cultural accomplishments through which people feed, clothe, house and 
reproduce themselves, explain the world around them, resolve disputes within their communities, extend their 
power at the expense of other communities and defend themselves against others’ attempts to extend power” 
(p.28). 
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income inequality and macroeconomic volatility. Public expenditure on education relative to 
national income, expected years of schooling for girls, and gross secondary-school enrolment 
are found to be inversely related to the share of natural capital in national wealth across 
countries by (Gylfason, 2001). Natural capital appears to crowd out human capital, thereby 
slowing down the pace of economic development (Gylfason, 2001). 
8.2. Background  
Many of the South Pacific Island Nations have populations of significantly less than one 
million people, such as Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu, Kiribati, Republic 
of Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, and Palau. Furthermore their populations 
are young. This presents especially specific and idiosyncratic challenges. Estimates indicate 
that Honiara and its surrounding areas could treble in size by 2050 and given the composition 
of the population this will mean youth are the overwhelming majority of residents (Keen et 
al., 2017).  
Economic growth and diversification have been restricted in these regions due to 
geographical barriers. These barriers will not be quickly overcome. Policies aimed at 
fostering the emergence of an export-oriented private sector are unlikely to be effective in 
generating substantial livelihood empowering solutions. Additionally, economic growth 
should not be seen as the apotheosis of effective planning and policy.  
The challenge for policy makers and the communities in these regions is therefore to think 
about how to meet employment challenges within the formidable constraints imposed by the 
reality of their geographical, social and economic setting. Slow economic growth, rapid 
population growth, and accelerating urbanisation mean that understanding social dynamics is 
a pressing priority for small Pacific Island countries.  
Natural resources can sever the social contract that exists between state and citizen, creating 
get rich quick power mongering rather than long term investment (Green, 2012). Given the 
current macroeconomic backdrop in which the current youth and livelihood dynamics are 
taking place it is imperative to understand the impact that this asset class is having. The 
previous chapter has assessed the individual fundamentals of this asset class. This chapter 
will institute the relevant contextual framing of the case study that further develops these 
idiosyncrasies and qualifications within the research setting. The natural resource sector in its 
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current form contributes little to improving indigenous livelihoods of local residents 
(Gilberthorpe, 2014).  
Judgments about policy interventions to create livelihood sustention within these industries 
should consider the quality and sustainability of the social environments they are likely to 
create (Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994; Birdsall et al., 2000; Stijns, 2003; Stijns, 2006). These 
nations might often benefit most from converting rents from natural resource industries into 
improved infrastructure services and human capital investment, rather than seeking to create 
direct large scale employment in those industries through implicit or explicit subsidisation 
(Lagerlöf and Tangerås, 2008). Importantly, improvement in employment supported by 
natural resource industries does not have to involve the creation of jobs within those 
industries (Ewers, 2015).  
Sound regulation of natural resource industries can generate sustainable flows of revenue to 
support employment in the delivery of public services and opportunities for better local and 
international employment through improvements in human capital.  
The Solomon Islands is characterised by high levels of subsistence agriculture, high levels of 
unemployment, low levels of formal sector employment and a dramatic youth bulge. Section 
8.3 will provide a demographic overview of the nation. This forms an important basis of 
understanding of the Solomon Islands before discussing specific implications for youth.  
Honiara, the capital city, requires specific and differential examination to be able to 
understand and identify key themes, issues and characteristics that are relevant to the urban 
condition and not the broader rural setting in which the majority of people live (KIP, 2015).  
Given the recent severe ethnic tension in the Solomon Islands and the ongoing associated 
issues understanding conflicts in this regard is imperative. Broadly speaking, the evidence 
illustrates that conflict related deaths have tripled since 2003 (OECD, 2016). Violent 
extremism and terrorism are also on the rise (OECD, 2016). The cost of violence is also 
rising, the global economic impact of violence is a staggering USD 13.6 trillion, equivalent to 
13.6 percent of Global GDP (OECD, 2016).  
A recent report from the OECD showcasing emerging thinking about violence, presents a 
new risk-based approach to monitoring various dimensions of fragility, and looks at financial 
flows in support of fragile contexts (OECD, 2016). This report finds that development, peace 
and security efforts in the developing world have not kept pace with the new reality of 
violence. We need to dedicate more resources and attention to violence. To be effective, the 
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report recommends we put people, especially youth, at the centre of these efforts (OECD, 
2016). Given that natural resource wealth can sever many of the basic kinship and social 
contracts that exists within a nations citizenry this needs to be better understood.  
This seminal logic, in addition to the years of fieldwork undertaken, also lead to the 
conclusion that youth need to be the focus of any effort to improve the future impact of 
violent regimes (KIP, 2015). The Solomon Islands is still suffering from many of the 
underlying symptoms that caused the ethnic tensions initially (KIP, 2015). Although in more 
recent years the nation has been more peaceful this has not been promoted by an amelioration 
of the underlying causes of the violence (KIP, 2015).  
A granular, disaggregated, locally informed understanding of the problem with long-term 
resolutions that impact the next generation positively is badly needed. Given the move 
towards a more local and disaggregated level of understanding with respect to social unrest 
caused by natural resource windfalls and ill-defined rights the Solomon Islands was selected 
as a case study
18
 to further explore these dynamics.  
The focus of the empirical analysis, presented in Chapter 9 will be on a disenfranchised youth 
cohort in the Solomon Islands’ capital city, Honiara. New data and analysis will contribute 
towards the nations understanding of the impact the current economic and social setting, in a 
country led by natural resource exports is having on the disenfranchised and marginalised 
youth. Better understanding this cohort is key to tailoring approaches and funding allocation 
where it is needed most so that the current dynamics are not perpetuated for another 
generation. It is the youth who are the next custodians of these issues and continued 
disagreement and inability to plan for the future will impact upon the livelihoods of future 
generations.  
In addition to the personal cost involved, youth unemployment has clear costs to society in 
terms of wasted talent (human capital) and the likelihood that embittered and disenfranchised 
young people will turn to crime and violence to vent this frustration (Anderson, 1998; 
Argenti, 2008; OECD, 2016). Given the recent violence and instability experienced in the 
Solomon Islands, this is a major concern (KIP, 2015).  
The objective of the thesis is to be able to more accurately determine the critical factors 
causing individuals to be disenfranchised and how institutions and state level power 
                                                          
18 
A case study is an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context, 
especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (Yin, 2014).  
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dynamics influence this. Given the raison d'être of this thesis within the context of the 
Solomon Islands a mixed methods
19
 approach has been chosen for the following reasons: 
 Lack of data or patchy data in many areas; 
 Corruption and transparency issues; 
 Access to information; 
 Absence of information and records;  
 To gain a more comprehensive understanding of granular detail relating to the 
problem;  
 Provide a more balanced view of the nature and drivers of the problem than what 
currently exist; 
 Draw together the strengths of each approach (quantitative/qualitative) to garner a 
more accurate and useful results from a complex and multi-faceted issue. 
Natural resource assets due to their commercial underpinnings and intimate relationship with 
administrative power can be easily exploited. This revenue need to be preserved and invested 
for the future of the nation. If the youth are ill-equipped to be the future custodians of this 
wealth, long-term, ingrained social problems ensue. Chapters 9, 10 and 11 will assess this in 
more detail and provide answers to the research questions outlined in the introduction.  
Systematically these research questions are divided into state and individual level questions: 
State Level 
 How can power distortions underpinned by wealth from resource extraction be better 
defined and studied? 
 What are the key contributing factors of power distortions predicated on natural 
resource dependence at a state level? 
 Why are the rent-seeking elite successful in sustaining their power in some countries 
but not in others?  
 Can international collective action be strengthened to modify the behaviour of rent-
seeking elites in affected countries with a critical mass of informed citizens?  
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 An overview of this form of research method is provided in (Bergman, 2008; Hesse-Biber, 2010; Creswell 
and Plano Clark, 2011) 
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 What can be done to mitigate and improve the current situation at a state level in the 
country and can this be applied in other settings? 
 How can citizens misunderstanding be countered to promote good government? 
Individual Level 
 What are the key characteristics of marginalised youth in such regions?  
 Can a disaggregation of pivotal factors be used to remedy prescriptions to current 
resource development issues? 
 How are disenfranchised individuals impacted? 
 What are the key contributing life condition factors that amplify power distortions at 
an individual level? 
 Do vocational programs assist in making up the shortfall in educational outcomes? 
 What is the current sentiment towards the government amongst the youth population? 
Understanding the aforementioned within a nation such as the Solomon Islands, due to its 
composition and natural resource reliance can assist in informing prescriptions within the 
nation and also provide a research framework for how similar issues can be studied 
elsewhere.  
8.3. Case Study Setting: The Solomon Islands 
The Solomon Islands consists of six major and approximately nine hundred (900) smaller 
volcanic islands, coral atolls and reefs, many of which are uninhabited, illustrating the sparse 
and uneven distribution of the population on many islands. The country is a former UK 
protectorate, established in the 1890s and one of the poorest countries measured in 
GDP/capita in the South Pacific (World Bank, 2015). The overwhelming majority of the 
country's population live in isolated rural villages on undeveloped outer islands. 
8.3.1. National Demographics 
The Solomon Islands’ population in the 2009 Census was 515,870, of which 19.7 percent 
were urban and 80.2 percent were rural (SIG, 2009). Approximations with respect to the rural 
urban split differ little in more recent calculations (SIG, 2015)From the 2012/13 Household 
and Income Expenditure Survey (HIES), the estimated total population is 615,804 persons 
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and 108,041 households (SIG, 2015). The total population consisted of 317,205 (51.5%) 
males and 298,598 (48.5%) females resulting in a sex ratio of 106 males per 100 females 
(SIG, 2015).  
An average household size is estimated at 6 persons, and over half of the Solomon Islands 
population is less than 20 years old (SIG, 2015). The Paid Worker Participation Rate (PWPR) 
in the 2009 Census was 23.7 per cent, and the salaried worker population rate was 16.2 per 
cent (SIG, 2009).  
The Solomon Islands’ HDI value for 2014 is 0.506, which puts the country in the low human 
development category, ranking 156 out of 188 countries and territories (UNDP, 2015). 
Between 2000 and 2014, the Solomon Islands’ HDI value increased from 0.446 to 0.506, an 
increase of 13.4 percent or an average annual increase of about 0.90 percent (UNDP, 2015).  
Official Development Assistance (Foreign Aid) was 22 percent of Gross National Income in 
2001 yet by 2010 had increased to 61 percent (World Bank 2015). The Solomon Islands has 
thus progressed from being moderately reliant on foreign aid to being one of the most aid-
dependent countries in the world, in per capita terms (Schwarz et al. 2011; Hayward-Jones, 
2014). Contrastingly the nation is among the most resource-rich countries in the Pacific 
(Moore, 2004; Allen, 2011; Gouy, 2011; Hameiri, 2014). The natural resources are however 
being depleted at unsustainable rates. Timber being a primary case in point (Allen, 2011; 
Hameiri, 2014; Nanau, 2014). The development assistance has been overwhelmingly in the 
form of money spent on the peace keeping effort relating to RAMSI (Hayward-Jones, 2014). 
The Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands was conceived in the 
‘state-building moment’ that informed Western responses to ‘state failure’ over the past two 
decades (Allen and Dinnen, 2016).The aggregated numbers when divided by a small 
population size tend to make the Solomon Islanders appear aid reliant with respect to nation 
accounts figures. This is in actuality false in terms of in country realities. What is occurring is 
that those in power within the nation are becoming aware of the windfall nature of being 
supported by aid in the short term and identifying as a nation as aid dependent. The political 
ideology has shifted however the impacts of this aid on the local, regionally dispersed 
population are minimal (KIP, 2015).   
Globally, the long term negative impacts of development assistance seems to far outweigh the 
short term benefit (Moyo, 2009). The impact of being reliant upon other nations and 
development assistance seems to also have a dramatic effect on the national psyche (KIP, 
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2015). The nation had until very recently been a self-sufficient nation where the local people 
lived intimately with their local environment. The majority of Solomon Islanders still live a 
rural life and recent data from the Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) are 
summarised below (SIG, 2015).  
 18% of total households are located in urban areas with 82% based in rural20 areas. Of 
these urban households, an estimated 84% of total household dwellings are owner 
occupied. Over half of the owner-occupied dwellings are in urban areas; 
 4% of all households rent their current dwellings and these households make up 19% 
of households in the urban areas; 
 94% of all household dwellings are free-standing individual dwellings, and about 83% 
of these dwellings consist of an outdoor kitchen; 
 83% of total households reported having their kitchens located outside the house with 
54% of these households located in urban areas; and 
 43% of households in urban areas have a private flush toilet facility, while 24% 
reported having a private slab toilet facility. Nearly half of the rural households use 
the seaside/mangrove areas as their main toilet facility.  
When total expenditure excluding imputed rent is disaggregated by province, Honiara 
accounts for the highest (22%) of all expenditure, followed closely by Malaita (21%) and 
Guadalcanal (20%) (SIG, 2015). When imputed rent is included, the composition of total 
expenditure varies significantly across provinces. For example, Malaita Province becomes the 
highest (22%) spending province, followed by Central (21%) and Isabel (20%) (SIG, 2015).  
Access to Communication Infrastructure 
A significant majority 97 percent of all households in the country do not have access to the 
internet at their household dwellings (SIG, 2015). Very few households, around 1 percent 
across the country, have telephone landline connections at their dwellings (SIG, 2015). At the 
provincial level, Honiara recorded the highest percent (4%) of dwellings with landline 
connections, less than a third of total population own a mobile phone and in Honiara, slightly 
more than half the population own a mobile phone (SIG, 2015). This is increasing as these 
technologies become cheaper and more accessible (KIP, 2015).  
                                                          
20
 A number of enumeration areas surrounding Honiara are classified as urban on the basis of their proximity 
and access to the town, population density, permanency of settlements and variety of economic activities (SIG, 
2015). All other areas in the country are considered to be rural. 
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Electricity 
Slightly less than half of all households have access to electricity (45%). Solar (40%) energy 
constitutes the main sources of lighting for the majority of households (SIG, 2015). The 
majority (98%) of these households are in urban areas. More than half the households in 
urban areas use wood and coconut shells as their main energy source for cooking.  
Water 
In rural areas, the main source of drinking water is community standpipes as reported by 45% 
of households, followed by river/spring (25%), household tank (13%) and community tanks 
(11%) (SIG, 2015). Two-thirds of rural households have to travel to the main source of 
drinking water (SIG, 2015). In urban areas, 57 percent of households obtain their drinking 
water primarily from metered-piped supplies provided by the Solomon Islands Water 
Authority (SIWA), followed by the household tank (16%) (SIG, 2015). Close to 90 percent of 
all households in both urban and rural areas claim that the same source of drinking water is 
also the same source for cooking. 
Labour Force  
Subsistence agriculture is the principal sectoral employer in the Solomon Islands. Of the 
labour force, 26.8 percent were in wage and salary jobs (SIG, 2009). From analysis of 2009
21
 
census results, of a total workforce of 208,118, 20.9 percent were in the formal workforce, 
consisting of wage employees and employers. The informal economy, consisting of the self-
employed, unpaid family workers or those producing goods such as cash crops for sale, 
constituted 37.4 percent of the labour force. The subsistence economy constituted 41.7 
percent of the labour force (SIG, 2015). Within the formal sector, 34.8 percent were in 
employed by Government, and 65.3 percent in the Private Sector (SIG, 2015).Within the 
population ten years and over, across the majority of provinces the main activity is the 
production of goods for self-consumption or home production, followed by being a full-time 
student (SIG, 2015).  
In Honiara, the predominant undertaking is being employed in the public/private sector, 
accounting for 33 percent of the population (SIG, 2015). Unpaid family domestic-work is 
very common, especially among the populations of Honiara, Rennell-Bellona and Makira 
provinces (SIG, 2015). 
                                                          
21
 Most recent record of labour force data. 
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Demographics Overview 
National level indicators are useful when designing overall economic and social policies. 
However when it comes to specific issues, local indicators are crucial. Context not only 
varies between countries and provinces, but also within them and distinct provincial 
differences should be taken into account. This is very important in the Solomon Islands due 
to the geographic dispersion and distinctly different development paradigms. Variances such 
as ethnicity, language, urban/rural economic activity and income disparities across provinces 
can hinder initiatives if not properly considered at the outset. 
8.3.2. Honiara (Capital City) 
Households in Honiara suffer from disproportionate levels of poverty, with almost one in 
three people unable to afford a basic minimum standard of living (SIG, 2009). These 
estimates are very sensitive to the definition of poverty as well as incomplete data.  
The median age in Honiara is three years older than the national average at 22.7 years old 
(SIG, 2015). Data suggest that from 1999 to 2009 there was a very distinct expansion of the 
age pyramid at age groups (15-30) years, indicating that Honiara gained people of these age 
groups from the other provinces as they expected to find opportunities for employment, 
education or other reasons (SIG, 2015). 
Honiara is distinct in its high percentage (78%) of households earning their main income 
from wages and salaries. There are very low rates of subsistence agriculture as the leading 
income source, with only 5 percent of households officially relying upon this within the city 
(SIG, 2015).  
9 percent of Honiara households recorded ‘own business’ as the main source of income (SIG, 
2015). The urban growth rate of 2.7 percent (1999 – 2009) is marginally greater than the 
national population growth rate of 2.3 per cent and likely closer to 3 per cent (SIG, 2015).  
Of the total Honiara labour force of 22,962, the labour force participation rate was higher for 
males (52.7%) than for females (43.1%), and it was considerably lower than any other 
province or the national average of 63 percent (SIG, 2015). This is likely because of the need 
for those not otherwise employed to engage in subsistence agriculture in the provinces and 
the small role this played in the Honiara economy.  
Even according to the limited definition of unemployment, Honiara’s unemployment rate was 
much higher than the national average of 2.3 percent, at 9.9 percent for women and 9 percent 
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for men (SIG, 2015). However, the employment to population ratio for Honiara was higher 
than all provinces, at 37 percent. Among the population over 12 years of age, 48 percent were 
in the labour force and 52 percent were either full time students, those engaged in home 
duties, the retired, the disabled, and those who did not work but who did not look for work 
(SIG, 2015). Of those in formal employment, the balance between private sector and 
government employees matched the national average at 67 percent and 33 percent 
respectively (SIG, 2015). 
8.3.3. Trade 
The import and export profile of the Solomon Islands is characterised by crude, unprocessed 
staple commodities forming the basis of one side of their economic equation coupled with 
diversified and complex products on the other. This creates a high risk of distortionary effects 
within the power trap complex due to the associated economic and social realities relating to 
technical capacity and human capital that this reflects within the nation.  
In 2015 the Solomon Islands exported $648M
22
. During the last five years the exports of the 
Solomon Islands have increased at an annualized rate of 10.8 percent, from $376M in 2010 to 
$648M in 2015. In 2015 the GDP of the Solomon Islands was $1.13B and its GDP per capita 
was $2.2k. 
The most recent exports are led by Rough Wood which represents 73.3 percent of the total 
exports of the Solomon Islands, followed by Processed Fish, which account for 7.97 percent. 
The top export destinations of the Solomon Islands are China ($395M), India ($62.5M), Italy 
($42.9M), the United Kingdom ($20.3M) and Thailand ($14.1M). 
In 2015 the Solomon Islands imported $438M, making it the 184th largest importer in the 
world. During the last five years the imports of the Solomon Islands have increased at an 
annualized rate of 4.8 percent, from $334M in 2010 to $438M in 2015. The most recent 
imports are led by refined petroleum which represents 16.4 percent of the total imports of the 
Solomon Islands, followed by rice which accounts for 9.3 percent. The top import origins of 
the Solomon Islands are Australia ($123M), Singapore ($72.3M), China ($52.2M), Malaysia 
($36.9M) and New Zealand ($21.7M). 
                                                          
22
 Million US Dollars. 
  
131 
8.3.4. Politics, Power & Youth 
“The understanding of human development requires examination of multi-person systems of 
interactions not limited to a single setting and must take into account aspects of the 
environment beyond the immediate situation. In the absence of such a broadened perspective, 
much of contemporary research can be characterized as the study of development out of 
context” (Bronfenbrenner, 1979, p. 2). 
The work of education anthropologists and sociologists has shown that behind the apparently 
natural uptake and success of schooling and seamless transition to employment lie specific 
processes and practices of acquisition, socialisation to and reproduction of habits, behaviours 
and dispositions (Disbray and Bauer, 2016). These underpin the acquisition of literacy, 
schooling and successful transition to work (Watson‐Gegeo, 1992; Heath, 1996; Barton et al., 
2000). With specific reference to the Solomon Islands see (Watson‐Gegeo, 1992; Watson‐
Gegeo and Gegeo, 1992; Gegeo and Watson-Gegeo, 2002).  
In remote Indigenous societies in Australia, the institution of Western schooling was 
introduced very recently (Price, 2012; Campbell and Proctor, 2014).  There has been little 
time for remote communities to reap the promised returns, or for inter-generational 
reproduction of the associated learning, literacy and work practices and routines (Kral and 
Falk, 2004; Kral, 2012; Guenther et al., 2014). The overarching goals and aspirations that 
drive these orientations and practices in day to day life is detailed within (Guenther and Bat, 
2013; Osborne and Guenther, 2013).  
Some scholars have articulated how different perspectives on context may be taken up and 
why they matter. For example, an outsider may mark different aspects of what is happening 
than an insider in a given community. Watson‐Gegeo (1992) describes what she calls a 
“vertical context”, involving larger institutional structures. Such a context, she points out, 
may be poorly understood or even unknown to the interactants, unlike a “horizontal context” 
that involves more immediate circumstances, events, and interactions (p. 53).  
The Solomon Islands’ current political system seems to be a recipe for instability (Allen and 
Dinnen, 2015; Allen and Porter, 2016). Prior to independence, which was implemented in 
1978, the nation was simply a chain of islands operating under different traditional and 
unwritten sets of norms and values. Leadership existed, even if the approach varied among 
the different societies. 
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Leadership concepts differ in the nation due to the ethnographic diversity that exists and the 
surrounding contexts (Douglas, 2013). Leadership concepts relating to self-interest and the 
“Big Man” concept are well outlined in (Sahlins, 1963; Godelier and Strathern, 1991). 
Hereditary leadership accession is more prevalent some areas of the nation such as Malaita 
(Douglas, 2013). An interesting overview of the diversity and cross-section of traditional 
leadership styles in South Pacific societies is included within (Douglas, 1979). How this 
power associated with leadership was used and was bequeathed differs greatly given the 
dissection of ethnic identities that exist within the one nation (Kabutaulaka, 2001; White, 
2003).  
Many leadership translations are gained through action and competition. As a result influence 
of pre-existing organisational structures relating to social leadership is particularly 
susceptible to the pitfalls associated with windfall wealth from natural resources. Due to the 
ingrained nature of competition within and between factions this further catalyses 
competition over the ability to maintain control over resources and the ability to fund 
regimes. The local sentiment is also that democracy and politics should be kept separate from 
cultural leadership (KIP, 2015). The ‘wantok’ socio-economic and political network that 
operates informally in the Solomon Islands proves to be a powerful and countervailing force 
to any ascribed political systems within the national government (Nanau, 2011).  
Upon gaining independence however the Westminster parliamentary democracy was 
established under the Solomon Islands’ Constitution (1978) and remains the political system 
used in the country today. The distinct limitations of this system within the constructs of this 
thesis are discussed in Chapter 5 and 6. 
The Westminster system and its adversarial politics together with the personality politics of 
Melanesia do not provide the bases of stable electoral democracy. However, the absence of 
nation-hood has its origins in the British, ‘divide and rule’ policies, as well as the 
centralization of services in Honiara. Kabutaulaka (2001)provides an explanation of the 
tensions and conflict in this regard. 
Although tribal wars between some of the islands did occur, by and large leadership and 
politics during the pre-independence era was stable, with the people respecting an authority 
that was directly responsible for their subordinates. This stability changed with the imposition 
of an open democratic electoral system. 
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Today, the Solomon Islands still maintains the traditional leadership system in rural areas but 
it is rarely effective in practice. People tend to see their local members of parliament as their 
saviour, someone they choose so that they can be assisted in return. 
This Westminster system combined with the electoral process has created a broad political 
spectrum whereby competition for leadership within the hierarchy of the system becomes 
never ending. Parliamentarians push their own agenda, in a constant power struggle. People 
are no longer seen as citizens but as servants of an agenda, with less pride in their national 
identity, but prepared to give blood for the sake of their tribal identity. A problematic 
dichotomy in recent times (Fox and Walsh, 2017).  
Power struggles in the Solomon Islands is ongoing and damaging. For one thing, political 
leaders tend to quickly forget their mandates, instead pushing their own agenda. Second, the 
constant power struggles have proven to be a huge distraction. Instead of doing what they 
were elected to do, the government is more obsessed with maintaining its numbers and 
authority (KIP, 2015).The power struggles become particularly threatening when they begin 
to involve ethnic groups of special interests. When this happens, it weakens the very 
foundation of the Solomon Islands as an integrated state of multiple islands, and it can result 
in fragmented political interests that can lead to even greater instability and tension. The 
nation is very susceptible to this dynamic reoccurring (Fox and Walsh, 2017). The result has 
been negative economic outputs, a weak political system, poor social services, and declining 
living standards for the entire population. 
The current electoral system is not the best tool for solving these challenges (KIP, 2015). The 
transplanted system of governance also has many flaws and does not seem to fit the setting at 
all. Changing the system is the only solution for genuine transformation in the country, and in 
saying this citizens must be proactive and play an important role in the process. Although it is 
a stretch to think that it could return to its traditional leadership system, the Solomon Islands 
could at least revisit its traditional concept of leadership and try to create an applicable hybrid 
model that could be tested carefully before it is adopted. Given the small population size and 
relative diversity if managed and guided properly the nation could provide examples for the 
rest of the world with respect to evolving such systems. How women are integrated into 
leadership roles will be a difficult consideration given the setting. One leading female MP 
believes that reserved seats for women in parliament is a step in the wrong direction as a 
measure to counteract the sixth lowest representation of women in parliament in the world 
(KIP, 2015).  
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As the nation looks to the future it will be imperative to understand what impact power trap 
dynamics will have and already have had upon the nation’s largest cohort, the youth. The 
number of marginalised youth is increasing (KIP, 2015). The education system has slowly 
unravelled from what was once considered the pre-eminent destination in the South Pacific to 
one of the poorest performers in the pacific region (KIP, 2015). Solutions to this problem 
need to be found
23
.  
Increasing numbers of Solomon Islanders are accessing post-secondary and tertiary 
education. Besides, NUSI, large numbers are attending USP and UPNG. Scholarships are 
being provided by government and by MPs. 
The Pacific Island Forum Secretariat (PIFS) Tracking Report (2015) indicates that close to 89 
percent of the school going age children are attending primary schools. The fact that the 
schools are largely exam oriented and elitist has to do with the system inherited from colonial 
times. In the post-colonial period the efforts to make education available to ever larger 
number of children throughout the country and not just a few in Honiara (where the elite 
schools are located) have had its challenges. The government has been attempting to address 
issues like untrained teachers and school facilities. Tellingly however within the PIFS report 
there are no listed major challenges or future plans to improve gender disparity with respect 
to education in the nation (PIFS, 2015).  
Coming together as a nation will be imperative but how this is achieved is not an easy answer 
(Higginbotham, 2004; Alter and Oppenheimer, 2009; Buckley-Zistel, 2009). Appreciating 
and respecting differences as a whole community not as divided parts is integral to any 
nation’s success.  
Managing youth populations has a huge amount to do with expectation management, 
leadership and promoting appropriate role models (KIP, 2015). This requires properly 
functioning, socially resilient communities in rural and urban settings. Villages and local 
communities previously performed the role of managing the social hierarchy however to do 
this the old tribal leadership structures must be respected. Rites of passage and interactions 
between social groups need to be accurately understood before broad, over-arching national 
policies can have any meaningful effect. The diversity and complexity of these are detailed in 
(Van Gennep, 2011). Without this understanding and cohesion, a huge array of problems 
ensue (Poulton et al., 2015).  
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 An overview of what life was like within King George VI School is provided by an expatriate teacher in the 
50s and 60s can be found at: https://solomonseducation.wordpress.com/author/mikekikilee/  
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At a recent youth forum, the late Prime Minister of Vanuatu, Baldwin Lonsdale, said “I 
personally feel convinced that responsible, ethical and proactive leadership is about 
considering others values more than one’s interest”. Adding, “the national interest must 
become the determinant of all your decisions”. He concluded by stating, “we lead because 
there are others who follow and so let us decide for their welfare more than us, Melanesia is 
resource rich but the quality of life in the region is poor”.  
 “Our region has never been more vulnerable; 
 “Climate change and Non-Communicable Diseases (NCDs) are threatening our very 
existence”; 
 “Corruption and greed are eroding cultural values and breaking apart Melanesia”; 
 “Two out of three Melanesian women suffer physical and or sexual violence in their 
lifetime”; 
 “Up to 40% of our daughters under the age of 15 are sexually abused”; 
 “PNG did not achieve any of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)”, despite 
huge resource projects. 
8.4. Solomon Islands’ Education System 
The Solomon Islands made remarkable progress in recuperating lost ground in education 
following civil unrest that spanned between 1998 and 2003. The net enrolment rate improved 
significantly from 56 percent in 1999 to 89 percent in 2013 (PIFS, 2015). Government 
prioritised education during the post-conflict period and in 2009, delivered fee‐free education 
up to form three. However, completing high school and the standard of education received is 
not consistent across provinces or even across schools. Social and institutional factors in the 
Solomon Islands, shaped by colonialism and modernization, affect classroom practice, 
constraining teachers' use of cultural knowledge (Watson-Grego and Grego, 1994). Notions 
of cultural congruence as solutions to classroom problems, distinguishing between 
appropriation of childrens' culture for hegemonic interests versus culture use for counter-
hegemonic empowerment are emphasised and critiqued within Watson-Grego and Grego 
(1994). 
Efforts and plans made by the Department of Education and Human Resource Development 
to expand educational facilities and increase enrolment have been hindered by a lack of 
government funding, misguided teacher-training programmes, poor coordination of 
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programmes and a failure of the government to pay teachers. There are also myriad issues 
relating to child exploitation (USDL, 2014).  
There are five types of schools operating in the formal education system of the Solomon 
Islands: Early Childhood Education Centres (ECEs), Primary Schools (PS), Community High 
Schools (CHS), Provincial Secondary Schools (PSS) and National Secondary Schools (NSS). 
Early Childhood Education (ECE) centres are the first introduction to formal schooling for 
most Solomon Islanders. ECE centres, also known as Kindergartens, tend to be community or 
village-based. 
Primary Education 
Currently the seven years of primary schooling are the official basic education program of the 
Solomon Islands. A child is expected to commence at the age of six or seven and continue for 
seven years. 
Secondary Education 
Entry into secondary school is highly competitive, with students admitted on the basis of their 
performance in the Solomon Islands Secondary School Entrance Examination (SISSEE). The 
official entry age for Form 1 is 13 years. All students enrolled in Form 1 study the same 
curriculum for the first three years of secondary school in preparation to sit the Form 3 
Examination. Places in upper secondary are allocated on the basis of performance in end of 
year examinations, with fewer and fewer places available at each more senior level of 
schooling. Secondary education follows after Primary schooling and continues for three (to 
Form 3), six (to Form 6), or, for a small number, seven years (to Form 7).  
In the Secondary school system, there are three categories of schools: 
 National Secondary Schools (NSS). These schools are the original High Schools 
operated by the Government and the Churches; their student enrolments come from 
across the country; 
 Provincial Secondary Schools (PSS). These schools were initiated by the Government 
but run by the Provinces; their student enrolment should be restricted to the provinces 
only; and 
 Community High Schools (CHS). These schools started as Primary schools and the 
secondary sections were added on. The school is built and managed by the 
Communities and assisted by the Church or Provincial Education Authorities. 
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Tertiary Education 
Prior to 1984, most of the training needs of Solomon Islands were met by various training 
institutions established by the government and administered by responsible ministries. Some 
of these training schools existed before the nation gained its independence in 1978.  
In 1984, an Act of Parliament called "Solomon Islands College of Higher Education” Act was 
passed. This Act basically pooled all the existing schools then that were under the 
government to form the now the College of Higher Education. These schools were Solomon 
Islands Teachers College, Public Administration Training School, Ranadi Marine Training 
School, Honiara Nursing Training school, and Honiara Technical Institute. These schools 
formed the basis for the establishment of the current schools: School of Education, School of 
Finance & Administration, School of Marine & Fisheries Studies, School of Nursing and 
Health Studies, School of Industrial Development and School of Natural Resources. 
In 2008, the need to diversify the training scope was realised by the government which gave 
rise to the need to amend the Act in 2008 to include the School of tourism and Hospitality 
and any other schools the College sees fit. This amendment had made way for the 
establishment of the School of Humanities, Science & Media. In late 2012, a bill was passed 
in parliament for the Solomon Islands National University to be initiated. In reality many 
who finish the required level of education travel internationally for their tertiary education.  
National Education Profile 
According to the most recent survey, of the total current population, 15 percent had never 
attended school, 47 percent had already left school and 38 percent were currently attending 
school (SIG, 2015).  
In rural areas, there is a higher occurrence of females who have never attended school (19 
percent of females against 14 percent of males) and a slightly lower prevalence of rural 
females against their male counterparts who are currently attending school (37 percent of 
females against 40 percent of males) (SIG, 2015).  
In assessing non-school attendance, of the current population of 15 percent that never 
attended school, reasons include: 
 Refusing to go to school (16%); 
 Being too young (49%); 
 Parents did not provide support (13%); and  
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 Other (21%). 
Similar trends exist between urban and rural areas, except for travel distance, which was a 
greater constraint in rural areas. However, the survey found a distinctly higher proportion of 
females in both urban and rural areas whose parents did not want them to attend school (SIG, 
2015). This included 17 percent of females against 2 percent of males in urban, and 21 
percent females, against 5 percent males in rural areas (SIG, 2015).  
Nationally, of those who attended school, 54 percent reported completing primary education, 
22 percent reported completing junior secondary and 14 percent completed senior secondary 
(SIG, 2015). A lower proportion of educational attainment at post-secondary levels is 
reported in rural (4%) compared to urban areas (22%). In terms of the reasons for leaving 
school, nationally, 29 percent of those who attended school left due to poor academic 
performance, followed by having completed the desired level (28%), school being too 
expensive (11%), school seen as having no value (9%) and other reasons (24%) (SIG, 2015). 
Similar trends exist between urban and rural areas and by gender. Fewer females reported 
that they had finished their desired level of school (SIG, 2015).  
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8.5. The Youth 
Youth populations can be one of the largest assets the nation has, however, if not managed 
correctly, can quickly become one of its biggest liabilities (Gregg, 2001; Young, 2012; 
Holden and Otsuka, 2014). This is illustrated by much of the disharmony and social tension 
that is currently existing in many nations around the world today (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; 
Collier and Hoeffler, 2005).  
Youth idleness is a growing concern nationally, particularly in urban areas and is higher for 
young women (Haque and Packard, 2014). The literature widely acknowledges that planning 
for the youth cohort entering the labour force is one of the biggest challenges facing the 
Solomon Islands (Amit-Talai and Wulff, 1995; Kabutaulaka, 2001; Gegeo and Watson-
Gegeo, 2002; Wainwright, 2003). Contrastingly the voting age in the Solomon Islands is 18, 
yet the Penal Code (1996) applies to youth older than 12 and the Labour Act makes it legal 
for children above 12 to work.  
In 2011, the Solomon Islands made a minimal advancement in eﬀorts to eliminate the worst 
forms of child labour. The Government passed the Immigration Act 2012, which prohibits 
and punishes all forms of traﬃcking in persons and provides speciﬁc legal protections against 
the traﬃcking of children. While the Government met some goals of its National Children’s 
Policy’s National Plan of Action for 2010-2015, education is not compulsory and laws do not 
adequately protect all children from hazardous work and commercial sexual exploitation. The 
Government has also not established a body to coordinate eﬀorts to combat child labour, and 
resources for enforcement are lacking. Children in the Solomon Islands continue to engage in 
the worst forms of child labour, including commercial sexual exploitation, particularly in 
association with the ﬁshing and logging industries (ILAB, 2012). 
According to the Solomon Islands Budget 2013 Budget Strategy and Outlook, the mission of 
the Youth Development Division of the Ministry of Women, Youth and Children, Family 
Affairs is to “uphold and promote the rights of women, young people and children and 
families to advance the well-being of the nation” (SIG, 2013) It is responsible for the 
implementation of the national youth policy. Coordination of youth policy is supported by the 
National Steering Committee, National Youth Stakeholders Committee and the National 
Youth Congress. According to the 2013 Budget Strategy and Outlook, the Youth 
Development budget is SBD 3.6 million (USD 495,180) for 2013, 2014 and 2015 
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respectively. According to the World Bank, Solomon Islands spent 34 percent of its 
government expenditure and 7.27 percent of its GDP on education provision in 2010.  
Education attainment makes a major difference to employment, with a difference of around 
40 percent between primary completers and university completers in wage and salaried 
positions (SIG, 2009). With rural youth engaged more in subsistence activities, inactivity is a 
greater concern in urban areas. Nationally 19.9 percent of 25-29 year olds are neither in work 
nor education, but this rises to 33.3 percent in urban areas and to 39.5 percent for urban 
women in this age group (SIG, 2009). Firms report that if they could find employees with the 
right skills they could add over 50 percent more jobs (KIP, 2015). Yet only about 20 percent 
of 15-24 year old Solomon Islanders are employed, while over 40 percent of youth are 
inactive (SIG, 2015). 
Most Solomon Islanders engage in a combination of formal and informal small business 
activity either as business owners or employees (KIP, 2015). In Honiara, many individuals 
are employed part time or as casuals by small business operating informally. Many others 
generate income through a range of informal and part time business trading opportunities, 
such as operating a temporary retail stall or selling products in the town market (Haque and 
Packard, 2014).  
Assigning a single employment category is very difficult as many people rely on a mix. The 
economy is not as specialised as a more developed economy and as a result people rely on 
broad, unspecified skill sets and multiple sectors to provide for their daily existence. Those 
with formal sector employment may also engage in agricultural or subsistence activities at 
various times to generate additional cash income or meet various social obligations (Haque 
and Packard, 2014). 
There is increasing community concern about the number of youth related issues seminal to 
the future progression of the nation. Early school leavers lack the skills to gain basic 
employment, limited availability of youth vocational training opportunities and the rise of 
delinquency and alcohol and drug related problems (KIP, 2015).  
There is concern too about the problems associated with urban drift including youth losing 
touch with their traditional and family support structures in order to participate in a cash 
economy. Subsistence farming dominates the economy but provides very limited 
employment prospects for youth (Curtain, 2013; Haque and Packard, 2014).  
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In recent years a consensus has developed among agencies and individuals working in 
economic development that investment in human capital, particularly investments in 
education, are crucial for economic growth (UNDP, 1990; World Bank, 1990; Becker, 
1995).Yet many developing countries continue to have serious problems with their 
educational systems and many observers argue that the provision of education in most 
developing countries is highly inefficient (Lockheed and Verspoor, 1991; Hanushek and 
Kremer, 1995). The intersection between natural resource revenues and education is analysed 
in (Gylfason and Zoega, 2006; Debrah and Graham, 2015). Resource abundance and human 
capital accumulation is well presented in (Stijns, 2006). The link between lifeworlds, 
leadership, culture and the personal meaning within our schools is extensively discussed 
within (Sergiovanni, 2000). 
Youth account for a quarter of the world’s working age population but almost half of its 
unemployed (Green, 2012). Depending upon the specific context this figure can become even 
more unevenly distributed. In addition to the personal costs involved youth unemployment 
has clear costs to society in terms of wasted talent and the likelihood that disenchanted young 
people will need outlets of some kind (Green, 2012).  
8.5.5. Youth Programs & Vocational Training 
A comprehensive analysis and exploration of vocational training in developing nations is 
provided by (Middleton, 1993). Immensely detailed and complex and located in a multi-
disciplinary framework, it provides a mix of techniques and policy analysis (Lillis, 1995).  
The entrepreneurship programs in other developing nations could also provide useful insight 
in conducting vocational training projects in (Alldén, 2008; Potter, 2009; Rodrigues et al., 
2014). Additionally, important research in relation to youth potential more generally is 
provided in (Delgado, 2004; Chiguuta et al., 2005; Kourilsky et al., 2007; Cunningham and 
Salvagno, 2011).  
This thesis is not providing a critical review of the Youth at Work (YW) program but will 
outline the practical realities of the program that are relevant to the cohort that has been 
analysed. The youth cohort was utilised as a convenient and practical data collection source.  
KIP (2015) reported that there was a great deal of difficulty when conducting the People 
Survey in the Solomon’s with respect to getting information and data from this demographic. 
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The YW cohort provide a sample that can begin to fill this knowledge gap and provide useful 
insight into the impacts upon this demographic specifically. 
The conceptualisation of the program was catalysed in 2012 when Secretariat of the Pacific 
Community advertised for five interns and received 260 applications. Subsequent dialogues 
between government and organisations highlighted the concern about high levels of youth 
unemployment and the future implications for the nation. This led to a request for external 
donor support to trial a one year project with three main objectives:  
 Match youth with role models;  
 Provide apprenticeships; and  
 Conduct training for youth in job seeking gaining formal employment (KIP, 2015). 
This initial pilot was funded primarily by the Australian Government. This effort combined 
training with internships in both public and private sector roles for over 200 youth taken from 
the original cohort of applicants. Additionally some 70 mentors were recruited and trained to 
support youth participants.  
YW is a practical response to a key national development priority for the Solomon Islands 
Government. The program aims to fill a critical gap in youth employment by placing young 
people, many of whom had been ‘pushed out’ of formal schooling, into a career pathway that 
leads to paid work or to starting their own business. Additionally, training in work related 
skills is provided and key development issues, together with mentoring support. The YW 
program is the combined effort of the Pacific Community, four SIG Ministries (Ministry of 
National Unity, Reconciliation and Peace, Ministry of Culture and Tourism, Ministry of 
Commerce, Industry, Labour and Immigration and Ministry of Women, Youth and Children 
and Family Affairs), the DFAT Pacific Leadership Program (PLP), the DFAT bilateral 
programme in the Solomon Islands and most recently, the UK based Diamond Jubilee Trust 
for the Queen’s Young Leaders Program. The program has been designed as a national 
initiative for unemployed youth and school leavers to provide training and employment 
opportunities for youth in Honiara and in selected provinces.  
According to the YW database, analysed in Chapter 9, 2298 young Solomon Islanders are 
expected to have completed the program, taking up internships in various government 
departments, private businesses and enterprises around Honiara. This does not mean 
permanent employment as this is not the case.  
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The youth participate in weekly training that attempts to holistically build their employability 
profile and fill a gap left by the education system. This involves CV writing, financial 
literacy, workplace ethics, environmental conservation, peace and reconciliation, as well as 
other topics.  
There is a policy framework under the National Youth Policy targeting youth employment. 
The Priority Policy outcomes commit to: 
 Improved and equitable access to education, training and employment opportunities 
for youth women and men (Youth and Career Pathways); and 
 Increased number of young people participating in activities that promote peace 
building and conflict prevention (Youth and Peace-Building). 
Concisely the group’s raison d'être is to increase the opportunity for large numbers of youth 
to engage in commerce for livelihood, with training on business set up and operation 
provided. 
This adaptive process has led to a range of innovations to provide alternatives to formal job 
placements for increasing numbers of young people. The program’s success has also lead to it 
creating some negative externalities which are now being counteracted. The program itself is 
based and run centrally in Honiara. Many youth in the rural areas are incentivised to come to 
the city to be able to participate in these types of training programs which is adding an 
additional migration catalyst to the already obvious and well documented problem of rural-
urban migration (Stark and Levhari, 1982; Curtain, 2013). The program is now developing a 
provincial focus. It was expanded to Choiseul in 2014 and there are plans to set up program 
activity in Malaita next year (KIP, 2015). Anecdotal evidence is inconclusive about these 
changes. The YW staff report that there has been a decreased motivation amongst the young 
people on the course, corresponding to the selection process (KIP, 2015). The YW staff 
indicate that the move to community-group selection has yielded less committed youth (KIP, 
2015). They also indicate that for many youth, it takes courage and a degree of commitment 
to appear at the YW office and register (KIP, 2015). It is this part of the selection process that 
appears to be yielding youth that are more motivated than youth pushed into the course by 
others. 
There are currently three other employment schemes that are operating in Solomon Islands: 
 Recognized Seasonal Employers (RSE) Program for New Zealand; 
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 Seasonal Workers Program (SWP) for Australia;  
 Rapid Employment Project (REP) that is being implemented by the World Bank.  
As well as these larger scale initiatives there are also international NGOs that are based in the 
nation facilitating projects that have a distinct focus on youth development. A poignant 
example would be the youth engagement programs conducted by Save the Children that aim 
to get young people to create sustainable livelihoods, participate in their communities and 
avoid recreational drugs. Similarly, World Vision’s economic development projects have 
engaged youth within similar project objectives.  
8.5.6. Previous research into YW Program 
A preliminary examination of previous research completed on the YW program allowed for a 
more precise survey to be implemented, evaluating areas that had not previously been looked 
at. The program appraisals to date provided the identification of the key areas in which 
further research agendas could be most fruitfully prescribed.  
Additionally, the underlying behavioural and social elements of why young men and women 
are flocking to these programs in greater numbers will also be assessed. The results from this 
work are interesting but not prescriptive as the data upon which the observations have been 
predicated is not sufficiently robust nor is the research well structured. Nevertheless, the 
research promotes some very useful avenues of enquiry.  
 
Key findings can be summarised as follows: 
Quantitative data from previous youth surveys - (Pasifiki, 2015) 
 A gender disparity in terms of employment is emerging; with females outperforming 
males. A higher percentage of females surveyed were employed than males (43 
percent of females compared to 31 percent of males); and more females than males 
(78 percent of females compared to 62 percent males) were still employed where they 
had done their YW internships; 
 Unemployed youth were optimistic about their chances of finding a job, with 84 
percent indicating they believed they “had a chance of finding a job soon”. This 
included almost equal amounts of males and females; 
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 The majority of unemployed youth reported having actively searched for employment 
post YW, more than half (55%) of unemployed youth reported having applied for 
jobs since finishing YW, with no significant gender differences.  
 Nearly all youth (93%) reported that they believe YW has either “very much 
improved”, or “improved” their chances of having good employment. 
Youth most commonly reported the following benefits from the YW Internships: 
 Learning practical skills related to individual jobs (e.g. data entry); 
 Knowledge and understanding about what having a job means and how to behave in 
the workplace e.g. how to relate to colleagues; 
 Learning the importance of having a good work ethic, e.g. working hard and being 
punctual; 
 Realising they want to work and formulating goals to work and earn money to 
improve their lives and the lives of their families. 
Qualitative Feedback from Youth 
 “The program has made me realise that I am an important person to my family and the nation 
as a whole”. This was reported by a young man, talking about the benefits of YW, September 
2013 (Pasifiki, 2015).  
The following themes emerged as the most common points of feedback: 
 The program increased levels of motivation, confidence and determination to find 
work; 
 Self-esteem was improved through participation, as was motivation to take on 
leadership roles in their local communities; 
 YW also gave youth valuable skills such as money management, as well as 
knowledge about issues facing Solomon Islanders, including gender issues; and 
 For some it was the first time they had been able to contribute to family income, 
which made them feel valuable. 
Moving forward it will be very important to provide vocational training in rural centres to 
stem the flow of rural-urban migration, which in many instances compounds the problem 
even further. A successful program can have a deleterious impact on broader dynamics 
associated with youth migration to the capital city. This broad context has been considered 
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and the program is being extended into Malaita and the Western Province. It has been 
acknowledged, that this has been done to combat the urbanisation of the schemes that are 
providing an incentive for even more young people to come to the city to have access to such 
programs (KIP, 2015). 
8.5.7.Concluding remarks 
The government and associated institutions have largely focused on the issue of youth 
unemployment. It is important to keep in perspective the civil unrest that has been faced by 
the nation in the past decade. Not taking into consideration the context and impact on the 
underlying social fabric of the nation can result in certain findings and prescriptions resulting 
in paradoxically maligned outcomes.  
Improving youth unemployment outcomes relies on improving the labour supply and this is 
in relation to quality as well as quantity. The reason programs such as YW exist are the 
mismatch of formal skills and qualifications. Put simply employers in the formal sector of the 
economy necessitate that staff possess formal educational qualifications. Formal sector 
employment in Solomon Islands is small and the number of internships will have an upper 
limit. From the current research that has been undertaken positive employment outcomes are 
difficult to substantiate and need more investigation.  
Program such as YW based on qualitative feedback are helping to improve attitudes, enhance 
the youth’s appreciation of their own value within communities and opening up their minds 
to possibilities in the future (KIP, 2015). Much of this is difficult to quantify and requires 
time for an accurate picture to reveal itself.  
Analysing the impact of vocational programs is not the enterprise of this research. The 
endeavour was to utilise this cohort in order to be able to characterise the youth who are 
impacted by disenfranchisement and marginalisation. More specifically, this sample 
contained youth who are still actively pursuing an improvement in their livelihoods given 
their unfavourable life conditions. These youth are essential to understand within the power 
trap complex as they can be the tipping point or critical mass required to evoke positive 
change. If a better understanding of these motivated youth can be promoted, improvements 
for them and the nation as a whole in the future might be possible.  
The very fact that a program such as YW exists indicates that there is a far greater 
educational and social problem at hand (KIP, 2015). The program has been put in place as an 
  
147 
attempt to manage temporarily a larger social issue. However as the nation grows and evolves 
a more permanent solution will need to be established. In order to achieve this, the drivers 
and challenges associated with why the youth are turning to such programs are of specific 
interest to this research agenda.  
This chapter not only outlines the study setting but also the current realities being faced by 
young people in the nation. This provides the relevant background and context required to 
assess and understand the more focused characterisation of youth conducted within Chapter 
9. Understanding the youth cohort's experience in the Solomon Islands is fundamental to 
prescribing any long term, sustainable outcomes. Far too many of youth are being 
impoverished and denied meaningful political influence. Educational outcomes are declining 
and since the civil unrest the exploiters of this power void have promoted this decline.  
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Chapter 9 – Characterisation of Marginalised, Motivated 
Youth Impacted by Power Traps  
For society to attempt to solve its desperate problems without the full participation of 
even very young people is imbecile”. — Alvin Toffler 
9.1. Overview 
This chapter specifically presents and discusses the findings from the Youth at Work (YW) 
case study including database analysis, focus groups and survey questionnaires from the 
youth cohort assessed. The initial analysis of the database which represents all youth that 
have been through the program will provide a better understanding of who is involved in the 
program and what their backgrounds are. These broad trends will be discussed to set the 
platform of understanding required to introduce more specific modelling and analysis of 
factors. 
Initially, scoping studies were carried out within the country to understand the realities of 
social problems stemming from natural resource driven economic growth and power bias. 
The case study setting of Honiara was then explored sporadically over a two year period and 
interviews were conducted throughout this period to better determine the pressing concerns 
and local context of relevant concerns. A thorough analysis of associated research into 
themes that were identified within the key informant interviews were then used to triangulate 
and cross check themes in the literature.  
Characterising the youth cohort, which has been recognised as fundamental to evoking 
positive change, is fundamentally important to exploring the relevance and applicability of 
hypothesised factors. A large amount of data had already been collected by the YW program 
at the beginning of each intake
24
 of students which greatly assisted in the broad preliminary 
characterisation. An initial analysis was conducted on a database from nine separate intakes 
of youth
 
compiled by staff of the program, totalling 2297 youth. 
Interviews and working groups helped to refine and explain the context that was influencing 
this data and also assisted in how to appropriately design survey questions that could 
                                                          
24
 Each intake was referred to as a ‘phase’ of youth within the nomenclature of the program itself. The term 
group, phase or intake are interchangeable. 
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elucidate things further. This subsequent research greatly aided the distillation of power 
distortion factors and promoted understanding of the overall power trap complex that had 
originally been hypothesised.  
This research has highlighted areas of relevance for future research and focussed upon 
several valuable proxies with respect to this form of research in the future. The hazards, 
pitfalls and complexities of this form of research are now far better understood as a result of 
its completion. This will greatly assist in streamlining and designing more efficient methods 
moving forward.  
9.2. Database Analysis 
The database analysed consists of data collected over nine separate intakes with a total of 
2297 individuals. The collected data includes myriad observations such as age, gender, 
marital status, province, level of education, their area of residence, schooling characteristics, 
etc. All author calculations within section are based on the YW database that has collected 
information characterising the youth at the start of each new intake. 
The mean value of age is 23.3; ranging from 15 to 35 years. The distribution of age is similar 
for all phases of the survey (see the kernel density graph in Figure 9.1):  
 
Figure 9.1. Kernel Density Distribution of Age. Author Calculations. 
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Figure 9.2. Distribution of Gender Phases (1-9). Author Calculations. 
 
Nearly 67 percent of respondents live in a patrilineal kinship system. Different provinces of 
the Solomon Islands have different kinship systems and this will be an important 
consideration when determining the ability of male and female youth to be empowered and 
secure in their livelihoods. The old capital city, Auki which is part of the Malaita province, is 
distinctly patrilineal. The current capital city of Honiara is situated in Guadalcanal which is 
distinctly matrilineal. These two systems are now overlapped as many from the previous 
capital have now moved to the new capital in Honiara as well as others that belong to 
different kinship systems from other regions.  
Severe social unrest has ensued in the country recently and many of the kinship ties are 
stronger than national identity which has contributed to widespread violence and has 
underpinned narratives that support fighting between Solomon Islanders (Bush and Le 
Mesurier, 2004; Moore, 2004). More specifically the unrest occurred between Gualanese and 
Malaitans over land alienation. Kinship ties are likely to be stronger than national identity in 
many countries, the problem with the Solomon Islands is that ethnic identities are stronger 
than national identities. However, all human beings have multiple identities and some 
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identities come to the fore in particular situations. For instance when the Solomon Islands 
national soccer team play the Socceroo’s, the Solomon Island identity grips spectators much 
more firmly than their ethnic, tribal, or religious identities. So which identity is given 
prominence is also situational. A better understanding of the impact of these kinship systems, 
based on context driven research, needs to be a focus of any research agenda in this realm 
moving forward.  
Table 9.1 displays key characteristics associated with the cohort. The overwhelming majority 
of youth that are included in the database are single (86%). Importantly, many involved in the 
YW program have been to an urban school, located in the capital city and have come from 
patrilineal family systems. Given that the Guadalcanal people are from a matrilineal kinship 
system this would indicate that a large proportion of youth involved in the program are not 
local residents but have migrated and become disenfranchised, resulting in their inclusion in 
the program.  
Table 9.1. YW Database Analysis 
 
Variable N Percent (%) 
Patrilineal family system 2266 67 
Zoned 2087 64 
Male 2297 49 
Single 2062 86 
Urban school 2242 77 
National Provident Fund (NPF) member 2246 57 
Have email 2297 11 
Have bank account 2285 69 
Have phone 2297 99 
 
Given the influence and importance of religion in the nation, the various religious affiliations 
of each individual are recorded. The results of this are presented in Figure 9.3. The majority 
of the respondents belong to four churches: Anglican (23%), SSEC (22%), Catholic/Roman 
Catholic (21%) and Seventh-day Adventist (18%). All religious affiliations are derived from 
a Christian ethos although numerous derivations are present in the country.  
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Figure 9.3. Religious Composition. Author Calculations. 
 
The level of education level of youth is presented in Figure 9.4. This ranges from 0 (no high 
school education) to 7 (the highest level). The categorisation for these calculations follows 
the local education nomenclature and levels. An education level of <1 would indicate that the 
respondent has not attended high school. For simplicity of explanation level 7 is the year of 
education received before attending university. The majority of respondents have level 5 and 
6 education standards which as a clarifying statement would mean they are 1 to 2 years short 
of completing a basic high school education. Given the limited funding in the education 
system and many students not wanting to leave school but not gaining the scores required to 
continue their education this may explain their motivation to be involved in a vocational 
program such as YW. The cohort perceived the value of education and felt let down that they 
were not able to formally finish their high school education (KIP, 2015).  
 
Figure 9.4. Level of Education. Author Calculations.  
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Figure 9.5 show the distinction between male and female youth. Due to the composition of 
the sample these results are very similar.  
 
 Figure 9.5. Level of Education for Males and Females. Author Calculations. 
 
In practical terms, those with the highest education level (7) are youth who have completely 
finished high school and could have been able to continue to university level education with 
the right national circumstances. The majority of youth that are disenfranchised, yet 
motivated to attend such programs as YW are those who have completed the basic high 
school education level (level 5) or above.  
The majority of youths, therefore, have education profiles that provide some explanation why 
they are involved in a vocational program such as YW. They are educated but have not been 
able to reach a standard that has allowed them to be empowered or productive within society. 
Due to the way the education system is designed, many youth are not able to complete high 
school due to their performance levels and the limited number of places. This is detailed in 
Section 8.4. Many youths did not leave high school because they wanted to (KIP, 2015). This 
is an important distinction to make. Many youths as a result are disenfranchised and denied 
an education due to the lack of places available, which is a function of a declining education 
system nationally. The functionality of the Solomon Islands’ education system and the 
inception of vocational programs as a result of rapid population growth and a declining 
education system is discussed in detail throughout Chapter 8.  
In addition to these aforementioned descriptive statistics, a regression analysis was conducted 
to determine the relationships that exist between key factors such as age, province and church 
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group with education level. Table 9.2 presents these findings. The dependent variable of 
‘level of education’ is discrete, and takes values from 0 to 7 consistent with the definitions 
mentioned previously. The functional form is a result of combining significant and 
meaningful covariates determined in key informant interviews with respect to the data that 
was available. The importance of living in a zoned area due to the availability and access to 
basic infrastructure services was initially identified as being seminally important to livelihood 
and educational outcomes. The church cohort an individual belongs to as well as their home 
province was also seen as an important variable set to test based on interviews.  
Table 9.2. OLS Regression Model for Level of Education 
 
OLS regression Level of education 
Age  0.060 (0.01)*** 
Single  0.577 (0.10)*** 
Lives in a zoned area  0.241 (0.07)*** 
Churches 
 
1=Anglican  Ref level 
2=Catholic/Roman Catholic -0.041 (0.11) 
3=Jehova W -0.642 (0.30)** 
4=UNITED -0.115 (0.17) 
5=SSEC -0.231 (0.11)** 
6=SDA  0.174 (0.12) 
7=Wesley -0.174 (0.29) 
8=CFC -0.151 (0.37) 
9=COC  0.260 (0.22) 
10=OTHER -0.334 (0.20) 
Provinces  
1=Malaita Ref level 
2=Guadalcanal -0.138 (0.10) 
3=Makira  0.253 (0.19) 
4=Choiseul  0.611 (0.23)*** 
5=Western  0.467 (0.13)*** 
6=Central  0.267 (0.21) 
7=Isabel  0.461 (0.20)** 
8=Temotu  0.402 (0.20)** 
9=Renbel  0.075 (0.45) 
10=OTHER  0.169 (0.90) 
Constant  2.727 (0.32)*** 
  Number of observations 2003 
R
2
 0.0656 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Being single has the most positive effect on education level (0.577). This indicates an 
increase of nearly 0.6 points on a Likert scale of 1 to 5. Given the underlying homogeneity of 
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the sample this isolated result is not significant. However it is highlighted as remaining single 
and becoming more educated may have an impact on not having children at an early age, 
which due to the population composition and rapid growth rates in the nation needs to be 
better understood. Many youth reported that being responsible for children was 
commonplace, these were not necessarily their own (KIP, 2015).  
From a religious perspective, if a person belongs to Jehovah’s Witnesses or South Sea 
Evangelical Church, their level of education will decrease by (0.642) and (0.231) respectively 
compared to the Anglican Church. This is supported by information garnered in personal 
interviews that describe a strong correlation with religious affiliation, social cohort and 
employment opportunities (KIP, 2015). Being affiliated with a certain church group does not 
necessarily reduce employment opportunities but determines in many regards the 
employment opportunities made available (KIP, 2015). Exploring further the sectoral 
religious affiliations and the educational requirements to fulfill such roles may provide 
interesting insight into the underlying motivation of youth to complete their education.  
In four provinces the level of education is generally higher compared with Malaita, namely: 
Choiseul (0.611), the highest effect, Western Province (0.467), Isabel (0.461), Temotu 
(0.402). This aligns with scoping research and key informant interviews and correlates with 
the localities of schools that have superior educational outcomes relative to others in the 
nation (KIP, 2015).  
Interestingly the analysis does indicate that living in a zoned territory increases level of 
education by (0.241). Within the database each respondent indicated their area of residence. 
These areas of residence were cross-referenced with city zoning and feedback from key 
informants in areas that were difficult to classify based on this duality. Resultantly zoned and 
un-zoned areas were able to be determined. Although difficult to further classify zoning due 
to communal property title and very limited land surveying in the nation useful proxies were 
used to further determine the associated livelihood realities with given locations. The 
individual’s water source at home provided useful insight in this regard. This proxy is 
employed and discussed further in Section 9.4. Given the intersection between property 
rights, financial transformation of natural resource assets and the associated impact on the 
livelihoods of local individuals, this finding supports the need for further research given the 
backdrop of violence stemming from property rights disputes, see Fox and Walsh (2017). 
Given that many individuals living in un-zoned areas are those that have been displaced by 
natural resource led development and are unable to afford to live in a zoned area this problem 
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needs to be further researched to understand the full extent of the impact this is having and 
how it can be resolved. This result in addition to the information provided by key informants 
and round table discussions would indicate that this is understating the true reality of the 
problem (KIP, 2015).  
The results garnered from the YW database analysis, of all youth involved in the program to 
date provided a very useful platform of understanding that was used to re-design survey 
questions and formulate additional hypothesise. The following sections describe the 
formulation of the survey questionnaire and the results associated with this data. Key 
informant interviews, an exhaustive literature review and working groups have led to the 
anticipation of factors influencing youth dynamics. This knowledge contributed to the 
formulation of explanatory variables. Subsequently hypotheses were formulated, tested and 
modelled, the results of which are included within Section 9.4. My own survey provided the 
additional data used to further analyse points of interest in this regard, the composition of 
which will now be discussed in Section 9.3.  
9.3. Own Survey 
The survey itself is modelled upon a synthesis of frameworks and conventions applied in:  
 Solomon Islands People Survey (ANU, 2011); 
 PNG LSMS Survey25; 
 Tailored synthesis of survey questionnaires employed by Professor Stein Holden. See 
for example Holden and Otsuka (2014). 
  
A selection was made on the basis of applicability to the study setting and Holden’s 
knowledge of potential problems with certain questions and question sets, including 
language, cultural factors and the way each question is asked. Previous research in the nation 
greatly aided the selection of relevant factors (SIG, 2015). These questions can be found in 
Appendix 1.  
Pilot surveys were then conducted with a selected group of participants to test the 
applicability of the questions. The first round of pilot surveys were completed by YW staff to 
                                                          
25
 Papua New Guinea Household Survey (1996). Accessed online via the World Bank Living Standards 
Measurement Study Database at: http://go.worldbank.org/CJ9LIGVJ00 
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give an indication of the applicability of questions and the practical realities of undertaking a 
survey in the study setting. The feedback included (KIP, 2015):  
 Surveys are very long;  
 The survey did not make sense to those that grew up in Honiara, which is a more 
urban setting than a lot of the country, and so many questions were not answered in 
pilot surveys; 
 Cultural factors resulted in questions needing adjustment to better fit the context. 
 
It was quickly realised that the level of English comprehension, in addition to the basic level 
of education possessed by the staff that piloted the survey, was not reflective of the general 
population that would be surveyed. To be able to better design the survey, a representative 
sample of youth was selected for focus group discussion to be able to get timely and accurate 
feedback on the survey in its current form.  
Difficulties associated with English to Pidgin translation and comprehension had not been 
fully taken into consideration. As a result, the decision was made to complete a further 
roundtable assessment with a group of ten (10) youth who were selected on the basis of their 
English speaking ability. A round table discussion was completed with this group in order to 
further develop and pilot the survey. There were immediately several key issues with the 
survey document.  
 The codes that had been left on the document for the purposes of streamlining when 
inputting the data caused a great deal of confusion; 
 The language that was used in the document was far too complex. Many of those 
involved in the program have a sound ability to comprehend the spoken word 
however reading and comprehending a document proved to be far more difficult than 
first appreciated; 
 As a result each of the students identified as having a stronger ability to read and 
comprehend English were selected as group leaders and trained in how to assist those 
having difficulties with the survey.  
 
Given the fragmented and dispersed nature of residents of the Solomon Islands, Honiara was 
the focus of the study. This means that experiences in many provinces were not addressed.  
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The analysis of the data harvested from the survey questionnaires was critical to gaining the 
required disaggregated understanding of power dislocation of the youth. The area is 
notoriously constrained by patchy and inconsistent data that makes this form of assessment 
both difficult and ambiguous. The YW database analysis and the data harvested from the 
survey questionnaire associated with this thesis make a contribution to improving this reality.  
The modelling contained within this chapter and the discussion of results has allowed for 
subsequent triangulation and validation of data employed from different sources to support 
the power trap hypothesis. This modelling also allowed for useful proxies to be tested for 
effectiveness in addition to hypotheses testing of variables that were not uncovered in key 
informant interviews or working groups.  
The survey questionnaire contains sections regarding schooling, family, issues associated 
with family/land/property, incentives to move into Honiara, previous migration experience, 
current migration experience. Overall, there are 185 variables, but only 114 contain data from 
all three phases of the survey, 71 variables/questions are available only for the Phase 9 short 
survey. 
On average, each question in Phase 8 Long Survey and YEP Long Survey contains 73 
percent and 77 percent non-missing values respectively. The data from the Phase 9 Short 
Survey has 41 percent non-missing values on average for each question. This is an important 
point to note as this has impacted the strength of statistical power associated with results as 
this power relies in part on sample size. Listwise deletion has been employed as the method 
for dealing with missing values and as a result the record from the survey questionnaire is 
excluded from analysis if any single value was missing.  
Of the 534 participants, only 206 answered the same comparable sequence of questions due 
to timing and distribution of surveys. Administering the surveys with a limited staff and 
limited duration presented myriad issues, some of which were mitigated against with prior 
roundtable discussion and key informant guidance. Table 9.3 provides an overview of the 
composition of the data collected.  
Table 9.3. Three Survey Groups 
 
Source Observations Percent 
Phase 9 Short Survey 328 61.42% 
Phase 8 Long Survey 185 34.64% 
YEP Long Survey 21 3.93% 
Total 534 100% 
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9.3.1. Overview of Survey Sample 
Overall within those surveyed, more than half of the respondents were female (56.1%; 
N=281), single (81.9%; N=428), lived in zoned areas in their youth with access to varying 
degrees of access to clean water, electricity and public services (81.4%; N=516). The 
underlying composition and quality of infrastructure is not addressed in this survey however 
understanding the relationship between land tenure insecurity, development and access to 
infrastructure services is incredibly relevant to future work. Fringe communities in the capital 
are growing and these individuals do not have access to government provided infrastructure 
services (KIP, 2015). A practical public investment strategy associated with tangential 
research in electricity infrastructure provision and development assistance within the 
Solomon Islands is presented in Chapter 9. See, Simshauser et al. (2016). 
The median age of youth in the survey sample is 22, which is slightly younger than the 
median age of the overall cohort analysed in the database which was 23.3. This is illustrated 
in figure 9.7.  
 
Figure 9.6. Distribution of Age. Author Calculations. 
 
Around one-fifth of the respondents (21.4%; N=98) have their own children, with the mean 
age of participants reporting to having one child at 23.8 years. Only six subjects do not have 
at least one brother or sister. Some 70.8 percent (out of 507 respondents) have between 3 to 6 
siblings. Secondary data supports these findings published within the UN statistics database 
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for the Solomon Islands. This report also illustrates that the youth have a fertility rate of 4.1 
for 2010-2015
26
.  
 
Less than half the respondents (43.8%; N=534) live in a Matrilineal kinship family system. 
This kinship system represents the influence of women in shaping land/property ownership 
and inheritance decisions This does not necessarily translate directly into formal household 
relations in the capital city of Honiara due to the difference in recognition within urban and 
rural settings relating to the adherence to kinship systems (KIP, 2015).  
A third of respondents earn money (32%; N=354) and almost all (86%, N=495) reported to 
be responsible for younger people. This is very common throughout the nation and forms a 
large part of societal cohesion in the nation (KIP, 2015).  
An important distinction to make within the sample that has been surveyed in comparison to 
the overall database of all intakes is that the survey sample has lower education levels. The 
majority of respondents (66.7%; N=334) have a secondary standard level of education (for 
example, Christian High School) while only 3.8 percent have finished tertiary education (the 
highest level of education across the sample; N = 19), while the others (29.5%; N = 148) have 
lower than secondary education.  
Proficiency in English, as measured by the survey, is average. 53% assessed their English 
skill level as “fair”, 29.6% reported to have “poor” or “very poor” knowledge of English, the 
rest 17.4% know English at the “Good” or “Very good” level. 
Table 9.4. English Level 
 
 
Count Percent Cumulative sum 
Very poor 33 6.3% 6.3% 
Poor 122 23.3% 29.6% 
Fair 277 53.0% 82.6% 
Good 89 17.0% 99.6% 
Very good 2 0.4% 100% 
Total 523 100%  
 
  
                                                          
26
 http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=solomon islands#Social 
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9.4. Modelling 
The modelling presented within this section tests the assertions identified in the round table 
discussions with the youth or with key informant interviews. As a result of testing the 
correlation between key variables, additional insights emerged which allowed for 
supplementary factors contributing to disenfranchisement and marginalisation to be explored. 
These findings are most useful in identifying interesting relationships between key variables 
as well as shedding new light on useful ways of measuring and testing certain assertions. 
Disaggregating these variables and being able to measure and define proxies to better 
understand the youth within sub-optimal settings will be integral to any meaningful solution 
that attempts to remedy such problems in the future. The following modelling seeks to 
develop this endeavor further. By utilising the cohort of youth involved in the YW program 
new data was able to be efficiently harvested to promote the aforementioned endeavor and 
present some preliminary findings. There are limitations with the data, primarily associated 
with missing values that have been treated with a standardised listwise deletion method. Due 
to the emotional sensitivity of many of the questions and the length of the survey many 
questions were not answered comprehensively enough to promote statistical power in this 
regard. Multiple imputation methods could be employed in future analysis to improve this 
analysis however the reasons for not answering were not deemed to be consistent enough to 
employ such techniques based upon round table discussions with youth (KIP, 2015).  
This modelling does however open up many avenues of inquiry, as well as supporting 
information garnered from round table and key informant discussions. It has also elucidated 
additional variables of interest that could provide interesting insight with more complete data. 
The results and modelling associated with the survey questionnaire will now be discussed and 
explored.  
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9.4.1. Model 1 – Factors Correlated with English Skill Level 
In this modelling, English skill level is used as a proxy for respondents’ overall requisite 
urban skill level. This is predicated on the fact that to participate in the formal economy and 
participate meaningfully within the education system, higher levels English is required. This 
modelling seeks to determine whether an individual’s level of English is impacted by the 
quality of living standard in early years, ethnicity, religion, parental status, gender water 
source and other controlling factors. That can be stated in two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1.1: English level is correlated with personal characteristics and socio-economic 
factors (earning money, age, gender, level of education); 
Hypothesis 1.2: English level is correlated with a water source at home.  
In the second hypothesis, the assumption is made that the water an individual’s water source 
can indicate a socio-economic status of a family: Those that are not on publicly supplied 
water are fringe dwellers, and have lower socio-economic status. The modelling results 
associated with each hypothesis are presented in Table 9.5. 
Table 9.5. OLS Regression Models for the Level of English 
OLS regression - English level Model 1.1 Model 1.2 
Age 0.034 (0.02)  
Female 0.864 (0.71)  
Female # Age -0.033 (0.03)  
Earn money 0.109 (0.10)  
Had radio at home 0.355 (0.17)** 0.465 (0.15)*** 
Age moved to Honiara -0.019 (0.01)***  
Ethnic group   
1=Malaita Reference group Reference group 
2=Guadalcanal 0.214 (0.15) 0.266 (0.12)** 
3=Other 0.029 (0.11) 0.086 (0.10) 
Responsible for younger -0.139 (0.10)  
Education level 0.047 (0.03)*  
Zoned territory 0.350 (0.13)***  
Water source in the household   
1=Piped to household  Reference group 
2=Piped into neighbourhood  0.375 (0.16)** 
3=Piped supply outside neighbourhood 
 0.013 (0.15) 
Well in yard  -0.401 (0.21)* 
Public well  -0.090 (0.20) 
Rainwater tank  -0.123 (0.17) 
River/creek  -0.014 (0.19) 
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Other  0.673 (0.52) 
Share room in a childhood house  -0.359 (0.13)*** 
Family pays for water in a childhood house 
 0.197 (0.10)* 
Constant 
1.474 (0.51)*** 2.498 (0.20)*** 
Number of observations 228 266 
R
2 
 
 
0.146 0.151 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Model 1.1 indicates that living in a zoned territory, adds an additional (0.350) points to 
English level on a scale of (1 to 5). Many of the displaced families move into un-zoned 
territories within the city boundary (KIP, 2015). Another significant factor is whether a 
respondent had a radio at home. This increases English level by an additional (0.355).  
Model 1.2 presents a slightly different set of variables which explores the impact of an 
individual’s accesses water on level of education. The various, relevant water sources were 
identified with scoping research and key informant interviews that were associated with 
determining the zoned and un-zoned areas of Honiara city. These were included to test their 
correlation with educational level to see whether there is a measurable impact.  
Additionally whether a respondent’s family was paying for water in their childhood house 
was included to determine who was able to afford this service in any form irrespective of the 
source. This had a positive effect on level of English (0.197).  
Whether the respondent shared a room in their family home was also identified as being an 
effective socio-economic indicator and was included as an additional variable in Model 1.2. 
Round table discussions highlighted that sharing a room in a house was a useful indicator of 
socio-economic status. Many of the basic houses that are built on land that is not zoned are 
simple two room dwellings. This as hypothesised had a negative effect on the level of English 
(-0.359).  
The results for Model 1.2 indicate that radio still has the greatest effect on English level
27 
(0.465) but now ethnicity becomes significant. Respondents who live in Guadalcanal have a 
better English ability compared to Malaita province (by 0.266). This can be explained in 
                                                          
27
 It may due to broadcasting of English-speaking BBC World Service and ABC Radio Australia and overall 
coverage of English-speaking songs and broadcasts. 
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reality by the fact that the capital city of Honiara, on Guadalcanal is where the majority of 
high schools are located (KIP, 2015). Malaita province has changed composition dramatically 
since the relocation of the nation’s capital city from Malaita (Auki) to Guadalcanal (Honiara). 
This has also underpinned a large portion of negative sentiments that are fueling violence and 
social dislocation (KIP, 2015).  
The source of water proxy in the respondents childhood house, which was identified in 
interviews as being a relevant proxy for socio-economic status and infrastructure provision, 
has an impact upon English level (KIP, 2015). Table 9.5 illustrates the relationship between 
water sources and English level.  
An individual accessing water from a well in a yard is associated with the greatest decrease in 
English level (-0.401). Intuitively this makes sense as such a reality would be associated with 
someone living in an urban environment in an area that is not serviced by basic state 
infrastructure. Round table discussions also identified that those living on the city fringe that 
have been displaced or migrated from a more rural setting will be associated with such a 
water source. Those accessing water from a river or creek are in a more rural setting and as a 
result have a comparably more stable livelihood setting. The former may be a useful proxy 
for quality of livelihood for future research (KIP, 2015). Additionally, if a family pays for the 
water, which again is a useful social proxy, this correlates with an increase in English level of 
(0.197) (KIP, 2015). 
Round table discussions highlighted that sharing a room in a house was a useful indicator of 
socio-economic status. Many of the basic houses that are built on land that is not zoned are 
simple two room dwellings. Whether a person shared their room in a house according to this 
modelling correlated with a decrease in English by (-0.359). For future research, this may 
also be a good proxy for household living standards.  
9.4.2. Model 2– Factors Correlated with Marital Status 
This modelling explores what factors lead people to be single or married. Several logit 
models are employed to answer this question. Framing the analysis in this manner allows for 
factors contributing to marriage to be analysed. This is relevant and important to the stability 
of the youth in the Solomon Islands due to the overwhelming religiosity of people of the 
nation. It also allows for an exploration of the impact of kinship systems on youth that are 
disenfranchised and what effect this has on their view of marriage.  
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Hypothesis 2.1: Being non-married is correlated with a socio-economic status (age, earning 
money) and family characteristics (having children, kinship system). 
Table 9.6. Logit Regression Model for being Non-Married (Single)  
 
Non-married (single) - Logit regression Model 2.1 
Age -0.256 (0.05)*** 
Has children -3.257 (0.34)*** 
Earn sufficient amount of money -1.293 (0.45)*** 
Patrilineal family system 0.549 (0.33)* 
  
Constant 9.099 (1.25)*** 
  
Number of observations 452 
Pseudo R
2
 0.421 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Coefficients are in odds ratios 
The important aspect of these results which deserves more attention is the fact that patrilineal 
kinship family system leads to higher probability of being single (odds ratio is 0.549). A 
matrilineal kinship system within this sample impacts upon the respondent’s choice to marry. 
This supports respondents answers to interview questions before surveys were conducted 
(KIP, 2015). This is an important and relevant point. Additional research in this regard could 
help to shed light on how young women are able to be empowered and what can promote 
effective family structures within the nation that foster this (Kabutaulaka, 2001; Maetala, 
2008; Stege and Huffer, 2008). Factors like higher age, having children and earning money 
tend to decrease the probability of being single (odds ratio -0.256, -3.257, -1.293 
respectively).  
The additional complexities associated with general observations such as this do not take into 
consideration the personal and social nuances that exist in any nation. The kinship 
composition within the Solomon Islands and its dispersion could be a very fruitful research 
environment to develop a greater understanding of these forms of social structures on the 
empowerment of women in developing economies (Malhotra and Schuler, 2005; Duflo, 
2012). These dynamics have been explored further with respect to land tenure security, 
migration and livelihood security within other regions (Holden et al., 2001; Deininger et al., 
2008; Holden and Otsuka, 2014). The Solomon Islands is in need of promoting such 
understanding given the current economic setting and levels of displacement.  
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9.4.3. Model 3– Factors Correlated with Income 
This modelling seeks to determine the factors that correlate with an individuals ability to earn 
money. This modelling seeks to determine additional factors to those identified during round 
table discussions. These discussions also assisted in identifying a livelihood sustaining 
amount in the capital city of 1000 SBD (KIP, 2015). The following hypotheses were tested: 
Hypothesis 3.1: Earning money depends on socio-economic factors (gender, age, level of 
English) and skills (Gardening, Producing Copra, etc.); 
Hypothesis 3.2: Earning money depends on social characteristics (gender, age) and type of 
water source as a proxy;  
Hypothesis 3.3: Earning money depends on social characteristics (gender, age, level of 
English, having savings) and a traditional skill of driving a canoe; 
Hypothesis 3.4: Earning money depends on a toilet type as a proxy of socio-demographic 
characteristics. 
The models presented in Table 9.7 and 9.8 explore possible relationships with variables and 
test assertions made within round table discussions and key informant interviews. The two 
models in Table 9.7 seek to determine significant factors that contribute to earning money, 
exploring household water source as a proxy for future work. Model 3.3 and 3.4 contained in 
Table 9.8 regress a different composition of identified variables and explore the usefulness of 
toilet type as a proxy.  
Table 9.7. Logit Regression Model for Earning Money 
 
Logit regression –  
Whether a respondent earns money 
Model 3.1 Model 3.2 
Female # Age   
Male 0.114 (0.04)*** 0.111 (0.03)*** 
Female 0.11 (0.04)*** 0.09 (0.03)*** 
English level 0.37 (0.16)**  
Gardening -0.932 (0.44)**  
Produce Copra 0.529 (0.32)*  
Mechanics -0.781 (0.42)*  
Crafting 0.474 (0.29)  
Driving canoe 0.78 (0.36)**  
   
Water source in the household   
1=Piped to household  Reference group 
2=Piped into neighbourhood  -0.066 (0.39) 
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3=Piped supply outside neighbourhood  -0.027 (0.33) 
4=Well in yard  0.04 (0.49) 
5=Public well  -1.27 (0.61)** 
6=Rainwater tank  -0.638 (0.41) 
7=River/creek  -0.535 (0.5) 
8=Other  0.374 (1.03) 
   
Constant -3.899 (1.08)*** -3.285 (0.90)*** 
  
 
Number of observations 268 379 
Pseudo R
2
 0.09 0.047 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Coefficients are in odds ratio 
 
The logic underpinning Model 3.1 are that mature men earn more than women and that the 
more formally skilled an individual the better the chance of gaining paid employment in this 
setting. A livelihood stabilising amount is an estimated benchmark based on key informant 
interviews and roundtable discussions with Honiara youth (KIP, 2015). This amount will vary 
for individuals depending upon surrounding circumstances and area of residence but was set 
at 1000 SBD
28
/Month for the purposes of this analysis. This is seen as being a sufficient 
amount of money to provide rent for a room and food for a month within the capital city of 
Honiara. Interviews also detailed that many rely on non-monetary based forms of transaction 
and food harvesting and therefore it should be viewed as a yardstick of financial security 
within an urban setting for this cohort (KIP, 2015).  
The interaction of age and gender shows that being male leads to a higher probability of 
earning money. The likelihood increases with age for both the male and female cohort (odds 
ratio 0.114 for men and 0.110 for women). The more advanced an individual’s English 
standard, a proxy for an overall worker’s urban skills, the greater the chances of earning 
money (0.370). In terms of skills, Producing Copra and Driving canoe lead to a higher 
probability of earning money (odds ratio 0.529 and 0.780 respectively), while Gardening and 
Mechanics lead to a lower probability of earning money (-0.932 and -0.781 respectively). 
Table 9.8. Logit Regression Model for Earning Sufficient Money 
 
Logit regression - Earn sufficient amount of 
money per month (>=1000 SBD) 
Model 3.3 Model 3.4 
Age 0.13 (0.06)**  
Female -1.21 (0.45)***  
Single 0.89 (0.47)*  
                                                          
28
 1 SBD = 0.17 AUD, 0.13 USD, 0.12 EUR at time of analysis. 
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Whether a respondent has savings 1.88 (0.46)***  
English level 0.78 (0.27)***  
Driving canoe -0.82 (0.49)*  
   
Toilet type of the household   
1=Own flush toilet  Reference group 
2=Shared toilet  -2.204 (1.10)** 
3=Household pit  0.146 (0.63) 
4=Household bucket  0.712 (0.49) 
5=Communal pit  No obs 
6=Closet over sea  -2.406 (1.06)** 
7=Other  No obs 
   
Constant -7.308 (2.04)*** -2.864 (0.93)*** 
  
 
Number of observations 302 342 
Pseudo R
2
 0.239 0.223 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Coefficients are in odds ratio 
 
More data are needed to better define which skills translate from a rural to an urban setting. 
However interview responses suggest that rural skills are not valued in the urban setting 
(KIP, 2015). It would appear however that the rural skills provide the requisite non-monetary 
safety net for individuals that are not able to enter the formalised economy, this is particularly 
relevant to those marginalised in communities (KIP, 2015). Therefore the importance of these 
skills as a safety net, although difficult to measure, cannot be understated.  
Table 9.9 divides jobs into a split classification of low-skilled (urban) and high-skilled 
(urban). Hypothesis 3.5: Current job skill of an urban person correlates with a job skill before 
urban migration. 
Table 9.9. Logit Regression for Current Skill Status 
 
Logit regression 
(High skilled job after moving to Honiara) 
Model 3.5 
Born in Honiara 1.34 (0.64)** 
High skilled job before  2.68 (0.64)*** 
  
Constant -3.16 (0.41)*** 
  Number of observations 181 
Pseudo R
2
 0.1993 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Coefficients are in the odds ratio 
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Possessing a highly-skilled job at the time of survey is positively correlated with previous job 
experience (also being high or low) and whether a respondent was born in Honiara or not. 
Better understanding the impact of urban skill bias associated with employment opportunities 
and a livelihood sustaining income is seminal to improving the understanding of how 
disenfranchised and marginalised youth can be empowered. Evidence from interviews 
indicate that rural youth are the most adversely effected by skill mismatch (KIP, 2015). In 
many instances these individuals are completely dislocated from the decision making process 
that causes them to migrate and are simply displaced one day by a new land development 
(KIP, 2015). It is these individuals that are moving into the un-zoned fringe areas of Honiara, 
their livelihoods destroyed and their skill set not applicable to find urban work (KIP, 2015).  
9.4.4. Model 4– Factors Correlated with Violence  
Model 4.1 and 4.2 presented in Table 9.10 seek to determine more accurately what 
contributes to a person being subjected to violence. 
Hypothesis 4.1: Less educated persons and women are subject to violence; 
Hypothesis 4.2: Less educated, low-skilled and low socio-economic status individuals are 
subjected to violence. 
Table 9.10. Logit Regression for Violence 
 
Logit regression - Violence Model 4.1 Model 4.2 
Interaction term: Education # Gender 
 
 
Education # Male -0.083 (0.10)  
Education # Female -0.220 (0.10)**  
   
Female  -1.112 (0.58)* 
Education # Level of English  -0.153 (0.05)*** 
Has savings  0.451 (0.58) 
Patrilineal system in the family  1.545 (0.56)*** 
High skilled job after moving to Honiara  -0.792 (0.56) 
   
Constant 0.529 (0.47) 2.027 (0.94)** 
  
 
Number of observations 147 84 
Pseudo R
2
 0.035 0.257 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Coefficients are in the odds ratio 
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Model 4.1 shows that less educated females have a greater chance of being subjected to 
violence (odds ratio -0.220). The explanatory power of this model is very low (the pseudo R-
squared value is 0.035). The results from Model 4.2 illustrate that respondents from 
patrilineal kinship system are more likely to be victims of violence (1.545). That means that 
people from the matrilineal kinship system are less likely to be victims of violence (-1.112), 
educated also makes this less likely (-0.153). 
The modelling illustrates that less educated females have a greater chance of being subjected 
to violence. Interestingly, respondents from matrilineal kinship system are less likely to be 
victims of violence. In matrilineal communities it is the women who in many instances are 
the head of the household as it is her lineage that is responsible for the inheritance of land and 
assets to the next generation. There is not a straightforward adherence to these traditions 
however and the urban society in the Solomon Islands is male dominated and so that impact 
of these kinship systems is diminished (KIP, 2015). Empowering women is an issue that the 
Solomon Islands must address, particularly given the prevalence of domestic violence and 
sexual abuse.  
The low number of observations (N=84) was discussed in separate round table dialogue with 
the youth to determine why this question was answered by so few. Many made the point that 
indicating they had been victims of violence or abuse was confronting and therefore these 
results would not depict the true reality of the problem within this cohort (KIP, 2015).  
9.4.5. Model 5 – Youth Perception of the Government 
The modelling included in Table 9.11seeks to further determine what makes people believe 
that the government assists the country. This is an important and sensitive consideration when 
analysing the composition of power in a nation. Targeted interviews have indicated that there 
is an enormous amount of corruption and prize capture for those who are elected to 
parliament (KIP, 2015). Consequently there are individuals who support the system in its 
current form as they are more easily able to exploit it for the ends they desire. What is not 
well understood is the perception of the government amongst disenfranchised, yet motivated 
youth in the country. Civil unrest in Honiara takes ethnic lines (not tribal lines) and youth 
from particular ethnicities are mobilized by their wantok leaders to participate in the conflict 
and violence. It is these youth that are the tipping point. Many of the underlying symptoms 
that resulted in civil unrest and violence still exist therefore a critical mass of citizens will 
also be needed to change. These youth provide that potential for change.   
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Hypothesis 5.1: Individuals with lower socio-economic status (with one set of variables) are 
less likely to support the government;  
Hypothesis 5.2: Individuals with lower socio-economic status are less likely to support the 
government (with expanded socio-economic status variables). 
Table 9.11. Logit Regression for Government Support 
 
Logit regression – Government Perception Model 5.1 Model 5.2 
Interaction term: 
Age # Has Savings # Born in Honiara  
 
Age # Has Savings =0 # Born in Honiara=0 -0.067 (0.03)** -0.172 (0.08)** 
Age # Has Savings =0 # Born in Honiara=1 -0.083 (0.03)** -0.234 (0.10)** 
Age # Has Savings =1# Born in Honiara=0 -0.029 (0.03) -0.107 (0.08) 
Age # Has Savings =1# Born in Honiara=1 -0.074 (0.04)* -0.165 (0.08)* 
   
Share room in a childhood house 0.586 (0.29)** 1.087 (0.74) 
   
Mode of transport - getting to respondent’s high school   
Walk  Ref 
Bus  1.469 (0.61)** 
Canoe  2.479 (1.29)* 
   
Toilet type of the household   
1=Own flush toilet  Reference group 
2=Shared toilet  0.817 (0.74) 
3=Household pit  1.586 (0.90)* 
4=Household bucket  0.459 (0.85) 
5=Communal pit  0.307 (1.37) 
6=Closet over sea  1.605 (0.69)** 
7=Other  No obs 
   
Constant 1.389 (0.80)* 1.591 (2.03) 
  
 
Number of observations 372 105 
Pseudo R
2
 0.045 0.202 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Coefficients are in the odds ratio 
 
Both models have weaknesses and strengths. There are two independent variables assessed. 
The first is whether a responded has shared a room in a childhood house, this has a positive 
effect on the respondent’s perception of the government (odds ratio 0.586). This proxy would 
indicate a lower socio-economic background and substandard education level. Roundtables 
and key informant interviews suggest that individuals from this background have a greater 
tendency to be coerced by government officials and are regularly incentivised via various 
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methods when elections are on (KIP, 2015). Relative to their normal income these incentives 
can be seen as important windfalls (KIP, 2015). Although more research is required and the 
data underpinning this assumption are far from representative, this is a worrying finding. If 
this finding is representative of the overall picture in the nation it would mean that any power 
structure would be difficult to dismantle. Those that are the most disenfranchised are the 
victims of such power dynamics however they are also the easiest to coerce in this regard. 
This can mean that power structures can be perpetuated cheaply and easily by the few who 
are gaining the benefits at the expense of the whole.  
An interesting interaction with age is explored in addition to whether the respondent was born 
in Honiara and whether they have savings. The relevance of these two variables is that if a 
person is born in Honiara they are exposed to a different livelihood than someone from a 
rural setting. If a person has savings it can make them less susceptible to political coercion in 
the form of windfall payments. Model 5.1 illustrates that almost all mature respondents are 
less likely to think that government assists the country (all odds ratios are negative). If people 
believe a narrative such as ‘the government will steal our money’ they will pressure for 
visible consumption and punish a government that used revenues for less visible assets. If 
people adopt decision rules of thumb such as ‘a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush’, 
they will discount the future more heavily. If they are subject to ‘coarse thinking’, conflating 
an oil discovery with the prospective lifestyle of an oil sheik, their expectations of 
government will be exaggerated.  
Additional factors are also explored within model 5.2. As a point of interest, those who get to 
school by walking and not by bus are less likely to support the government (odds ratio 1.469). 
Intuitively, they are not able to see any immediate value in state funded infrastructure and 
therefore are not motivated to be politically obedient.  
To further extend upon the logic of an individuals perception of government and access to 
state infrastructure, toilet type and water source within the household are potentially useful 
proxies (KIP, 2015). This is tied intimately with government spending and would give a good 
indication of basic infrastructure service provision. Electricity connection is also useful proxy 
for socio-economic status and associated infrastructure service provision (KIP, 2015). Its 
cost, due to current production strategies, is amongst the highest in the world and this needs 
to be addressed (Simshauser et al., 2016). A strategy for this will be detailed in Chapter 9.  
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9.4.6. Model 6 – Factors Correlated with Education 
This modelling seeks to address and identify factors that are impacting individual’s ability to 
attain an education. Years of key informant interviews have also identified many previously 
discussed issues that are interspersed throughout the thesis (KIP, 2015).  
The history of the schooling system in the nation as well as its success in a past generation 
makes the current situation a sad reality. This was discussed in detail in Chapter 8. As with 
other modelling the desire was to see if any other patterns or trends could be identified 
beyond the scope of what has been garnered from an extensive literature review, historical 
analysis and interviews on the topic. Two hypotheses were tested: 
Hypothesis 6.1: Level of education is correlated with a socio-economic status (borrowing 
money without success and water source as a proxy) 
Hypothesis 6.2: Level of education is correlated with socio-economic status and associated 
educational infrastructure (time needed to get from home to school used as a proxy).  
The results of this analysis are included in Table 9.12. 
Table 9.12. OLS Regression for Level of Education 
 
OLS regression - Level of education Model 6.1 Model 6.2 
Ever borrow money without success -0.480 (0.21)** -0.527 (0.321)* 
English level 0.282 (0.13)** 0.361 (0.22)* 
Time from home to school  0.418 (0.23)* 
   
Water source in the household   
1=Piped to household Reference group Reference group 
2=Piped into neighbourhood 0.108 (0.37) 0.458 (0.52) 
3=Piped supply outside neighbourhood -0.270 (0.30) -0.241 (0.46) 
4=Well in yard 0.073 (0.47) 0.109 (0.63) 
5=Public well -1.346 (0.47)*** -1.699 (0.62)*** 
6=Rainwater tank 0.283 (0.34) 0.245 (0.57) 
7=River/creek -0.723 (0.39)* -0.799 (0.68) 
8=Other -1.258 (1.00) -1.240 (1.12) 
   
Constant 4.158 (0.42)*** 3.626 (0.72)*** 
  
 
Number of observations 306 168 
R
2
 0.086 0.114 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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A respondent’s level of education is positively correlated with their standard of English. 
Schools teach in English and therefore students who can speak better English will learn more. 
That being said, the individual must go to school to learn English. To simplify this causation 
our purposes here, it is assumed that a higher level of English corresponds with a high level 
of education.  
The water source in the household is also utilised in this modelling as a socio-economic 
proxy. Individuals whose source of water is a public well are less likely to achieve a higher 
level of education since this water source is associated with low socio-economic status (-
1.346). This is the same for those who access water from a creek or river in a more rural 
setting (-0.723). Other categories had no significant effect on level of education within 
modelling. 
An increased duration of getting from home to school has a positive effect on the 
respondent’s level of education (0.418). This may relate to their overall motivation for being 
educated and the subsequent value the individual places upon their education. It may also 
indicate that the individual is still living in a more rural setting where they have not been 
displaced. It was those that were displaced and living on the fringes that presented the 
greatest personal impacts (KIP, 2015).  
9.5. Concluding remarks 
Organisations such as the YW program need to be supported so that the education system can 
be re-designed to assist in providing the requisite support for the ever expanding youth 
populations in the nation (KIP, 2015). Although vocational programs are able to provide 
some assistance they are in no way a substitute for a functioning education system. 
Investment and research into this realm is badly needed. Every indication in the years that 
this research was conducted suggest that this situation is not improving. As more-and-more 
youth are left disenfranchised and without an education, the easier it becomes for those in 
power to continue to perpetuate systemic corruption that does the country so much damage. 
Investing in the people of the nation and promoting education in the nation will be a key 
component of reducing the severity of the power trap that currently exists in the Solomon 
Islands for the vast majority of the citizens. 
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Chapter 10 - Findings and Practical Financing 
Recommendation 
“Our youth are not failing the system; the system is failing our youth. Ironically, the 
very youth who are being treated the worst are the young people who are going to 
lead us out of this nightmare”. — Rachel Jackson 
10.1.Overview 
The previous chapter reported on a characterisation of a sample of disenfranchised youth in 
the capital city of the Solomon Islands, Honiara. Although disenfranchised, these youth are 
still motivated. This point is substantiated by the fact that they have enrolled and participated 
in a vocational program aimed at assisting them integrate into urban life. This chapter 
discusses the additional insights gained from the analysis in Chapter 9 and frames these 
insights in terms of possible outcomes and points of concern. Given that the current youth 
population is the next adult cohort, understanding the dynamics observed are crucial. The 
youth constitutes the transmission mechanism whereby windfall dynamics and systemic 
corruption are passed to the next generation.  
As the Solomon Islands develop, it will be the youth who become responsible for 
administering the rights to access the natural resources of the nation. Investing in people is 
the primary ambition of any successful government ideology to combat the cronyism, 
corruption and inequality that the system currently promotes (KIP, 2015). A focus on the 
youth, in addition to refocused policy and well-informed research agendas, can mitigate the 
deleterious effects of corruption and declining educational outcomes in the nation. The youth, 
the future custodians, can, if empowered and educated, have a major impact in changing the 
poverty trap dynamics that they currently experience. The evidence, substantiated by the 
number of participants in vocational programs, indicates that they are motivated to do so.  
Sentiments recently expressed by the Nation’s Prime Minister suggest that there is an 
evolving sentiment towards promoting human capital, in line with development agendas. It 
would appear that education seems to be returning to the level of importance that was once 
placed upon it in (KIP, 2015).  
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Education Gets Paradigm Shift 
 “Our economic strength currently lies in our natural resources. However, as natural 
resources will deplete, the only sustainable resource that we can confidently rely on 
as the mainstay of our economy is human resources, which we sustainably produce at 
a rate of 2.3 percent annually." 
“The question about job availability in the Solomon Islands for all Solomon Islanders 
studying abroad after the completion of their studies is a challenging question that 
Solomon Islanders, especially students, continue to pose to the government.  
“As a matter of fact, our natural resources cannot sustain our fast growing 
population rate and therefore what we should now pursue is to educate Solomon 
Islanders to be able to secure employment abroad. Highly educated Solomon 
Islanders do not need to come back home to work after the completion of their studies. 
They can stay on to work in their countries of study or secure employment elsewhere 
abroad. The only thing that the Government would need to do is to put in place a law 
that will ensure that they remit home a certain portion of their earnings.” 
Meanwhile, responding to a question by the Solomon Islands Brisbane Community 
about the issue of introduction of dual citizenship by the Solomon Islands’ 
Government, Prime Minister Sogavare said the DCCG is working on the legislation 
for the introduction of dual citizenship and this bill will be taken to Parliament either 
at its final sitting for 2016 or its first sitting for 2017. 
He said, “the introduction of dual citizenship would enable Solomon Islanders 
studying and working abroad to participate in national general elections and thus see 
a great improvement in the quality of Solomon Islands’ parliamentary leadership”. 
The Prime Minister said, “the quality of parliamentary leadership reflects the level of 
education of voters and he believes that if the educated Solomon Islanders studying 
and working overseas are given the opportunity of participating in national general 
elections, the Solomon Islands would see a great difference”. 
Source: Press Release, Prime Minister's Office. 
Education must promote diversified cultural capacities. Although this thesis focuses on the 
importance of developing the youth in regions that are impacted by disenfranchisement and 
marginalisation, schools and education are not a solution in themselves. Evidence abounds of 
cultural genocide that has occurred within schooling systems in colonial territories, the 
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Canadian residential school experience provides innumerable examples; see Chrisjohn et al. 
(1997), Grant (1996) and Llewellyn (2002). The Australian aboriginal colonial schooling 
legacy also provides a powerful illustration of the negative impacts of such cultural 
disintegration (Krieken, 1999; Krieken, 2004). 
What will be important for the youth of the Solomon Islands is the practicality of their 
education. They need to be educated to meet the dual objective of promoting and celebrating 
their own culture and traditional knowledge as well as understanding the systems of 
commerce and legislation that are impacting their livelihoods. Indigenous people are 
intrinsically linked to their land spiritually, in essence it is where they frame their kinship 
religions, upon which they frame their identities as individuals. Destroying these areas not 
only destroys their culture it destroys the individuals sense of place in the world and their 
connection to their past. Substance abuse fills this emotional void (KIP, 2015). As developed 
nations become more urbanised this basic connection with the land is lost. Educating the 
youth of the Solomon Islands to formally understand their rights to combat cultural 
asymmetries needs to form part of the nation’s education program.  
There is an intrinsic link between the destruction of these cultures and large scale resource 
development projects as well as distinct and known trade-offs based on history. Many 
indigenous reserves are vacant undeveloped areas that have significant cultural value to 
indigenous people and were set aside for that reason. As these people have also become more 
urbanised and integrated into communities they become fringe dwellers, caught between two 
worlds. These people if educated meaningfully can become the gateway group between the 
two lifeworlds and introduce a cross-pollination of ideas and learning, if their traditions and 
cultures are respected. The current education system in the Solomon Islands is rife with 
disenfranchisement, substance abuse and depression amongst youth. An introduction of 
traditional values and beliefs into this world may allow people to better develop a sense of 
who they are and who those around them are such that community strength and unity may be 
promoted. This may allow societies to embrace difference and better comprehend the fact that 
losing traditional knowledge from oral cultures would significantly reduce the intellectual 
diversity of the world.  
If meaningfully educated, the youth of the Solomon Islands could foster a national ideology 
that promotes natural values over all others. This would mark a distinct move away from 
developing land for commodification outputs and valuing the natural, unspoiled environment 
as it currently exists. In the long-run it is more valuable to the people of the nation in this 
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form as the rest of the world becomes polluted, overpopulated and severely impacted by 
human populations. Educating the youth in alternative environmental valuation 
methodologies can further promote this endeavour (Godoy and Bawa (1993).  
The nation must market itself differently and look to attract a different kind of visitor and 
investor in line with the Costa Rican model (Ericson, 2011; Rankin, 2012). Attracting 
individuals who are independently wealthy and looking to make a difference in the world, not 
take a piece of it could markedly change development outcomes. Once a critical mass of 
engaged and environmentally aware individuals is reached these values can be promoted in a 
prosperous and sustainable fashion.  
Seeking to develop extractive development projects attracts people with a mindset of taking 
what they can and leaving. What remains are fractured communities and environmental 
degradation with the profits accruing offshore. Meaningfully educating the youth of the 
Solomon Islands and energising human rights education with a national marketing agenda in 
line with Costa Rica’s model could result in the Solomon Islands being valued appropriately. 
Those who call the nation home can be empowered culturally and intellectually, being proud 
of who they are and where they are from. Codifying into legislation forms of cultural 
protection in the Solomon Islands has not been enough to date as most do not understand this 
legal landscape in practical terms and this is to the advantage of those in power. Having an 
organised citizenry that is educated on their rights can empower communities and individuals 
within them. The current manipulation of legislation put in place to protect local cultures and 
the people’s connection to the land is indicative of systemic corruption that has over-ridden 
well intentioned formal, codified institutions. This illustrates that without a critical mass of 
informed citizenry legislative loopholes cannot be defended against. An informed and 
organised community however can overturn decisions that will disempower, marginalise and 
in some instances destroy a people’s culture. Not having this capacity means putting 
complete faith in those who are leading development projects, seeking profit maximisation 
and in many instances having a poor understanding of the cultural damage ensuing as a result 
due to severe lifeworld asymmetries.  
10.2. Human Capital 
As previously mentioned in Chapter 1, the youth in the Solomon Islands have dual 
exploitative burdens, namely:  
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(1) That of unemployment, underemployment, inadequate education and training, absence 
of much in the way of non-resource industry which renders their political power non-
existent;  
(2) An almost complete lack of local politicians who can represent them indirectly by 
ensuring that resource companies are taxed to provide the education, training and industries 
that the young need.  
Consequently, to understand the impact and long term implications of resource curse style 
dynamics which catalyse and foster power distortions, the experiences and impact upon youth 
cohorts needs to be accurately understood as they provide an insight into what the future will 
look like. Not understanding them can be perilous and the recent ethnic tension in the nation 
provides a powerful, recent example of what happens when this is not understood (KIP, 
2015).  
Youth unemployment and disenfranchisement is one of the largest developmental challenges 
facing the Solomon Islands as indicated by this research and supporting literature (Watson‐
Gegeo and Gegeo, 1992; UNICEF, 2014). Young men and young women are impacted 
differently with respect to finding work in Honiara (Ward, 1995; ANU, 2011; Curtain, 2013).  
Unemployed youth contribute to economic, social and security challenges, both in the capital 
city of Honiara, and in provincial areas (KIP, 2015). There is a large group of school leavers 
who drop out of formal education between the ages of 12-18 who have insufficient education 
and misaligned skills to find work and limited networks or job finding skills (KIP, 2015). 
There is also a large cohort who have been severely impacted by the most acute effects and 
subsequent after effects of the ethnic tension via direct involvement or being victims of the 
unrest (KIP, 2015). Child soldier recruitment occurs in many regions of the world and is still 
a pressing concern (Cohn and Goodwin-Gill, 1994; Betancourt et al., 2013; Crombach et al., 
2013).  
The intersection between schooling, knowledge, power and the impact on culture and social 
relations in the Solomon Islands is well summarised in Watson‐Gegeo (1992); Watson‐Gegeo 
and Gegeo (1992); Gegeo and Watson-Gegeo (2002). Oakeshott and Allen (2015) discuss the 
impact of education on promoting a national consciousness within the schooling system in 
the last twenty years. Key informant interviews and round table discussion with youth in the 
case study support the notion that without a properly functioning education system, 
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corruption dynamics that are strengthened by information asymmetries and misinformation 
become further entrenched.  
For those who complete secondary studies, there are few jobs in the public and private sector 
available, due to lack of job experience and the low number of jobs (KIP, 2015). For 
university graduates, many find work outside of their field of study due to limited options 
(KIP, 2015). These factors lead to a high level of disenfranchisement of youth (KIP, 2015). 
Without youth who are educated in specific skill sets  
There is a rising level of substance abuse among youth along with petty criminality (KIP, 
2015). The extent of this problem is not well understood however the highly visible nature of 
this criminality and substance abuse makes it readily identifiable. Given the current substance 
abuse problems with low level narcotics one can easily sense the problem that adoption of a 
more insidious and destructive drug would bring. This is exemplified by the recent hard drug 
transition of Jamaica (for evidence of this destruction see Stone (1991). Given the current 
level of disenfranchisement and the composition of society, the introduction of a hard drug 
that is affordable, such as the Jamaican experience with ice, would have disastrous effects on 
the nation. Rapid increases in wealth and intersections with disparate cultures associated with 
human capital installation for natural resource projects has the real potential of introducing 
more insidious substance abuse. This is a worrying concern and it is not well understood 
(KIP, 2015).  
There are few programmes targeting youth and few outlets for youth development. 
Organisations like sporting clubs provide one possible outlet and means of connecting with 
external networks that can aid youth in developing their own self-confidence and support 
networks. These organisations can also be very useful in providing examples of community 
role models that youth can look up to if managed correctly. Creating dreams and aspirations 
for these individuals is extremely important (KIP, 2015). If youth cannot derive inspiration 
from their local context motivation levels suffer as result. Sporting clubs are one example of 
an organisation through which this can be achieved.  
Given the violence that has recently ensued in the nation and given the fact that until very 
recently the people of the nation were part of a tribal society, such outlets are imperative. The 
cultural intersection with these tribal realities and modern systems of business and commerce 
are poorly understood. The motivations that underpin youth psychologies of those who are 
becoming what the western world are defining as terrorists and youth who are joining civil 
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militia have a lot in common. A first line of defence is learning how to minimise the 
receptivity of mostly ordinary people to recruiting organisations (Atran, 2003). There is a 
pressing need to better understand the reasons for this from a psychological perspective 
which goes beyond the identification and analysis of factors driving power dynamics.  
Section 9.4.4 illustrates that being female and less educated increases the chance of being 
subjected to violence, an indication of disempowerment. Members of matrilineal kinship 
systems are less likely to be victims of violence. Determining what can empower women is 
integral to a functioning society. This result opens up an interesting avenue of inquiry in this 
regard. There is an alarming prevalence of violence towards women in the nation with it 
being discussed almost as if it were an expected reality of a life (KIP, 2015).  
Section 9.4.5 addressed the youth’s perception of government. More mature respondents 
were less likely to think the government was assisting the country. A concern stemming from 
this finding is that younger members of society are more inclined to support the government 
but have far less knowledge of the political process or outcomes stemming from it. Given that 
these youth are also the most marginalised they can also be the most easily coerced as 
illustrated by the composition of civil military forces during the period of ethnic tension 
(KIP, 2015). The receptivity of individuals to be influenced by a political narrative to the 
point of committing extreme acts of violence and destruction needs to be better understood in 
this regard. Extending upon the characterisation of disenfranchised youth and further 
improving the psychological drivers of power traps within such settings can continue to 
improve the understanding of how this takes place and what can be put in place to counter 
this trend. Each setting and context will be different however the factors identified as being 
influential to stabilising power traps within the conceptual frameworks introduced within this 
thesis can greatly expedite the process of exploring the subtle nuances associated with each. 
Once the influential factors are identified a corresponding understanding of the subtle human 
cultural and sociological mechanics underlying the factors can allow power traps to be 
meaningfully understood and prescriptions prioritised accordingly. For these youth, moving 
forward personal social networks and the importance of speaking English in the urban, 
commercialised economy remains important if they are aspiring to have an urbanised and 
globalised livelihood (Mortensen and Vishwanath, 1994; Nardi et al., 2000; Mislove et al., 
2010).  
Section 9.4 broadly explores the use of water source as a socio-economic proxy. Importantly 
the results from Section 9.4.1 and 9.4.6 indicate that individuals accessing water from a 
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source that is associated with an unzoned, transient community has the poorest educational 
outcomes. Interviews indicated that these youth had been displaced and were forced to move 
away from a previous home environment which contained personal support structures (KIP, 
2015). These marginalised youth are the most vulnerable but also the most motivated to 
achieve until the surmounting personal factors contribute to destabilising disempowerment. 
This research has elucidated many issues that eventuate as a result of displacement, 
underpinned by insecure rights and a broad setting of disempowerment. Future research 
needs to focus on the big picture of better managing this phenomenon with respect to 
resource development, acknowledging the indigenous communities cultural kinship with the 
land (KIP, 2015). Access to technology will remain an important aspect of knowledge 
dissemination moving forward, how this is utilised will be up to those in power. 
Communication technology is merely a platform, if it is corrupted by the underlying social 
setting the outcomes will not be positive.  
At present, the reality is one of acute state administrative power dislocation and wide spread 
disenfranchisement further promoted by unfavourable life condition factors. The livelihoods 
of many individuals in this setting are supported and survived by the fact that they possess the 
requisite rural skills (KIP, 2015). As the nation becomes more interwoven into the globalised 
marketplace the potential for disruption and severe social unrest given the current social 
environment is acute.  
This research and the frameworks presented will help researchers and practitioners 
understand these power dynamics more clearly. A loss of culture, over emphasis on urban job 
prospects and degrading the local way of life to increase profit margins will result in 
instability within the system. A balanced approach to this planning is required that 
emphasises humility and the value of the traditional cultures. Research needs to focus on how 
to re-establish a balance between being connected with the outside world and commercial 
realities, while protecting the livelihoods of the local people in the nation. These decisions 
need to be made by Solomon Islanders with the guidance of effective, ground up, well 
focused, objective research. It is hoped that this thesis can aid policy and planning decisions 
in this regard with a more useful and practical way of conceptualising such issues and 
introduce more accurate sense of how relevant histories brought the nation to where it is 
today. 
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Given that corruption at present is systemic and widespread there will need to be numerous 
practical solutions conceptualised that can positively impact the situation at hand. Given the 
capital intensive nature of resource projects, the potential for large revenue windfalls can 
further catalyse and promote corruption. In addition unfavourable costs of capital reduce the 
ability of the Solomon Islands to develop its own wealth internally. A possible solution to 
project funding was conceptualised and tested with data from the nation and current 
development assistance agendas and is presented in Section 10.2.  
Rebuilding or even re-invigorating the countries education system is badly needed. This form 
of infrastructure investment will require external funding and has the inherent potential of 
creating further dependency. An innovative approach to project funding has been applied to 
maximise the potential of any investment in the country by leveraging from a more developed 
nations credit security rating. If the Solomon Islands is able to effectively negotiate and 
appropriate royalties from their natural resources capital will need to be utilised in the most 
effective way possible to maximise the potential of these resources.  
Section 10.2 provides a practical example of how to implement key infrastructure projects 
that assist the nation develop without further promoting dependency issues that are currently 
plaguing the nation. Given the availability of data and current development agendas within 
the sector, electricity infrastructure development is used as an example to illustrate and 
exemplify the aforementioned investment malady. How the Solomon Islands interact with 
international credit markets will be a key determinate in maximising any investment made in 
the nation moving forward, irrespective of the sector. The capital intensive nature of resource 
projects means that many developing nations must observe from the sidelines. However as 
developing nations seek to reduce dependency, improve internal outcomes and benefit from 
their wealth more productive financing structures need to be conceptualised. Effective and 
empowering decisions made by the current government representatives in this regard can 
leave a positive legacy for the next generation.  
10.3. Physical Capital
29
 
This section presents one practical alternative that can leverage from another countries credit 
security rating and utilise a development assistance budget in a more meaningful and 
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 A separate research paper was published on this matter in relation to financing the enlargement of the 
Solomon Islands power supply and power generation capabilities (Simshauser et al., 2016).  
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productive sense for the recipient nation. Chapter 7 and 8 outline the current dependency 
issues the Solomon Islands have in this regard.  
Debt finance is crucially important to capital intensive infrastructure projects. Debt 
instrument choice is most strongly linked with the credit history of the issuing entity and the 
current credit quality of the issuer (Denis and Mihov, 2003). Firms with the highest credit 
quality exhibit a strong preference for public debt, while firms with credit ratings towards the 
middle of the spectrum tend to prefer bank debt, whereas those at the bottom of the credit 
rating spectrum borrow from non-bank private sources and at high cost (Berger and Udell, 
1998; Carey et al., 1998; Berger and Udell, 2006). This pattern broadly supports the model of 
Diamond (1991) and Diamond and Rajan (2001) in which borrowers with high credit ratings 
earn rents from their reputations with lenders. The existence of such rents is also consistent 
with observations made within Graham and Harvey (2001) that managers place a high 
priority on maintaining their existing credit rating. At the other end of the spectrum, non-bank 
private debt plays a unique role in accommodating the debt financing needs of entities with 
low credit quality (Kahan and Tuckman, 1993). 
Given the central importance of the cost of capital to a nation’s development and 
infrastructure projects the option of 3PC Financing will be explored. 3PC financings are 
similar to a credit wrap designed to combat otherwise very high premium on loan facilities 
(credit wrapping is the enhancement of a debt obligation by higher credit quality issuers)
30
.  
Wrapped financings have been identified in numerous variations, contexts and semblances 
over time (Smith Jr and Warner, 1979; Kahan and Tuckman, 1993; Rosenberg et al., 2004). 
Diggle et al. (2004) observe that liquidity costs are always borne by investors, whereas 
issuing costs are absorbed by issuers. If the credit wrapper is a high credit-rated Federal 
Government, it will have the effect of adding significantly to the liquidity of any debt issue, 
and clearly, add to the credit quality of any new issue and in turn reduce the cost of debt 
(Bekaert and Harvey, 1995; Diggle et al., 2004).  
3PC Financing as originally envisaged entailed a structured power project arrangement 
between the US Federal Government, a State Public Utility Commission and a power project 
developer with an aim of dramatically reducing the cost of capital for capital-intensive (low 
                                                          
30
 The concept of debt, credit wrapped by Federal governments is not a new one to global capital markets. In the 
US, the largest mortgaged backed issuers, the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae); the Federal 
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) and the Federal Home Loan Bank System are known as 
Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs). The difference is that the underlying asset underpins the loans and 
acts as the collateral (Regan et al., 2010). 
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emission) power projects (Rosenberg et al., 2004). How this would be achieved centred 
around financially engineering the cost and level of debt raised through re-organising the 
allocation of power project financial risk. The concept is analogous to Monoline Insurers
31
, 
the ultimate impact of which is that lenders have an additional recourse to the credit wrapper 
(i.e. the Monolines) and the issuer (i.e. Regulated Utility) achieves a lower cost of funds 
(Chava and Roberts, 2008). This same principle could be applied to other capital intensive 
infrastructure projects and could be utilised by the Solomon Islands to either fund resource 
projects that they will be the beneficiaries of or to reduce the cost associated with key 
infrastructure projects such as education facilities or key infrastructure services. 
By way of a practical illustration a derivation of 3PC Financing has been abstracted and 
applied to the Solomon Islands. This was done with the primary intention of reducing 
country, credit and illiquidity risk premiums that would otherwise add to relevant WACC 
calculations (Simshauser et al., 2016).  
The derivation of 3PC Financing, developed within Simshauser et al. (2016), has one crucial 
difference to that of Rosenberg et al. (2004). It was envisaged that the Power Purchase 
Agreement (PPA) rather than the project debt would become the subject of a credit wrap. 
That is, the Commonwealth of Australia would credit wrap a long-dated (and otherwise un-
rated) Solomon Islands Electricity Authority PPA. The reason for this is twofold: (1) 
approved revenue streams for banking energy infrastructure projects is of paramount 
importance (Stelwagon, 1996; Joshi, 2002; Doh and Ramamurti, 2003; Kundra, 2008; 
Simshauser and Ariyaratnam, 2014); and (2) to ensure responsibility for power plant 
construction risk and operating risk remains with project proponents, where it is best 
managed.  
Through a credit-wrapped PPA, 3PC Financing can greatly improve the prospects for a 
project financing on favourable rates and terms. The use of project finance theories are of 
vital importance to the success of a 3PC Financing policy in the context of growth and 
development theories. The derivation of a 3PC Financing policy necessarily involves non-
trivial capital commitments by private power project developers and a syndicate of Project 
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 Monolines are insurance companies that provide guarantees to issuers of debt, typically in the form of a credit 
wrap, which has the effect of enhancing the credit rating of the debt (thereby reducing the risk premiums in line 
with the higher credit rating achieved on issue). In Australia between 2003-2007, more than $6 billion of debt 
issued by Australian electricity and gas utilities (e.g. United Energy, Powercor, Citipower, ETSA Utilities, 
Basslink, ElectraNet, Envestra) was wrapped by AAA- rated monoline insurance companies (e.g. Ambac, FSA, 
XLCA, MBIA). At the time, this credit enhancement had the effect of reducing spreads from 100+bps to less 
than 40bps over swap rates. 
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Banks. The benefit of this is that it brings all of the technical, commercial and due diligence 
capabilities to the process of developing and screening long-lived energy infrastructure 
projects, thereby reducing the risk of non-viable projects proceeding (Brealey et al., 1996; 
Sader, 2000; Ramamurti, 2003; Yamin and Sinkovics, 2009; Chaudhuri and Mukhopadhyay, 
2014; Pi and Zhou, 2014).  
Using direct foreign development assistance to fund or part-fund such projects could lower 
power production costs even further than a 3PC Financing. But a sole focus on exogenous 
sources of growth for a developing economy risks potential reliance and more critically, Type 
II investment error (i.e. accepting a project that should be rejected). This is because a plant 
funded by development assistance or through an issue of Australian Government Bonds is 
unlikely to be subjected to the level of commercial scrutiny that is achievable under other 
structures. A Project Finance model on the other hand results in a concentrated ownership 
of syndicated bank debt which encourages risk-averse Project Banks to devote considerable 
resources to evaluating and minimising plant construction and operating risks prior to 
commitment (Brealey et al., 1996; Nelson and Simshauser, 2013). Moreover, Australian 
policymakers may be better to focus on a broader strategy that recognises the importance of 
endogenous forms of growth given that the Solomon Islands is now, according to some 
measures, per capita the second most aid-reliant country in the world. 
The important message here is that there are many new and innovative ways of doing things 
that empower people and nations as opposed to making them reliant. Moyo (2009) expresses 
this concern powerfully within the African context with respect to aid funding. As a simple 
rule of thumb, if funding is not building additional capacity it will eventually have a 
detrimental impact and cause unrest once it is taken away. Funding from sources that 
perpetuate dependency further amplify these effects. This has to be a key consideration 
moving forward. This practical example of providing financing to the electricity sector 
provides an illustration of how to start thinking about project finance innovation which will 
be an integral part of the development of the Solomon Islands and other developing nations 
moving forward. This is also an important consideration for donor nations that are looking to 
improve how development assistance budgets are spent.  
  
187 
This may prima facie appear to be a somewhat novel approach to the delivery of foreign aid. 
But as the Foreign Minister recently noted, Australia is among the top 10 donor countries in 
the OECD
32
 and therefore innovation of how Foreign Aid is delivered is important: 
…Innovation will drive the way we deliver Aid. We have taken advice from the World 
Bank and other likeminded aid agencies and this is ground breaking stuff for 
Australian Aid. Over the next four years we will spend $140 million in trialing and 
testing development innovations. Finding much more creative and clever ways to 
achieve better results, thinking differently and being more entrepreneurial in our 
approach… (Bishop, 2014). 
The Australian Government intends to trial new methods of delivering foreign aid and 3PC 
Financing of strategic power projects appears consistent with this objective. A similar logic 
that seeks to find innovative and empowering investment solutions needs to be prioritised in 
this regard without compromising project evaluation integrity. Subsequent modelling 
demonstrates that a Commonwealth Government credit wrapped PPA in the Solomon Islands 
substantially bolsters the economic case for renewable energy projects and reduces the 
combustion of imported diesel fuels (Simshauser et al., 2016). Given the capital-intensive 
nature and strategic importance of renewable energy infrastructure in a country otherwise 
reliant on imported diesel fuels, innovative forms of financing become even more important 
(Sorrell, 2004; Bergmann et al., 2006; Wüstenhagen and Menichetti, 2012). 
The research and analysis conducted within Simshauser et al. (2016) presents a 3PC 
Financing policy designed to substantially reduce the production costs associated with 
capital-intensive power projects in an unrated sovereign nation. However, such policy and 
associated prescriptions are not specific to the Solomon Islands. The conceptual framework 
as well as the associated financial logic that underpins the initiative can be generalised to 
other ‘user pays’ infrastructure projects, and, to other developing nations. How this is 
designed for alternative settings needs to be carefully considered.  
The broad applicability of 3PC financing means that it is not country specific, project specific 
or asset class specific (Simshauser et al., 2016). From a perspective of funding education in 
the Solomon Islands this framework could also be applied. A PPA in this instance is merely a 
contract between two parties, the seller who generates the electricity and the buyer who is 
purchasing the electricity. Given the demand for education in the Solomon Islands the 
                                                          
32 
A$5 Billion a year for the next two years, increasing with CPI thereafter. 
  
188 
educational equivalent of a PPA could be designed such that those receiving an education, 
could, with the use of government assistance, provide the requisite guarantee of revenue in 
the long-run to fund current development in this sector.  
There are a number of non-trivial issues however that require resolution before a 3PC 
Financing policy could be contemplated for power projects in the Solomon Islands. Land 
access and detailed modelling (using high quality data) are clearly essential pre-conditions. 
But resolving property rights issues (i.e. in relation to land as security for finance) would 
appear to be a threshold issue of paramount importance to development agendas in general, 
as highlighted by Chapter 6. 
Financing improvements in the Solomon Islands power system have historically been sourced 
from the World Bank, the Asia Sustainable and Alternative Energy Program trust funds, the 
International Finance Corporation, the Australian Agency for International Development 
(AusAID) and other foreign governments. Clearly, these sources of finance will remain 
essential for improvements in the overall operation of power systems and the electrification 
of rural areas. For rural and remote areas, small-scale solar PV and battery represent a 
promising prospect. But for the utility-scale projects that were examined, 3PC Financing was 
capable of producing quantum reductions in system operating costs.  
3PC policy can have the effect of encouraging more private sector involvement in, and 
competition for, investment in strategic infrastructure projects. Further, the involvement of 
project banks should ensure the standards of technical due diligence that typically occurs in 
mature power market projects also occurs in the Solomon Islands. When banks do not do this 
the entire system is compromised and can actively facilitate corruption and dramatically 
reduce the power of lawmakers to control flows of capital. New banking institutions that 
align themselves with agendas of detrimental natural resource development projects such as 
logging in the Solomon Islands provide worrying evidence, this is not easily legislated 
against (KIP, 2015). 
By leveraging balance sheets, donor governments may continue foreign aid programs and 
modify the fiscal mix to suit their own macro-economic conditions while simultaneously 
improving the welfare and standard of living of the aid-recipient country population. While 
3PC Financing may appear novel, the concept is not without broader precedent. In Australia, 
the Clean Energy Finance Corporation (CEFC) does exactly this for renewable projects in 
Australia. 3PC Financing appears to be consistent with the basic tenets of the Australian 
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Government’s ‘new aid paradigm’ (see Bishop, 2014). 3PC Financing would thus appear 
worthy of consideration by Australian policymakers. If this is the case, the question for 
policymakers is how to translate desktop modelling results into practice and applying similar 
project financing logic to the development of other key infrastructure required in the 
Solomon Islands.  
Ordinarily in power system planning the cost of supply, reliability of supply and 
environmental objectives collide and require continuous trade-off by policymakers. It must be 
rare in practice to see these trade-offs avoided. Yet the Solomon Islands appear to be a unique 
case in point. The opportunity exists to dramatically reduce the cost of energy supply, 
increase the security of supply, and improve the environmental performance of electricity 
production through a 3PC Financing policy. The policy implications of the research 
conducted within Simshauser et al. (2016) is relatively straightforward. By utilising a credit-
wrap and improving the credit quality of a project income stream, the cost of large capital-
intensive user-pays infrastructure projects can be meaningfully reduced. Given the 
relationship between the availability and affordability of electricity and human development, 
devoting effort to such a policy appears warranted. 
Given the capital intensive nature of electricity infrastructure projects such a prescription 
could be viewed as one application of such a financing structure. Investment will be required 
to develop the Solomon Islands’ education system and how to fund such an undertaking will 
require careful consideration of the costs associated with individual strategies that go beyond 
the bottom line figures as discussed in Section 10.1. Applying logic such as the 3PC 
financing of power infrastructure to education and the leveraging of development assistance 
budgets to the benefit of the nation will be required to achieve meaningful outcomes. 
Objective research could guide the formulation of an investment strategy in education that 
promotes internal capacity, maximises comparative advantage and promotes long term 
financing solutions to social capacity problems.  
The difficulty associated with implementing such a strategy in the Solomon Islands is that the 
administrative institutions that are required for the effective implementation of such 
prescriptions are at present compromised. If a project could be designed and implemented 
with the purpose of providing an illustration of the potential of such a project within the 
realm of education it could be used as a project archetype. This could then encourage others 
to follow the same model and it could then be developed further. Given the systemic levels of 
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corruption in the nation at present there would need to be an overwhelming emphasis placed 
upon transparency for any project development of this nature to realise its potential.   
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Chapter 11 – Conclusion 
"No one is born a good citizen; no nation is born a democracy. Rather, both are 
processes that continue to evolve over a lifetime. Young people must be included from 
birth. A society that cuts off from its youth severs its lifeline"- Kofi Annan 
11.1. Reflection on Research Questions 
This thesis has promoted the importance of understanding youth populations impacted by 
politicised power dynamics in a setting of resource dominated wealth. Thus, it becomes 
possible to offer prescriptions that could empower disenfranchised youth and alter the future 
of a resource-intensive developing country. The national assembly needs to take important 
steps to minimise destructive power factors, such as systemic corruption at the state level. 
The powerless have to be empowered. Education is a key factor since outcomes are declining 
in the Solomon Islands, leading to a steady loss of empowerment and widening knowledge 
gaps. National peace is being undermined by widespread domestic violence and civil unrest. 
Many of the elite are setting an example that promotes the short-term benefits of a corrupt 
regime while the youth observe. The impact this will have is largely unknown. However, this 
thesis has underlined the negative growth trajectories of nations who disregard the potential 
deleterious impact of this wealth.  
Apart from the broad study objective of more accurately determining the impact of the 
politicised assignment of rights on youth populations in regions economically defined by 
rapid natural resource led growth, legal pluralism and cultural de-generation, the study posed 
a series of specific research questions in Section 1.3. Reflections on these questions based on 
the conceptual understanding, review of literature and empirical analysis in the thesis are 
outlined below: 
 How can power distortions underpinned by wealth from resource extraction be better 
defined and studied? 
Dramatic improvements can be made in this field by addressing, with new data and research, 
the psychological and political impacts of windfall gains on individuals and communities. 
Although these have been identified as key components of the negative growth associated 
with resource abundance, research has been sparse. The source of the wealth is not as 
important as the windfall potential associated with the streams of income yielded. Natural 
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resource projects tend to be the focus of research in developing nations as they constitute the 
overwhelming majority of economic activity and the largest enclaved export earning 
capacity. Collier (2017) supports the view that psychological factors are important, focusing 
on the impact of social psychology and mass opinion in determining local and national claims 
to resources. Natural resource projects provide an economic opportunity for poor societies to 
rapidly develop from their own resources but this can easily be denied by rent-seeking 
activities. Therefore, natural capital must be managed correctly so that internal capacity can 
be built and dependency reduced. To date, this has rarely been the case in the least developed 
nations.  
The Solomon Islands is currently impacted by a multitude of factors contributing to the 
perpetuation of power distortions. Low levels of education, declining educational outcomes, 
as well as further marginalisation and disenfranchisement of youth are perpetuating the 
impacts of windfall-fuelled corruption dynamics. Focusing research on the psychological 
underpinnings of these dynamics on youth populations in impacted nations such as the 
Solomon Islands is imperative as the youth are the transmission mechanism to the next 
generation. The characteristics of the disenfranchised youth presented in Chapter 9 can be 
thought of as an illustration of the inter-generational impact that power distortions caused by 
systemic corruption has on those with the least political power.  
The role of emotion in inter-group conflict and the impact multiple social identities can have 
on improving inter-group relations and reducing associated violence also presents many 
promising avenues of enquiry given the social fragility and commonplace violence in the 
Solomon Islands at present, see (Levy et al., 2017a; Levy et al., 2017b). 
 Can a disaggregation of pivotal factors be used to remedy prescriptions to current 
resource development issues? 
Practical, focused, ground-up research can provide not only an improved understanding of 
such issues but a way forward for badly needed research in regions where data does not exist 
or is inherently unreliable. This thesis has developed this understanding in line with recent, 
influential, research agenda recommendations (Collier, 2017; Papyrakis, 2017).  
Chapter 3 highlighted the limitations of the resource curse literature which has focused on 
broad macro-economic dynamics and not granular disaggregated social realities. In addition, 
key informant interviews and round table discussions in the Solomon Islands highlighted the 
need for a more community orientated understanding of factors driving power distortions that 
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were amplifying the impact of corruption within formal institutions of the nation. Focusing 
research on the marginalised youth refined conceptual logic relating to life condition factors 
that were further marginalising individuals. Clear points of delineation were subsequently 
able to be drawn between pivotal state level factors and individual level factors of 
disempowerment given this enhanced knowledge of the context. In each setting the influence 
of certain factors will be different however disaggregating these factors initially allows for a 
well guided contextual appraisal of the setting which allows key factors to be more readily 
identified.  
 What are the key contributing factors of power distortions predicated on natural 
resource dependence at an individual level and state level? 
The key contributing factors to power distortions and self-reinforcing state level power traps 
are context specific in so far as certain factors will be more influential than others depending 
upon the context. Within the Solomon Islands the key factors driving power trap dynamics at 
a state level are:  
 The ease with which elites can be captured; 
 The ability of nodal actors to manipulate pre-existing legal frameworks; 
 Legal pluralism with respect to property rights; 
 Reduced levels of human capital in comparison to project development proponents; 
 Declining educational outcomes and wide spread youth disenfranchisement and 
marginalisation, providing an inter-generational transmission channel for associated 
corruption dynamics.  
At an individual level: 
 High rates of violence exposure; 
 Declining individual educational outcomes; 
 Insecure livelihoods, underpinned by an environment of legal pluralism, inconsistency 
in decision making and systemic corruption that is readily influenced by windfall 
psychology.  
This research has illustrated and provided a comprehensive framework for preliminary 
identification of factors, as well as providing an example of how disaggregated ground up 
research can be undertaken to bolster this understanding in other settings. The contribution of 
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the conceptual framework developed is in guiding research more clearly and avoiding 
universal explanations and prescriptions in solving or viewing such problems. Each study 
setting needs to be comprehensively understood before key factors become apparent. 
However the factors themselves will be applicable in any setting with varying degrees of 
impact with respect to driving power trap dynamics.  
Each of these factors will be influenced by context specific drivers that must be first 
understood from the ground up before relative weights of importance and distortion potential 
can be assigned. This process is time consuming and methodical however this framework 
assists in illustrating where research needs to focus which greatly expedites this process.  
Understanding the importance of property rights, hereditary succession and individual 
empowerment within a polarised institutional landscape of private property and customary 
title will be seminal to improving outcomes for the next generation and promoting livelihood 
security in the Solomon Islands specifically. Many of the other individual life condition 
factors identified in section 2.3.1 are heavily influenced by these dynamics. The factors in the 
Solomon Islands driving power distortions at present are acutely unstable and livelihood 
insecurity driven by disputes over land has the potential to severely disrupt another 
generation of youth if not managed effectively.  
 How are disenfranchised individuals impacted? 
In acute circumstances, disenfranchised individuals that are powerless to effect change 
through formal channels yet refuse to co-operate with an agenda are subjected to violence. 
Those who attempt to avoid this interaction are isolated, marginalised and disempowered. 
The neighbouring country of PNG, which is further down the natural resource development 
pathway in this regard, provides a telling example. This nation has experienced civil war in 
Bougainville over the rights to copper. The genocide that occurred in East-Timor, another 
nearby island nation over the rights to the countries oil and gas provides another stark 
illustration of the potential impacts in analogous geo-political regions. 
Many of the youth in the Solomon Islands are exposed to alarming levels of domestic 
violence even though peace is being kept by external military forces at a national level. This 
research has indicated that individuals with the lowest education levels have a greater 
likelihood of being a victim of violence. Being female compounds this trend further. This is a 
worrying finding that requires more research to understand how this reality may be improved 
for those that are the most at risk of acute individual disempowerment.  
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 Why are the rent-seeking elite successful in sustaining their power in some countries 
but not in others?  
Low levels of education that foster extreme levels of information asymmetry are the key. The 
case study of the Solomon Islands has illustrated that without a critical mass of informed 
citizenry, accountability and transparency are compromised. Within such settings, 
institutional structures do not balance power or provide equitable distribution of resources but 
facilitate and sustain distorted power dynamics to the detriment of the majority and benefit of 
a few.  
This is allowed to persist as levels of human capital that is needed for the effective 
functioning of administrative institutions that distribute the rights to resources continue to 
deteriorate. A poorly educated citizenry can be more easily coerced with misinformation that 
propels the agenda of political elites who are able to maintain their positions without 
necessary accountability.  
 What are the key characteristics of marginalised youth in such regions?  
The population of youth characterised within the case study are defined by having low levels 
of education, low levels of trust, are un-employed or under-employed and have limited 
ambitions for their future lives. A second characteristic of such a marginalised group is their 
vulnerability and limited ability to save and invest to accumulate wealth and thus they are 
likely to remain impoverished. A third characteristic is their limited political influence and 
thus engagement in improving their life situation through collective action of one form or 
another. Instead many escape into substance abuse and are easily coerced into criminal 
activity.  
Given their dislocation from the decision making processes and their inability to 
meaningfully influence power brokers that control the political complex, the youth are the 
impartial victims. What is left behind they will inherit and therefore inter-generationally 
equitable decisions need to prevail or this decline will accelerate.  
The disenfranchised youth in these regions experience: 
 Poor education outcomes; 
 Diminished levels of trust; 
 Anxiety, depression and a loss of hope; 
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 Insecure livelihoods, long-term unemployment, vulnerability; 
 Alienation; 
 Severely diminished self-confidence, self-esteem and motivation levels; 
 Lack of self-worth and a purpose; 
 Limited political engagement; 
 Limited savings or investment; and 
 High frequency of substance abuse and petty criminality. 
This research exposed worrying findings with respect to marginalised females. Less educated 
females have an increased exposure to violence, a key contributing factor to disempowerment 
at an individual level. This research has indicated that females from matrilineal kinship 
systems are less likely to be the victims of violence and are more likely to be married. More 
research is needed to determine the universality of this finding. This reinforces the 
importance and influence of state level hereditary succession, property rights and land tenure 
security on individual empowerment.  
 Can international collective action be strengthened to modify the behaviour of rent-
seeking elites in affected countries with a critical mass of informed citizens?  
International collective action can, in theory, provide assistance within this realm. During the 
course of this research undertaken in the Solomon Islands it would appear that foreign 
interaction in a commercial sense has amplified power trap dynamics. The large volume of 
development assistance that has been provided has not improved the internal capacity of local 
institutions or individuals due to the fact that this was associated with restoring peace and 
order to the nation. In fact it has increased dependency and fostered an environment of 
distributing development assistance budgets as opposed to creating new wealth. A foreign 
military presence has restored peace in a temporary sense but, domestically, individuals are 
subjected to commonplace violence. The underlying social issues have not been resolved and 
associated dependencies predicated on the aid mentality have, in many ways, served to 
disintegrate the fabric of a once proud nation. Transparency will be the key to keeping 
political and social elites accountable. Given the currently declining educational outcomes 
and the systemic corruption in government, collective international action could be best 
assisted by not participating in projects that are known to be corrupt in nature. Logging 
projects in the nation illustrate this clearly. Unfortunately, attempts at controlling the finance 
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channels associated with these projects has led to the inception of an entirely new banking 
institution in the nation which lacks corporate social responsibility. If a minimum corporate 
social responsibility standard for any banking institution in the nation had to be met in this 
regard it could place additional pressure on those in power to re-assess the value of such 
projects. It may also promote project transparency in this regard. Those in power however 
must enforce these standards and the current political environment provides little incentive 
for those in office to promote this long-term endeavour over short-term gains.   
 Do vocational programs assist in making up the short fall in failed educational 
outcomes? 
Vocational programs such as YW were conceptualised as a way of counteracting 
disenfranchisement and promoting a move towards positive lifestyle cycles within the youth 
of the nation. Although helpful, these programs are not a substitute for entrenched 
educational institutions that produce an informed citizenry. The very fact that they exist is 
symbolic of the far greater problem at large. The deterioration of the nation’s education 
system commenced after independence and its further deterioration was one of the key side 
effects of the civil unrest in the nation. There was a large number of youth whose education 
was terminally affected in this period. The system has not recovered and continues to 
deteriorate. In some ways these vocational programs create a pious hope for individuals. The 
root cause of the problem is really what needs to be addressed. A comprehensive overview 
and review of vocational programs is detailed in Chapter 9.  
 How can citizen misunderstanding and cultural de-generation be countered to promote 
good government? 
Internal capacity and the development of human capital in the nation must be a focus. 
Declining educational standards that are currently being experienced in the nation will need 
to be resolved to promote this endeavour. In simple terms, this will require targeted solutions 
that provide the greatest benefit for the least cost. Investing money in good teachers in line 
with well supported and targeted research that identifies where they are most needed would 
be the most cost effective and influential method of catalysing an improvement in this regard. 
Promotion of a dual-leadership model which respects traditional culture can help to balance 
the impacts of cyclical political reigns of local elite. Although the Solomon Islands is going 
through a period of rapid change, long-term stability provided by traditional values and 
community structure can provide great value. An over emphasis on transplanted institutions 
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that do not have the requisite human capital to function effectively can only be countered 
with improved educational outcomes and human capital development. Balancing this 
perspective with traditional values and beliefs can help to create tailor made educational 
programs that promote dual objectives which restores pride in the nation’s original cultures as 
well as improving the ability of the next generation to participate in the globalised world as 
they choose. This dual objective will be necessary in providing sustainable and stable 
solutions in this regard and can give the people of the Solomon Islands ownership of their 
collective futures.   
 What is the current sentiment towards the government amongst the youth population? 
Given the disenfranchised realities that many youth in the Solomon Islands are experiencing 
there is a negative sentiment in the nation towards the government. Older citizens have an 
ingrained distrust of government which, given the recent realities they have experienced, is 
very understandable. Many of these underlying social and cultural issues have not been 
addressed effectively and the recent peace keeping mission to the nation has further masked 
the underlying social reality.  
This research has highlighted that there is prevalence amongst the political elite to openly 
coerce marginalised and disenfranchised youth. Roundtables and key informant interviews 
suggest that individuals from lower socio-economic backgrounds have a greater tendency of 
being coerced by government officials and are regularly incentivised via various methods 
when elections are on. Relative to their normal income, these incentives, although relatively 
minor, can be seen as coercive windfalls.  
Modelling of data associated with proxies of socio-economic status, such as water source and 
the number of rooms in an individual’s house support the views and opinions expressed by 
youth in interviews. These proxies, with better data, could provide revealing insights into 
social dynamics that could provide a strong platform for future research. Importantly, these 
proxies are tied intimately with government spending and zoned areas of infrastructure 
provision. Within Honiara specifically these would give a good indication of basic 
infrastructure service provision in line with associated expectations and susceptibility to 
coercion in line with Collier (2017). This form of coercion and perception distortion 
exercised by political elites in the nation needs to be better understood as it appears to be 
driving many inter-related dynamics and sustaining illegitimate power structures that are 
distributing the rights to land and resources inequitably. More worryingly this is done through 
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formal institutional manipulation which for extended periods of time can frame such 
corruption as legal and justified.  
11.2. Implications of the Study for a Conceptual Understanding of Power Traps in 
Resource Dominated Economies 
The contribution of this research is to further promote the conceptual understanding of the 
psychology of resource windfalls upon their communities and their most vulnerable and 
powerless members, the youth. Natural resource windfalls in developing nations involve a 
clear collision between influentially large windfall gains and basic social institutions with 
limited human capital development. Disaggregating these factors on a state and individual 
basis with new research on the experience of a disenfranchised youth cohort has highlighted 
areas that need to be better understood to build an accurate understanding of such effects. It 
has also underlined and contributed to the overwhelming importance of understanding the 
impact of social organisation and systemic corruption on the next generation. The role of the 
disaggregated factors presented in Chapter 2 is to assist in identifying areas of priority and to 
enhance the preliminary investigation associated with establishing influential individual level 
and state level factors within the complex. This allows practitioners to more readily address 
with more detailed research the pivotal factors in each setting. The Solomon Islands’ setting 
is unique in that the majority of factors have aligned to create a particularly vulnerable setting 
at an individual level and state level which has led to the need for peacekeeping forces in the 
nation to keep civil order. In more stable settings the framework highlights preliminary 
factors of relevance and this could then allow contextually grounded research to be better 
focused. The power trap complex can operate in any setting, understanding the pivotal factors 
driving it within each context allows for a prioritisation of factors which can contribute to 
poverty reduction and shared prosperity.   
The Solomon Islands is currently poised to undergo rapid development in line with a rapid 
youth population explosion. Thus such frameworks for understanding and measuring the 
impact of the problem are relevant and timely. Given the overwhelming influence of natural 
resources on economic wealth in the Solomon Islands this thesis directly speaks to the youth 
and future leaders of the country. The current systemic corruption has an impact on the 
surrounding national psychology. Much of this systemic corruption has been fuelled by 
resource windfalls or at least windfall motivated psychology within a manipulable setting of 
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legal pluralism and pre-existing social structures centred around a big man. Understanding 
the impact that this sustained reality has had on the current youth of today is integral to 
designing any solution that may assist the future of the nation. How this impacts the youth’s 
current realities in terms of opportunities and livelihoods means that they are intimately 
connected to the problem, the issue being they have little power or ability to help solve it. 
This creates dissent and severe dissatisfaction. Measuring the level of impact it has had and 
what might be done to promote empowering dynamics within the youth needs to be a priority 
of the government if the future is going to be brighter for the people of the Solomon Islands.  
11.3 Limitations and future research 
The limitations of conducting research in the Solomon Islands were somewhat assuaged by 
the willingness and open access that was provided by pivotal individuals. It was these 
relationships and information that highlighted the importance of the disenfranchised youth 
cohort that was studied. The case study investigated the extent to which the identified 
characteristics fit the sample population. Given that a limited number of youths were able to 
be characterised in detail, with all questions answered, it is difficult to understand the broader 
applicability of these findings. Time spent in the country would indicate that problems are far 
more acute than what this research indicates and that indeed many of the youth show a 
genuine motivation to progress that is not common throughout other disenfranchised youth 
interviewed outside the YW cohort. However, the characterisation of this cohort has 
highlighted areas of relevance that can provide a basis for further research, even though not 
all participants in the YW program were able to be surveyed. Although the survey was not 
fully representative, secondary information sources helped to determine the broader 
applicability of the findings drawn from the characterisation survey. In many instances, this 
data presented more worrying findings than the youth cohort data.  
This research and specific case study also highlights the importance of understanding the 
distinction between males and females with regards to better understanding the key 
characteristics of marginalised youth in power trapped nations. Due to the duality of kinship 
systems (patrilineal and matrilineal) that are operating under one state entity in the nation this 
could provide a rare and useful natural experiment in this regard.  
A disaggregated analysis of factors impacting power distortions driven by windfalls, given 
psychological and political juxtapositions, has been virtually non-existent. Aligning 
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individual, as well as social realities with ground up data can significantly improve the 
understanding required to formulate meaningful solutions for the youth in the long-term. 
Understanding these dynamics in nations that are experiencing acute symptoms associated 
with power trap dynamics can illuminate key factors more readily and advance research in 
this regard. Ideally a representative sample of youth in the nation could be surveyed to obtain 
a more comprehensive characterisation. Individuals could be identified that have become 
disenfranchised due to specific reasons or in relation to the development of specific natural 
resource projects such as forestry and a greater understanding could be developed around 
disaggregated catalysts causing marginalisation. Social field-experiments such as dictator and 
trust games within chosen youth samples could also promote greater understanding of the 
associated psychology impacting outcomes. The role of inter-group relationships would seem 
to be a very fruitful avenue of inquiry given the current circumstances and withdrawal of 
military forces. 
Traditional knowledge has frequently been over looked in the search by outside professionals 
to find solutions to development problems. However, an increased use of traditional 
knowledge may make development programs more appropriate to local conditions, provide 
innovative solutions to certain problems, contribute to a sense of self-worth and collective 
self-esteem among local people, and enhance popular participation and empowerment.  
Creating different futures for the youth in the Solomon Islands is not linked to economic 
growth in the traditional sense and is not about attempting to emulate the conditions of a 
regions’ symbolic of wealth. Economic growth can be the ultimate driver of unsustainability 
in certain conditions. It rests upon the paradoxical combination of promised abundance and 
structural scarcity, in which desires are transformed into needs and needs are reduced to 
solvent demand (Rist, 2014).  
This thesis has emphasised the importance of understanding periods of history where 
analogous factors have combined to produce socially destructive dynamics. Much of the 
discourse in this regard has been overwhelmed by an obsession with growth and 
development. Natural resource led growth in developing economies highlight two systemic 
natural limits, ecological and social. The current plight of the youth in the Solomon Islands 
and the underlying civil unrest would indicate that this social limit has been reached, it is no 
longer sustainable in its current form.  
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As the Solomon Islands look to the future is will be imperative to counteract growth obsessed 
social development with a balanced perspective that recognise the value of the local 
environment and people in the nation. Introducing principles of de-growth into the discourse 
could allow mentalities to adjust to alternative possibilities that do not follow the paths of 
natural resource led development such as PNG, which has not had a socially sustainable and 
empowering relationship with economic growth in this regard.  
Better understanding the youth, particularly those who are the most disenfranchised and 
marginalised can greatly assist any nation learn what the limits of its social resilience are. 
Researching and understanding this cohort can greatly assist in highlighting impacts and put a 
human face to the side-effects of rapid structural change and rampant commodification. To 
know the youth in this regard is to know the impact of a social order on the future of the 
nation in so far as one can work towards combating the amelioration of social problems 
which create disharmony, distrust and generational perpetuation. Let’s protect and nurture 
our lifeline. A page taken from the Istatabu Freedom Movement newsletter sums up 
eloquently the social narrative that motivates those involved at a grass roots level and 
potential for an entrenched ideology. 
“Dear Mr. Government, 
When I give food to the poor, they call me a saint. [But] when I ask why the poor have no 
food, they call me a communist. 
The above saying epitomises what is happening to us. 
Look, Mr. Government, when we give our land for your benefit and that of the nation-state, 
You call us generous. 
When we ask why we have not benefited, you ignored us. 
When we start shouting, wanting to be heard, you call us troublemakers. 
When we take up arms to ask what rightfully belongs to us, you call us militants. 
When we became angry because you trampled on us, you call us hot-headed youth. 
Those are the names you use to justify your disregard for/of us. 
Soon, you may call us guerrillas or terrorists. 
That, however, will not get rid of us” (ISFM, 2000). 
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Phase 8 Long Survey 
Question # Interview question Unit 
TITLE PAGE 
Single/Married Code: (0=Single; 1=Married) 
Highest Level of Education 
Number (FORM) If it is Grade put 
G 
AGE Number 
Gender Code: (0=Male; 1=Female) 
Brothers Number 
Sisters Number 
Province and Station YOUTH Write 
Zone in Honiara Write 
1 Do you earn money? (Y/N) 1=Yes; 0=No 
2 
How well do you speak and read English?  
Code 1=very good, 2= good, 3=fair, 4= poor, 5= very 
poor 
3 
Do you have your own children?  1=Yes; 0=No 
If yes, how many? Number 
4 
Are you currently responsible for someone 
younger than you? (Y/N) 
1=Yes; 0=No 
5 
How do you evaluate your current health 
condition? 
Code 
1=very good, 2= good, 3=fair, 4= poor, 5= very 
poor 
6 
How old were you when you first moved to 
Honiara? (If not from Honiara). 
Number 
7 
How much money did you earn (average per 
month) this year? 
Number SBD 
From what? Write 
8 Do you have savings? (Y/N) 1=Yes; 0=No 
9 How many times have you been employed? Number 
10 
If you could make money would you prefer to 
live in a rural area/village? 
1=Yes; 0=No 
11 
What job do you view as being able to make 
the highest salary?  
Write 
12 
Do you think the government helps the 
country? (Y/N) 
1=Yes; 0=No 
  Can you……………..? TICK if YES   
13 Build a simple house?  1=Yes; 0=No 
14 Make a garden that produces fruit/vegetable? 1=Yes; 0=No 
15 Catch Fish?  1=Yes; 0=No 
16 Produce Copra? 1=Yes; 0=No 
17 Fix a Car or Motorbike?  1=Yes; 0=No 
18 Can you create a piece of art you could sell?  1=Yes; 0=No 
19 Can you measure and cut timber? 1=Yes; 0=No 
20 
Can you pilot a canoe or boat over long 
distances eg. Auki to Honiara 
1=Yes; 0=No 
21 Weld or join metal? 1=Yes; 0=No 
22 Work with electronics? 1=Yes; 0=No 
23 
What types of jobs have you had before 
coming here?  
Write 
24 
What types of jobs have you had since you 
came here? 
Write 
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25 How did you normally get to school? Write 
26 How long did it take? ONE WAY Number 
27 
Did you leave school early due to financial 
reasons? (Y/N) 
1=Yes; 0=No 
  FATHER   
28 Is your father still alive? (Y/N) 1=Yes; 0=No 
29 
If not from Honiara, how old was he when you 
first moved (can give estimate)?  
Number 
30 
What was is his religion? 
Code 1=Anglican ; 2= Catholic ; 3=SSEC ; 4=SDA ; 
5=Other, (specify) : 
31 What is his current job? Write 
32 Highest level of schooling he has? Number 
33 Good role model? 1=Yes; 0=No 
  MOTHER   
34 Is your mother still alive?  1=Yes; 0=No 
35 
If not from Honiara, how old was she when you 
moved (can give estimate)? 
Number 
36 
What is her religion? 
Code 1=Anglican ; 2= Catholic ; 3=SSEC ; 4=SDA ; 
5=Other (specify) 
37 What is her current job? Write 
38 Highest level of schooling she has? Number 
39 Good role model? 1=Yes; 0=No 
  FAMILY - GENERAL   
40 Do your parents own their house? (Y/N) 1=Yes; 0=No 
41 Do your parents own land? (Y/N) 1=Yes; 0=No 
42 Is your garden private or shared?  1=Private; 2=Shared 
43 
Does the garden provide enough food all year? 
(Y/N) 
1=Yes; 0=No 
44 
How many of your brothers and sisters are 
living with your parents? 
Number (B/S) 
  LAND   
45 
Has your families land been impacted by a 
company’s operations? E.g. logging or mining 
company. (Y/N) 
1=Yes; 0=No 
If YES – what or who? Write 
46 Who owns the land in your village?  Write 
47 
Have you been impacted by land ownership 
problem? 
1=Yes; 0=No 
HOUSE (Childhood) - Where you lived the longest 
48 Permanent house? (Y/N) 1=Yes; 0=No 
49 How many bedrooms?  Number 
50 How many people?  Number 
51 
What is the main source of water that your 
household used? 
Code 
1=Piped to household; 2=Piped into 
neighborhood; 3=Piped supply outside 
neighborhood; 4=Well in yard; 5=Public well; 
6=Rainwater tank; 7=River/creek; 8=Other  
52 Does the household have a toilet? (Y/N) 1=Yes; 0=No 
53 
What is the main source of water that your 
household used? 
Code 
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1=Piped to household; 2=Piped into 
neighborhood; 3=Piped supply outside 
neighborhood; 4=Well in yard; 5=Public well; 
6=Rainwater tank; 7=River/creek; 8=Other  
54 Does the family pay for water? (Y/N) 1=Yes; 0=No 
55 
What type of toilet does the household use? 
Code 
1=Own flush toilet; 2=Shared toilet; 
3=Household pit; 4=Household bucket; 
5=Communal pit; 6=Closet over sea; 7=Other 
(specify) 
56 Do you have a separate cook house? (Y/N) 1=Yes; 0=No 
57 Does the house have a kitchen? (Y/N) 1=Yes; 0=No 
58 
What kind of fuel is usually used by the 
household for cooking? 
Code 
1=Wood (including copra); 2= Kerosene; 
3=Gas; 4=Electricity; 5=Other (specify) 
59 
What is the main material of the outside walls? 
Code 
1=Fiber cement/brick; 2=Timber; 3=Corrugated 
iron/sheet metal; 4=Traditional material; 
5=Other (specify) – write detail 
60 
What is the main material of the floor? 
Code 
1=Cement / tiles or carpet; 2=Finished timber; 
3=Traditional material; 4=Earth/mud; 5=Other 
(specify) 
61 
What is the main material of the roof? 
Code 
1=Corrugated iron/sheet metal; 2=Fibro 
cement/tiles; 3=Traditional materials; 4=Other 
(specify) 
  
Does the house have access to………..? 
Tick if YES 
  
62 Electricity? 1=Yes; 0=No 
63 Telephone? 1=Yes; 0=No 
64 Internet? 1=Yes; 0=No 
65 Mobile Phone? 1=Yes; 0=No 
66 Television? 1=Yes; 0=No 
67 Radio? 1=Yes; 0=No 
Current ACCOMODATION 
48 Permanent house? (Y/N) 1=Yes; 0=No 
49 How many bedrooms?  Number 
50 How many people?  Number 
51 
What is the main source of water that your 
household used? 
Code 
1=Piped to household; 2=Piped into 
neighbourhood; 3=Piped supply outside 
neighbourhood; 4=Well in yard; 5=Public well; 
6=Rainwater tank; 7=River/creek; 8=Other  
52 Does the household have a toilet? (Y/N) 1=Yes; 0=No 
53 
What is the main source of water that your 
household used? 
Code 
1=Piped to household; 2=Piped into 
neighborhood; 3=Piped supply outside 
neighborhood; 4=Well in yard; 5=Public well; 
6=Rainwater tank; 7=River/creek; 8=Other  
54 Does the family pay for water? (Y/N) 1=Yes; 0=No 
55 What type of toilet does the household use? Code 
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1=Own flush toilet; 2=Shared toilet; 
3=Household pit; 4=Household bucket; 
5=Communal pit; 6=Closet over sea; 7=Other 
(specify) 
56 Do you have a separate cook house? (Y/N) 1=Yes; 0=No 
57 Does the house have a kitchen? (Y/N) 1=Yes; 0=No 
58 
What kind of fuel is usually used by the 
household for cooking? 
Code 
1=Wood (including copra); 2= Kerosene; 
3=Gas; 4=Electricity; 5=Other (specify) 
59 
What is the main material of the outside walls? 
Code 
1=Fiber cement/brick; 2=Timber; 3=Corrugated 
iron/sheet metal; 4=Traditional material; 
5=Other (specify) – write detail 
60 
What is the main material of the floor? 
Code 
1=Cement / tiles or carpet; 2=Finished timber; 
3=Traditional material; 4=Earth/mud; 5=Other 
(specify) 
61 
What is the main material of the roof? 
Code 
1=Corrugated iron/sheet metal; 2=Fibro 
cement/tiles; 3=Traditional materials; 4=Other 
(specify) 
  
Does the house have access to………..? 
Tick if YES 
  
62 Electricity? 1=Yes; 0=No 
63 Telephone? 1=Yes; 0=No 
64 Internet? 1=Yes; 0=No 
65 Mobile Phone? 1=Yes; 0=No 
66 Television? 1=Yes; 0=No 
67 Radio? 1=Yes; 0=No 
68 
Why did you decide to leave your village? 
Code 
1=Not interested in rural livelihood; 2= to help 
family/parents with additional income; 3= to 
save money for agricultural investment; 
4=looking for urban livelihood; 5= to avoid 
dispute/trouble in the village; 6=to avoid early 
marriage; 7= to study, 8=Other, explain: Can 
be more than one response 
69 
Did you come here to make more money? 
(Y/N) 
1=Yes; 0=No 
70 
Did your parents agree with your decision to 
move? (Y/N) 
1=Yes; 0=No 
71 
Did something happen that made you move to 
Honiara? (Y/N), if Yes explain  
1=Yes; 0=No 
72 
If yes, what was the nature of the 
trigger/problem? 
Code 
1= opening up of opportunity; 2== personal 
problem; 3= individual financial difficulty; 
4=family financial difficulty; 5= family non-
financial problem; 6=others  
73 
How old were you at the time of your first 
migration? 
Number 
74 
What was the highest school grade you 
completed when you moved to Honiara? 
Number 
75 
Who did you originally know in Honiara? 
Code 1= relative; 2= friend; 3= acquaintance; 
4=spouse/fiancé 
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76 
What was the distance on foot from your 
house in the village to school? 
Number (KM) 
77 How did you get to school? Write 
78 
Did you leave school early due to financial 
reasons? 
1=Yes; 0=No 
79 Did you try a life of farming before you moved? 1=Yes; 0=No 
80 
If yes, what was your farming involvement? 
Code/Write 
1= worked on family farm; 2= worked on other 
farms. 
Years of experience?  
81 
Overall how satisfied were you with your life in 
the village before your first migration? 
Code 
1=very satisfied, 2=fairly satisfied, 3= neither 
satisfied nor dissatisfied, 4= dissatisfied, 
5=very dissatisfied, 6=don’t know/don’t 
remember/not willing 
  HONIARA – Moving to the City   
82 
Is this (Honiara) the first town/city you have 
moved to? (Y/N) 
1=Yes; 0=No 
83 Did you come alone to this town/city? (Y/N) 1=Yes; 0=No 
84 
If no, what was your relation with who you 
moved here with? 
Code 
1= relative; 2= friend; 3= acquaintance ; 
4=spouse/fiancé 
85 
What is the main reason for choosing this city? 
Code 
1=better livelihood/employment opportunity, 2= 
close to birth village, 3= Language and cultural 
similarity to own village, 4=have a 
relative/friend who live there, 5=better 
opportunity for education; 6= better quality of 
life; 7=others 
86 
Do you know anyone in this town/city before 
you came here? (Y/N) 
1=Yes; 0=No 
87 
Who was the most helpful person in assisting 
with your move?  
Write 
88 
How much did it cost you to arrive in this 
town/city? 
Number SBD 
89 
Who covered the cost of your move to the city? 
Code 1=Myself; 2= My parents; 3= My relatives; 4= 
Employer; 5=Other (Specify) 
90 
How much money of your own did you have 
when you moved here? 
Number SBD 
91 
Did you yourself borrow money for the 
migration? (Y/N) 
1=Yes; 0=No 
92 
If yes, who lend you the money? 
Code 1= relative; 2= friend; 3= acquaintance; 
4=spouse/fiancé; 5=Money lender 
93 
Is this city/town where you want to settle? 
(Y/N) 
1=Yes; 0=No 
94 
If no, where is your next destination? 
Code 1= Other town/city (NAME:…………………..); 
2= Abroad; 3=Back to village; 4= others 
95 
If no, how long do you intend to stay in this 
city/town? 
  
1= less than 1 year, 2= 1-2 years, 3= 3-5 
years, 4= more than 5 years, 6=don’t know 
96 
What is the reason for your choice of next 
destination? 
Code/Write 
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1=better livelihood/employment opportunity, 2= 
close to birth village, 3= Language and cultural 
similarity to own village, 4=have a 
relative/friend who live there, 5=better 
opportunity for education; 6= better quality of 
life; 7=others 
97 
How many cities/towns have you lived in 
before you arrived here? 
Number 
98 
How long have you lived in this city/town? (in 
months/years) 
Number 
99 
How many of the following connections do you 
have in this city (number)? 
Number 
100 
Close relative (parents, siblings, uncle/aunt, 
first cousins)? 
Number 
101 Distant relative?  Number 
102 Friend? Number 
103 Acquaintance?  Number 
104 
How many people do you have in your social 
network that you feel you can trust? 
Number 
105 
Why did you choose this particular 
person/people to live with? 
Code 
1= Low price; 2= proximity to work place; 3= 
free access (eg. live with family or relative); 4= 
easier to rent; 5=emotional attachment; 
6=others 
nice person, mothers sister. If more than one 
response rank by importance 
106 Do you share your room? (Y/N) 1=Yes; 0=No 
107 If Yes, with how many people? Number 
108 
What is your contribution financially or other to 
the house?  
Number SBD 
109 
Do you fear that you may be evicted (forced to 
leave) from this house/unit without your fault? 
(Y/N) 
1=Yes; 0=No 
110 
If you are out of work or have no income or 
savings, do you have a relative or friend who 
can provide food and shelter for at least one 
month? (Y/N) 
1=Yes; 0=No 
111 
For how many weeks at the maximum do you 
think you can rely on food provided by your 
friends or relatives if you have no income or 
savings? 
Number; Write 
112 
For how many weeks at the maximum do you 
think you can rely on shelter provided by your 
friends or relatives if you have no income? 
Number; Write 
113 
Have you ever borrowed money when you live 
in this city? (Y/N) 
1=Yes; 0=No 
114 
If yes, who lent you the money? 
Code 
1=friend; 2= relative; 3= neighbor/colleague; 
4=bank; 5=money lender; 6=credit association; 
7=others 
115 
Have you ever tried to borrow money and 
failed to get it? (Y/N) 
1=Yes; 0=No 
  If yes;   
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116 For what?  Write 
117 How much? Number SBD 
118 From which source/whom? Write 
119 
What are the most important challenges in 
your expected/planned occupation? 
Code 
1=job security/reliability; 2= health impact of 
job; 3=personal security on the job; 4=my 
occupation does not yield enough income ; 5= 
Getting the job, 6=others 
120 
Have you experienced any threat or violence in 
the last one month? (Y/N) 
1=Yes; 0=No 
121 
If yes, what was it (if more than one mention 
the most recent incident) 
Code 
1= verbal threat; 2=chased away; 3=beaten 
up, no physical sign; 4=beaten up, visible 
marks and bruises; 5=severely beaten up with 
physical damage eg. Fracture, teeth lose …; 
6= stabbed or shot; 7=others 
122 
If yes, who committed this threat or violence? 
Code 
1=A stranger; 2=competitor on the 
job/business; 3=friend/relative; 4=A 
neighborhood bully; 5= A person I know but; 
6= police; 7=other 
123 
What was the reason for the threat or 
violence? 
Code 
1=personal conflict or misunderstanding; 
2=work related conflict or misunderstanding; 
3= territorial issues; 4= I was involved in illegal 
activity; 5= I was working without permission/in 
prohibited area; 6= bullying ; 7= others 
124 
How common is such experience for your 
friends and other people you know 
Code 
1=Very common; 2= Somewhat common; 3= 
uncommon 
125 
Are there people around you that you cannot 
trust and that can threaten you? (Y/N) 
1=Yes; 0=No 
126 
What is the most important thing that you 
need to get a job? 
Code 
1=Formal Education; 2=Financial constraint; 
3=place for business; 4= skill/training; 5=Social 
Network; 6=permit/license; 7=age limit; 
8=others 
127 
What is the 2
nd
 most important thing to get a 
job? 
Code 
1=Formal Education; 2=Financial constraint; 
3=place for business; 4= skill/training; 5=Social 
Network; 6=permit/license; 7=age limit; 
8=others 
128 
Are you taking real actions to achieve your 
long term objectives/desired occupation – in 
addition to the youth at work program? (Y/N) 
What? 
1=Yes; 0=No; Write 
129 
Rank the city/town relative to your expectation 
at time of arrival 
Code 5=much better; 4=better; 3=as expected; 
2=worse; 1=much worse; 0=I had no 
expectation 
130 Ease of finding a place to live  Code 
  
241 
Question # Interview question Unit 
131 Ease of finding employment/livelihood Code 
132 Sense of security Code 
133 Integrating with locals Code 
134 Finding friends Code 
135 Cost of living Code 
136 
How satisfied are you with life in Honiara? 
Code 
1=very satisfied, 2=fairly satisfied, 3= neither 
satisfied nor dis-satisfied, 4= dissatisfied, 
5=very dissatisfied, 6=don’t know/don’t 
remember/not willing 
137 
List the three most important challenges you 
experienced during your first three months in 
this city? 
Code;Write 
Code: 1= place to stay; 2=work/job; 3=making 
friends; 4= language; 5=getting around 
places/confusion; 6= food/money for 
sustenance; 7=access to 
education8=substance abuse; 9=other 
(specify):  
Code;Write 
  Code;Write 
138 
List the three most important challenges you 
are experiencing now? 
Code;Write 
Code: 1= place to stay; 2=work/job; 3=making 
friends; 4= language; 5=getting around 
places/confusion; 6= food/money for 
sustenance; 7=access to education; 
8=substance abuse; 9=other (specify) 
Code;Write 
  Code;Write 
139 
Do you regret your decision to migrate from 
your village? (Y/N) 
1=Yes; 0=No 
140 
Are you able to go back there if you want to? 
(Y/N) 
1=Yes; 0=No 
141 
Are there things you would have done 
differently if you knew what you know now 
about life in this city? (Y/N) 
1=Yes; 0=No 
142 If yes, give one example Write 
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TITLE PAGE 
Single/Married Code: (0=Single; 1=Married) 
Highest Level of Education Number (FORM) 
AGE Number 
Gender Code: (0=Male; 1=Female) 
Brothers Number 
Sisters Number 
Province and Station YOUTH Write 
Zone in Honiara Write 
1 Do you earn money? (Y/N) 1=Yes; 0=No 
2 
How well do you speak and read English?  
Code 1=very good, 2= good, 3=fair, 4= poor, 5= very 
poor 
3 
Do you have your own children?  1=Yes; 0=No 
If yes, how many? Number 
4 
Are you currently responsible for someone 
younger than you? (Y/N) 
1=Yes; 0=No 
5 
How do you evaluate your current health 
condition? 
Code 
1=very good, 2= good, 3=fair, 4= poor, 5= very 
poor 
6 
How old were you when you first moved to 
Honiara? (If not from Honiara). 
Number 
7 
How much money did you earn (average per 
month) this year? 
Number SBD 
From what? Write 
8 Do you have savings? (Y/N) 1=Yes; 0=No 
9 How many times have you been employed? Number 
10 
If you could make money would you prefer to 
live in a rural area/village? 
1=Yes; 0=No 
11 
What job do you view as being able to make 
the highest salary?  
Write 
12 
Do you think the government helps the 
country? (Y/N) 
1=Yes; 0=No 
  Can you……………..? TICK if YES   
13 Build a simple house?  1=Yes; 0=No 
14 Make a garden that produces fruit/vegetable? 1=Yes; 0=No 
15 Catch Fish?  1=Yes; 0=No 
16 Produce Copra? 1=Yes; 0=No 
17 Fix a Car or Motorbike?  1=Yes; 0=No 
18 Can you create a piece of art you could sell?  1=Yes; 0=No 
19 Can you measure and cut timber? 1=Yes; 0=No 
20 
Can you pilot a canoe or boat over long 
distances eg. Auki to Honiara 
1=Yes; 0=No 
21 Weld or join metal? 1=Yes; 0=No 
22 Work with electronics? 1=Yes; 0=No 
23 
What types of jobs have you had before 
coming here?  
Write 
24 
What types of jobs have you had since you 
came here? 
Write 
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25 How did you normally get to school? Write 
26 How long did it take? ONE WAY Number 
27 
Did you leave school early due to financial 
reasons? (Y/N) 
1=Yes; 0=No 
28 
Has your families land been impacted by a 
company’s operations? E.g. logging or mining 
company. (Y/N) 
1=Yes; 0=No 
If YES – what or who? Write 
29 Who owns the land in your village?  Write 
30 
Have you been impacted by land ownership 
problem? 
Write 
Childhood House 
31 Permanent house? (Y/N) 1=Yes; 0=No 
32 How many bedrooms?  Number 
33 How many people?  Number 
34 
What is the main source of water that your 
household used? 
Code 
1=Piped to household; 2=Piped into 
neighborhood; 3=Piped supply outside 
neighborhood; 4=Well in yard; 5=Public well; 
6=Rainwater tank; 7=River/creek; 8=Other  
35 Does the household have a toilet? (Y/N) 1=Yes; 0=No 
36 
What is the main source of water that your 
household used? 
Code 
1=Piped to household; 2=Piped into 
neighborhood; 3=Piped supply outside 
neighborhood; 4=Well in yard; 5=Public well; 
6=Rainwater tank; 7=River/creek; 8=Other  
37 Does the family pay for water? (Y/N) 1=Yes; 0=No 
38 
What type of toilet does the household use? 
Code 
1=Own flush toilet; 2=Shared toilet; 
3=Household pit; 4=Household bucket; 
5=Communal pit; 6=Closet over sea; 7=Other 
(specify) 
39 Do you have a separate cook house? (Y/N) 1=Yes; 0=No 
40 Does the house have a kitchen? (Y/N) 1=Yes; 0=No 
41 
What kind of fuel is usually used by the 
household for cooking? 
Code 
1=Wood (including copra); 2= Kerosene; 
3=Gas; 4=Electricity; 5=Other (specify) 
42 
What is the main material of the outside walls? 
Code 
1=Fiber cement/brick; 2=Timber; 3=Corrugated 
iron/sheet metal; 4=Traditional material; 
5=Other (specify) – write detail 
43 
What is the main material of the floor? 
Code 
1=Cement / tiles or carpet; 2=Finished timber; 
3=Traditional material; 4=Earth/mud; 5=Other 
(specify) 
44 
What is the main material of the roof? 
Code 
1=Corrugated iron/sheet metal; 2=Fibro 
cement/tiles; 3=Traditional materials; 4=Other 
(specify) 
  
Does the house have access to………..? 
Tick if YES 
  
45 Electricity? 1=Yes; 0=No 
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46 Telephone? 1=Yes; 0=No 
47 Internet? 1=Yes; 0=No 
48 Mobile Phone? 1=Yes; 0=No 
49 Television? 1=Yes; 0=No 
50 Radio? 1=Yes; 0=No 
Current HOUSE 
31 Permanent house? (Y/N) 1=Yes; 0=No 
32 How many bedrooms?  Number 
33 How many people?  Number 
34 
What is the main source of water that your 
household used? 
Code 
1=Piped to household; 2=Piped into 
neighborhood; 3=Piped supply outside 
neighborhood; 4=Well in yard; 5=Public well; 
6=Rainwater tank; 7=River/creek; 8=Other  
35 Does the household have a toilet? (Y/N) 1=Yes; 0=No 
36 
What is the main source of water that your 
household used? 
Code 
1=Piped to household; 2=Piped into 
neighborhood; 3=Piped supply outside 
neighborhood; 4=Well in yard; 5=Public well; 
6=Rainwater tank; 7=River/creek; 8=Other  
37 Does the family pay for water? (Y/N) 1=Yes; 0=No 
38 
What type of toilet does the household use? 
Code 
1=Own flush toilet; 2=Shared toilet; 
3=Household pit; 4=Household bucket; 
5=Communal pit; 6=Closet over sea; 7=Other 
(specify) 
39 Do you have a separate cook house? (Y/N) 1=Yes; 0=No 
40 Does the house have a kitchen? (Y/N) 1=Yes; 0=No 
41 
What kind of fuel is usually used by the 
household for cooking? 
Code 
1=Wood (including copra); 2= Kerosene; 
3=Gas; 4=Electricity; 5=Other (specify) 
42 
What is the main material of the outside walls? 
Code 
1=Fiber cement/brick; 2=Timber; 3=Corrugated 
iron/sheet metal; 4=Traditional material; 
5=Other (specify) – write detail 
43 
What is the main material of the floor? 
Code 
1=Cement / tiles or carpet; 2=Finished timber; 
3=Traditional material; 4=Earth/mud; 5=Other 
(specify) 
44 
What is the main material of the roof? 
Code 
1=Corrugated iron/sheet metal; 2=Fibro 
cement/tiles; 3=Traditional materials; 4=Other 
(specify) 
  
Does the house have access to………..? 
Tick if YES 
  
45 Electricity? 1=Yes; 0=No 
46 Telephone? 1=Yes; 0=No 
47 Internet? 1=Yes; 0=No 
48 Mobile Phone? 1=Yes; 0=No 
49 Television? 1=Yes; 0=No 
50 Radio? 1=Yes; 0=No 
51 
How long have you lived in this city/town? (in 
months/years) 
Number 
52 
How many of the following connections do you 
have in this city (number)? 
Number 
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53 
Close relative (parents, siblings, uncle/aunt, 
first cousins)? 
Number 
54 Distant relative?  Number 
55 Friend? Number 
56 Acquaintance?  Number 
57 
How many people do you have in your social 
network that you feel you can trust? 
Number 
58 
Why did you choose this particular 
person/people to live with? 
Code 
1= Low price; 2= proximity to work place; 3= 
free access (eg. live with family or relative); 4= 
easier to rent; 5=emotional attachment; 
6=others 
nice person, mothers sister. If more than one 
response rank by importance 
59 Do you share your room? (Y/N) 1=Yes; 0=No 
60 If Yes, with how many people? Number 
61 
 What is your contribution financially or other to 
the house? 
Number SBD 
62 
Do you fear that you may be evicted (forced to 
leave) from this house/unit without your fault? 
(Y/N) 
1=Yes; 0=No 
63 
If you are out of work or have no income or 
savings, do you have a relative or friend who 
can provide food and shelter for at least one 
month? (Y/N) 
1=Yes; 0=No 
64 
For how many weeks at the maximum do you 
think you can rely on food provided by your 
friends or relatives if you have no income or 
savings? 
Number 
65 
For how many weeks at the maximum do you 
think you can rely on shelter provided by your 
friends or relatives if you have no income? 
Number 
66 
Have you ever borrowed money when you live 
in this city? (Y/N) 
1=Yes; 0=No 
67 
If yes, who lent you the money? 
Code 
1=friend; 2= relative; 3= neighbor/colleague; 
4=bank; 5=money lender; 6=credit association; 
7=others 
68 
Have you ever tried to borrow money and 
failed to get it? (Y/N) 
1=Yes; 0=No 
69 For what?  Write 
70 How much? Number SBD 
71 From which source/whom? Write 
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Question # Interview question Unit 
TITLE PAGE 
Single/Married Code: (0=Single; 1=Married) 
Highest Level of Education 
Number (FORM) If it is Grade put 
G 
AGE Number 
Gender Code: (0=Male; 1=Female) 
Brothers Number 
Sisters Number 
Province and Station YOUTH Write 
Zone in Honiara Write 
1 Do you earn money? (Y/N) 1=Yes; 0=No 
2 
How well do you speak and read English?  
Code 1=very good, 2= good, 3=fair, 4= poor, 5= very 
poor 
3 
Do you have your own children?  1=Yes; 0=No 
If yes, how many? Number 
4 
Are you currently responsible for someone 
younger than you? (Y/N) 
1=Yes; 0=No 
5 
How do you evaluate your current health 
condition? 
Code 
1=very good, 2= good, 3=fair, 4= poor, 5= very 
poor 
6 
How old were you when you first moved to 
Honiara? (If not from Honiara). 
Number 
7 
How much money did you earn (average per 
month) this year? 
Number SBD 
From what? Write 
8 Do you have savings? (Y/N) 1=Yes; 0=No 
9 How many times have you been employed? Number 
10 
If you could make money would you prefer to 
live in a rural area/village? 
1=Yes; 0=No 
11 
What job do you view as being able to make 
the highest salary?  
Write 
12 
Do you think the government helps the 
country? (Y/N) 
1=Yes; 0=No 
  Can you……………..? TICK if YES   
13 Build a simple house?  1=Yes; 0=No 
14 Make a garden that produces fruit/vegetable? 1=Yes; 0=No 
15 Catch Fish?  1=Yes; 0=No 
16 Produce Copra? 1=Yes; 0=No 
17 Fix a Car or Motorbike?  1=Yes; 0=No 
18 Can you create a piece of art you could sell?  1=Yes; 0=No 
19 Can you measure and cut timber? 1=Yes; 0=No 
20 
Can you pilot a canoe or boat over long 
distances eg. Auki to Honiara 
1=Yes; 0=No 
21 Weld or join metal? 1=Yes; 0=No 
22 Work with electronics? 1=Yes; 0=No 
23 
What types of jobs have you had before 
coming here?  
Write 
24 
What types of jobs have you had since you 
came here? 
Write 
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25 How did you normally get to school? Write 
26 How long did it take? ONE WAY Number 
27 
Did you leave school early due to financial 
reasons? (Y/N) 
1=Yes; 0=No 
  FATHER   
28 Is your father still alive? (Y/N) 1=Yes; 0=No 
29 
If not from Honiara, how old was he when you 
first moved (can give estimate)?  
Number 
30 
What was is his religion? 
Code 1=Anglican ; 2= Catholic ; 3=SSEC ; 4=SDA ; 
5=Other, (specify) : 
31 What is his current job? Write 
32 Highest level of schooling he has? Number 
33 Good role model? 1=Yes; 0=No 
  MOTHER   
34 Is your mother still alive?  1=Yes; 0=No 
35 
If not from Honiara, how old was she when you 
moved (can give estimate)? 
Number 
36 
What is her religion? 
Code 1=Anglican ; 2= Catholic ; 3=SSEC ; 4=SDA ; 
5=Other (specify) 
37 What is her current job? Write 
38 Highest level of schooling she has? Number 
39 Good role model? 1=Yes; 0=No 
  FAMILY - GENERAL   
40 Do your parents own their house? (Y/N) 1=Yes; 0=No 
41 Do your parents own land? (Y/N) 1=Yes; 0=No 
42 Is your garden private or shared?  1=Private; 2=Shared 
43 
Does the garden provide enough food all year? 
(Y/N) 
1=Yes; 0=No 
44 
How many of your brothers and sisters are 
living with your parents? 
Number (B/S) 
  LAND   
45 
Has your families land been impacted by a 
company’s operations? E.g. logging or mining 
company. (Y/N) 
1=Yes; 0=No 
If YES – what or who? Write 
46 Who owns the land in your village?  Write 
47 
Have you been impacted by land ownership 
problem? 
1=Yes; 0=No 
HOUSE (Childhood) - Where you lived the longest 
48 Permanent house? (Y/N) 1=Yes; 0=No 
49 How many bedrooms?  Number 
50 How many people?  Number 
51 
What is the main source of water that your 
household used? 
Code 
1=Piped to household; 2=Piped into 
neighborhood; 3=Piped supply outside 
neighborhood; 4=Well in yard; 5=Public well; 
6=Rainwater tank; 7=River/creek; 8=Other  
52 Does the household have a toilet? (Y/N) 1=Yes; 0=No 
53 
What is the main source of water that your 
household used? 
Code 
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1=Piped to household; 2=Piped into 
neighborhood; 3=Piped supply outside 
neighborhood; 4=Well in yard; 5=Public well; 
6=Rainwater tank; 7=River/creek; 8=Other  
54 Does the family pay for water? (Y/N) 1=Yes; 0=No 
55 
What type of toilet does the household use? 
Code 
1=Own flush toilet; 2=Shared toilet; 
3=Household pit; 4=Household bucket; 
5=Communal pit; 6=Closet over sea; 7=Other 
(specify) 
56 Do you have a separate cook house? (Y/N) 1=Yes; 0=No 
57 Does the house have a kitchen? (Y/N) 1=Yes; 0=No 
58 
What kind of fuel is usually used by the 
household for cooking? 
Code 
1=Wood (including copra); 2= Kerosene; 
3=Gas; 4=Electricity; 5=Other (specify) 
59 
What is the main material of the outside walls? 
Code 
1=Fiber cement/brick; 2=Timber; 3=Corrugated 
iron/sheet metal; 4=Traditional material; 
5=Other (specify) – write detail 
60 
What is the main material of the floor? 
Code 
1=Cement / tiles or carpet; 2=Finished timber; 
3=Traditional material; 4=Earth/mud; 5=Other 
(specify) 
61 
What is the main material of the roof? 
Code 
1=Corrugated iron/sheet metal; 2=Fibro 
cement/tiles; 3=Traditional materials; 4=Other 
(specify) 
  
Does the house have access to………..? 
Tick if YES 
  
62 Electricity? 1=Yes; 0=No 
63 Telephone? 1=Yes; 0=No 
64 Internet? 1=Yes; 0=No 
65 Mobile Phone? 1=Yes; 0=No 
66 Television? 1=Yes; 0=No 
67 Radio? 1=Yes; 0=No 
Current ACCOMODATION 
48 Permanent house? (Y/N) 1=Yes; 0=No 
49 How many bedrooms?  Number 
50 How many people?  Number 
51 
What is the main source of water that your 
household used? 
Code 
1=Piped to household; 2=Piped into 
neighborhood; 3=Piped supply outside 
neighborhood; 4=Well in yard; 5=Public well; 
6=Rainwater tank; 7=River/creek; 8=Other  
52 Does the household have a toilet? (Y/N) 1=Yes; 0=No 
53 
What is the main source of water that your 
household used? 
Code 
1=Piped to household; 2=Piped into 
neighborhood; 3=Piped supply outside 
neighborhood; 4=Well in yard; 5=Public well; 
6=Rainwater tank; 7=River/creek; 8=Other  
54 Does the family pay for water? (Y/N) 1=Yes; 0=No 
55 What type of toilet does the household use? Code 
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1=Own flush toilet; 2=Shared toilet; 
3=Household pit; 4=Household bucket; 
5=Communal pit; 6=Closet over sea; 7=Other 
(specify) 
56 Do you have a separate cook house? (Y/N) 1=Yes; 0=No 
57 Does the house have a kitchen? (Y/N) 1=Yes; 0=No 
58 
What kind of fuel is usually used by the 
household for cooking? 
Code 
1=Wood (including copra); 2= Kerosene; 
3=Gas; 4=Electricity; 5=Other (specify) 
59 
What is the main material of the outside walls? 
Code 
1=Fiber cement/brick; 2=Timber; 3=Corrugated 
iron/sheet metal; 4=Traditional material; 
5=Other (specify) – write detail 
60 
What is the main material of the floor? 
Code 
1=Cement / tiles or carpet; 2=Finished timber; 
3=Traditional material; 4=Earth/mud; 5=Other 
(specify) 
61 
What is the main material of the roof? 
Code 
1=Corrugated iron/sheet metal; 2=Fibro 
cement/tiles; 3=Traditional materials; 4=Other 
(specify) 
  
Does the house have access to………..? 
Tick if YES 
  
62 Electricity? 1=Yes; 0=No 
63 Telephone? 1=Yes; 0=No 
64 Internet? 1=Yes; 0=No 
65 Mobile Phone? 1=Yes; 0=No 
66 Television? 1=Yes; 0=No 
67 Radio? 1=Yes; 0=No 
68 
Why did you decide to leave your village? 
Code 
1=Not interested in rural livelihood; 2= to help 
family/parents with additional income; 3= to 
save money for agricultural investment; 
4=looking for urban livelihood; 5= to avoid 
dispute/trouble in the village; 6=to avoid early 
marriage; 7= to study, 8=Other, explain: Can 
be more than one response 
69 
Did you come here to make more money? 
(Y/N) 
1=Yes; 0=No 
70 
Did your parents agree with your decision to 
move? (Y/N) 
1=Yes; 0=No 
71 
Did something happen that made you move to 
Honiara? (Y/N), if Yes explain  
1=Yes; 0=No 
72 
If yes, what was the nature of the 
trigger/problem? 
Code 
1= opening up of opportunity; 2== personal 
problem; 3= individual financial difficulty; 
4=family financial difficulty; 5= family non-
financial problem; 6=others  
73 
How old were you at the time of your first 
migration? 
Number 
74 
What was the highest school grade you 
completed when you moved to Honiara? 
Number 
75 
Who did you originally know in Honiara? 
Code 1= relative; 2= friend; 3= acquaintance; 
4=spouse/fiancé 
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76 
What was the distance on foot from your 
house in the village to school? 
Number (KM) 
77 How did you get to school? Write 
78 
Did you leave school early due to financial 
reasons? 
1=Yes; 0=No 
79 Did you try a life of farming before you moved? 1=Yes; 0=No 
80 
If yes, what was your farming involvement? 
Code/Write 
1= worked on family farm; 2= worked on other 
farms. 
Years of experience?  
81 
Overall how satisfied were you with your life in 
the village before your first migration? 
Code 
1=very satisfied, 2=fairly satisfied, 3= neither 
satisfied nor dissatisfied, 4= dissatisfied, 
5=very dissatisfied, 6=don’t know/don’t 
remember/not willing 
  HONIARA – Moving to the City   
82 
Is this (Honiara) the first town/city you have 
moved to? (Y/N) 
1=Yes; 0=No 
83 Did you come alone to this town/city? (Y/N) 1=Yes; 0=No 
84 
If no, what was your relation with who you 
moved here with? 
Code 
1= relative; 2= friend; 3= acquaintance ; 
4=spouse/fiancé 
85 
What is the main reason for choosing this city? 
Code 
1=better livelihood/employment opportunity, 2= 
close to birth village, 3= Language and cultural 
similarity to own village, 4=have a 
relative/friend who live there, 5=better 
opportunity for education; 6= better quality of 
life; 7=others 
86 
Do you know anyone in this town/city before 
you came here? (Y/N) 
1=Yes; 0=No 
87 
Who was the most helpful person in assisting 
with your move?  
Write 
88 
How much did it cost you to arrive in this 
town/city? 
Number SBD 
89 
Who covered the cost of your move to the city? 
Code 1=Myself; 2= My parents; 3= My relatives; 4= 
Employer; 5=Other (Specify) 
90 
How much money of your own did you have 
when you moved here? 
Number SBD 
91 
Did you yourself borrow money for the 
migration? (Y/N) 
1=Yes; 0=No 
92 
If yes, who lend you the money? 
Code 1= relative; 2= friend; 3= acquaintance; 
4=spouse/fiancé; 5=Money lender 
93 
Is this city/town where you want to settle? 
(Y/N) 
1=Yes; 0=No 
94 
If no, where is your next destination? 
Code 1= Other town/city (NAME:…………………..); 
2= Abroad; 3=Back to village; 4= others 
95 
If no, how long do you intend to stay in this 
city/town? 
  
1= less than 1 year, 2= 1-2 years, 3= 3-5 
years, 4= more than 5 years, 6=don’t know 
96 
What is the reason for your choice of next 
destination? 
Code/Write 
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1=better livelihood/employment opportunity, 2= 
close to birth village, 3= Language and cultural 
similarity to own village, 4=have a 
relative/friend who live there, 5=better 
opportunity for education; 6= better quality of 
life; 7=others 
97 
How many cities/towns have you lived in 
before you arrived here? 
Number 
98 
How long have you lived in this city/town? (in 
months/years) 
Number 
99 
How many of the following connections do you 
have in this city (number)? 
Number 
100 
Close relative (parents, siblings, uncle/aunt, 
first cousins)? 
Number 
101 Distant relative?  Number 
102 Friend? Number 
103 Acquaintance?  Number 
104 
How many people do you have in your social 
network that you feel you can trust? 
Number 
105 
Why did you choose this particular 
person/people to live with? 
Code 
1= Low price; 2= proximity to work place; 3= 
free access (eg. live with family or relative); 4= 
easier to rent; 5=emotional attachment; 
6=others 
nice person, mothers sister. If more than one 
response rank by importance 
106 Do you share your room? (Y/N) 1=Yes; 0=No 
107 If Yes, with how many people? Number 
108 
What is your contribution financially or other to 
the house?  
Number SBD 
109 
Do you fear that you may be evicted (forced to 
leave) from this house/unit without your fault? 
(Y/N) 
1=Yes; 0=No 
110 
If you are out of work or have no income or 
savings, do you have a relative or friend who 
can provide food and shelter for at least one 
month? (Y/N) 
1=Yes; 0=No 
111 
For how many weeks at the maximum do you 
think you can rely on food provided by your 
friends or relatives if you have no income or 
savings? 
Number; Write 
112 
For how many weeks at the maximum do you 
think you can rely on shelter provided by your 
friends or relatives if you have no income? 
Number; Write 
113 
Have you ever borrowed money when you live 
in this city? (Y/N) 
1=Yes; 0=No 
114 
If yes, who lent you the money? 
Code 
1=friend; 2= relative; 3= neighbor/colleague; 
4=bank; 5=money lender; 6=credit association; 
7=others 
115 
Have you ever tried to borrow money and 
failed to get it? (Y/N) 
1=Yes; 0=No 
  If yes;   
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116 For what?  Write 
117 How much? Number SBD 
118 From which source/whom? Write 
119 
What are the most important challenges in 
your expected/planned occupation? 
Code 
1=job security/reliability; 2= health impact of 
job; 3=personal security on the job; 4=my 
occupation does not yield enough income ; 5= 
Getting the job, 6=others 
120 
Have you experienced any threat or violence in 
the last one month? (Y/N) 
1=Yes; 0=No 
121 
If yes, what was it (if more than one mention 
the most recent incident) 
Code 
1= verbal threat; 2=chased away; 3=beaten 
up, no physical sign; 4=beaten up, visible 
marks and bruises; 5=severely beaten up with 
physical damage eg. Fracture, teeth lose …; 
6= stabbed or shot; 7=others 
122 
If yes, who committed this threat or violence? 
Code 
1=A stranger; 2=competitor on the 
job/business; 3=friend/relative; 4=A 
neighborhood bully; 5= A person I know but; 
6= police; 7=other 
123 
What was the reason for the threat or 
violence? 
Code 
1=personal conflict or misunderstanding; 
2=work related conflict or misunderstanding; 
3= territorial issues; 4= I was involved in illegal 
activity; 5= I was working without permission/in 
prohibited area; 6= bullying ; 7= others 
124 
How common is such experience for your 
friends and other people you know 
Code 
1=Very common; 2= Somewhat common; 3= 
uncommon 
125 
Are there people around you that you cannot 
trust and that can threaten you? (Y/N) 
1=Yes; 0=No 
126 
What is the most important thing that you 
need to get a job? 
Code 
1=Formal Education; 2=Financial constraint; 
3=place for business; 4= skill/training; 5=Social 
Network; 6=permit/license; 7=age limit; 
8=others 
127 
What is the 2
nd
 most important thing to get a 
job? 
Code 
1=Formal Education; 2=Financial constraint; 
3=place for business; 4= skill/training; 5=Social 
Network; 6=permit/license; 7=age limit; 
8=others 
128 
Are you taking real actions to achieve your 
long term objectives/desired occupation – in 
addition to the youth at work program? (Y/N) 
What? 
1=Yes; 0=No; Write 
129 
Rank the city/town relative to your expectation 
at time of arrival 
Code 5=much better; 4=better; 3=as expected; 
2=worse; 1=much worse; 0=I had no 
expectation 
130 Ease of finding a place to live  Code 
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131 Ease of finding employment/livelihood Code 
132 Sense of security Code 
133 Integrating with locals Code 
134 Finding friends Code 
135 Cost of living Code 
136 
How satisfied are you with life in Honiara? 
Code 
1=very satisfied, 2=fairly satisfied, 3= neither 
satisfied nor dis-satisfied, 4= dissatisfied, 
5=very dissatisfied, 6=don’t know/don’t 
remember/not willing 
137 
List the three most important challenges you 
experienced during your first three months in 
this city? 
Code;Write 
Code: 1= place to stay; 2=work/job; 3=making 
friends; 4= language; 5=getting around 
places/confusion; 6= food/money for 
sustenance; 7=access to 
education8=substance abuse; 9=other 
(specify):  
Code;Write 
  Code;Write 
138 
List the three most important challenges you 
are experiencing now? 
Code;Write 
Code: 1= place to stay; 2=work/job; 3=making 
friends; 4= language; 5=getting around 
places/confusion; 6= food/money for 
sustenance; 7=access to education; 
8=substance abuse; 9=other (specify) 
Code;Write 
  Code;Write 
139 
Do you regret your decision to migrate from 
your village? (Y/N) 
1=Yes; 0=No 
140 
Are you able to go back there if you want to? 
(Y/N) 
1=Yes; 0=No 
141 
Are there things you would have done 
differently if you knew what you know now 
about life in this city? (Y/N) 
1=Yes; 0=No 
142 If yes, give one example Write 
 
  
 
